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ABSTRACT
Piaget first observed and described the problems which young
infants have in understanding the nature of objects forty years ago.
Both his description and his analysis of the development of the
object concept are still widely supported today. This thesis,
while accepting the Piagetian description of the behaviours
involved, suggests that Piaget's account of the underlying
cognitive processes is no longer tenable. Alternative theories of
object concept development which have been put forward in recent
years are also examined and rejected. An identity theory of
object concept development is proposed and a series of six
interlinked experiments presented in an attempt to provide support
for this theory. On the basis of these and the many other
experiments reported in the literature, it is suggested that an
identity theory alone can adequately cover the variety of
appropriate and inappropriate object-related behaviours seen in the
first two years of life.
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
Aim of this thesis
This thesis intends to examine the development of the
understanding of the nature of objects in the human infant. It is
generally agreed that development of a mature object concept spans
a period of approximately 18 months. According to Bower (l97l):
"discovery of the object concept must simplify the
world of the infant more than any subsequent advance".
The idea that a notion so basic to any understanding of the world
has in fact to be developed is perhaps initially hard to accept.
Nonetheless, there is ample evidence that this is the case.
It is perhaps necessary at the outset to define what is meant
by development of the object concept. Observation of the behaviours
shown by infants in response to objects and events involving objects
strongly suggests that they have great problems in understanding the
true nature of objects. According to the traditional analysis,
these problems arise from their failure to appreciate that objects
persist independently in space, time and form irrespective of whether
or not they themselves are perceiving or acting upon them. According
to this view, the infant does not seem to believe - as adults do -
that objects are:
"permanent, substantial, external to the self, and




For the young infant, objects and actions are inextricably linked
in his early understanding of reality and no differentiation is
made between the self and external reality.
While this thesis does not seek to deny that objects do in
fact present infants with enormous problems of understanding, it
suggests that both the traditional and other analyses of object
concept development cannot fully explain the range of inappropriate
behaviours found during this period of development. It is hoped
that the work to be reported in this thesis may help to clarify the
true source of the infant's difficulties. An alternative account
of the cause and nature of these problems (the identity theory of
object concept development) will be forwarded.
The problem of understanding the nature of objects
With new and ingenious research techniques constantly
increasing our knowledge of the previously unsuspected capacities of
infants, it may seem improbable that it takes nearly 18 months on
average for an infant to develop a fully-fledged concept of the
object. It is now accepted that infants only a few weeks old can
quickly learn to interpret and control various aspects of their
environment - both physical and social. Infants of only 12 hours
have been shown to move in precise synchrony with the segmentation
of adult speech (Condon & Sander, 197h). Infants will imitate
behaviours such as tongue protrusion and mouth opening in the second
week of life (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). A newborn baby can learn
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that, in order to get sucrose, he must turn his head to the right
on the sound of a buzzer but not when a tone sounds. This complex
learning task can even be successfully reversed by babies of only a
few hours old (Lipsitt, 1969). Why then does development of a
mature object concept seem to be such a laborious process for the
human infant? Although we all intuitively accept that there are
all sorts of things that a baby must learn, it is somewhat
surprising to find that a concept of an object is one of them.
Nevertheless,it is very easy to demonstrate the primitive
nature and inadequacies of the infant's early understanding of
objects. They very clearly do not think of objects in the way we
do. A h month old, for example, shows no surprise if an object
moves along a track, goes behind a screen and re-emerges on the same
path of movement completely transformed in all respects - size, shape
and colour (Bower, Broughton & Moore, 1971> Goldberg, 1976). He is
equally unsurprised if this transformation of the object takes place
before his very eyes (Bower, 197^a). To an adult, it is obvious
that a substitution has taken place or some sort of deception been
carried out5 in both cases, however, the infant will continue to
track the transformed object as if it were the same object.
Similarly, a moving object which suddenly disappears mysteriously
into thin air will not produce any evidence of surprise in £ month
old babies (Moore, Borton & Darby, 1978 - but see Chapter 5).
Even if we use an object as significant to the baby as his own
mother, we again fail to elicit any signs of surprise when we show
him a display which would be impossible in the real world of
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objects. A simple arrangement of mirrors has been used to
produce the simultaneous appearance of three mothers (Figure 1.1).
Contrary to adult prediction, this produces no surprise or
puzzlement in a baby under 5 months of age. He will, in fact,
interact happily with each of the 'mothers' in turn. At a later
age, as the baby's understanding of objects develops, the knowledge
that the same thing cannot be in three places at the same time will
lead to distress and confusion in this situation (Bower, 1971*
Shiomi, 1977 (pers. comm)).
Figure 1.1
The multiple mother
(l) Gouin-Decarie (1965) has, however, verified Piaget's hypothesis
that significant persons will achieve cognitive permanence for the
infant before inanimate objects. Other evidence that person
permanence may precede object permanence is presented by Bell (1970),
Brossard (197^) and Paradise & Curcio (197U). These experiments have,
however, recently ccme under fire (Jackson, Campos & Fischer, 1978).
It has been suggested that such results are experimental artefacts,
attributable to the experimenters' failure to equate factors such as
the demands of the two search tasks and the familiarity and attraction
of the person and object involved. Any differences found need not
therefore reflect any true differences in levels of understanding.
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It is indeed surprising to discover that, unlike adults,
infants do not perceive objects in any coherent fashion. An
infant has to learn the seemingly simple principle that if an
object is covered by a cup, it still exists while covered; he also
has to learn that, if that cup is moved, the object inside it will
share all of its movements. This latter is in fact one of the
final acquisitions of object knowledge; more basic notions must
first be acquired. Fortunately, as the research on early learning
has shown, the human infant seems to be particularly motivated to
learn for learning's sake (e.g Papousek, 1969). Even in a fairly
impoverished environment, a normal infant in his everyday
activities can hardly fail to come across the problems posed by his
limited understanding of objects. From this conflict between his
own rather restricted and egocentric conception of reality and the
reality evidenced by commonplace events, we might expect the
development of increasingly more comprehensive notions of the true
nature of objects to emerge.
The observations and theory of Piaget - the traditional analysis
of the problem
Developmental psychologists have been slow to appreciate the
subtlety, breadth and significance of the observations on the
development of the object concept made by Piaget nearly forty years
ago (Piaget, 1936, 1937, 19U6). Even today, he is still widely
misunderstood and misrepresented. He was probably the first to
recognise the importance of studying cognitive development in
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infancy; to most of Piaget's contemporaries, infancy was
irrelevant to later intellectual growth and infant research (what
little there was) directed itself to charting physical development
and the more obvious social behaviours, such as smiling. Piaget,
however, claimed that the symbolic processes necessary to later
cognitive development were in fact built on the acquisitions of
infancy. Only by studying infancy, the period of 'practical'
intelligence, could we truly understand the nature and development
of later intelligence. To Piaget, development of the object
concept is the prototype of cognitive development in general; it is
the foundation from which mathematical reasoning and logical thought
will develop. Until the infant attributes substantiality and
permanence to objects, he obviously cannot understand spatial and
causal relations between objects. Development of the object
concept is therefore central to the construction of reality
according to Piaget.
As early as 1936, Piaget observed that the infant's
understanding of objects and object interactions goes through a
regular, invariant sequence of development. Despite the many
criticisms of the inadequacy of his observational techniques and the
use of only his own three children as subjects, his descriptions of
the behaviours involved have survived the rigorous examination of
present-day researchers (e.g Uzgiris & Hunt, 1973).
As the volume of experimental research on the object concept
grows, however, it has become increasingly obvious that Piaget's
explanation for this sequence of behaviour is more susceptible to
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criticism than his descriptions. Piaget's epistemological
position is that all knowledge is, in infancy (and, indeed, later),
derived from action. A long practice period of pure action is
necessary before the symbolic function can appear and even then,
thought will be closely tied to its sensori-motor origins. Actions
are believed to be the starting point for all future operations of
intelligence:
"... operations must be carried out materially in
actions, in order to be capable afterwards of being
constructed in thought. That is why there is such
a long sensori-motor period before speech ...
During this first year, every later substructure is
precisely constructed: the notion of the object,
that of space, that of time, in the form of temporal
sequences, the notion of causality, in short, the
important notions later to be used by thought and
which are developed and used by material, action as
early as its sensori-motor level".
(Piaget, 1972)
In infancy, everything that is perceived is tied to the infant's
own activity; there is no real 'awareness' or 'idea' of objects
as external to the self for the infant during this period.
Objects are treated as if they were extensions of the self, there
being no true differentiated awareness of either. For Piaget,
development is seen as resulting from a continuous process of
(2)
extension and co-ordination of these schemas of actions into
(2) In Piagetian terminology, a 'schema' is an organised set of
actions. Although Piaget & Inhelder (1968) later attempted to
restrict use of this term to organisations of images, preferring to
use 'schemes' for organised actions, this distinction has not been
widely adopted. The traditional terminology will therefore be used
in this thesis.
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hierarchical structures. The infant strives to construct a
working conception of reality - a state of relative equilibrium
between the accommodatory and assimilatory functions, one which
differentiates the activity of the subject from the state of the
object. Exercise of these schemas is inherently satisfying,
resulting in a dynamic system which is never absolute nor closed.
The infant has what Flavell (1963) describes as 'a need to cognize'.
Cognitive development is therefore seen as a continual process
of organising and reorganising of structures. It is, however, a
continuous process with discontinuous results, according to Piaget.
Development, for Piaget, is stage-like with each stage incorporating
preceding stages and preparing the way for the next, more
comprehensive and stable stage.
Piaget's model of development has been criticised on the
simplest of grounds - that it neither significantly illuminates any
of the problems nor does the use of it result in any great saving.
It assumes more than it explains and cannot therefore meet the
criteria for a scientific model. Nor can his 'experiments' be
regarded and assessed as scientific experiments - they are designed
to illustrate a point of view rather than to increase our
understanding and knowledge of development. Small, probably
unrepresentative samples, scanty (if any) statistical data and
somewhat varied procedures make many of his 'experiments'
unacceptable in any strict scientific sense. It is not therefore
surprising that his model and experimentation have been met with
hostility in many scientific circles, a hostility only fostered by
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Piaget's apparent belief that he is_ being scientific.
By adopting the language of symbolic logic for his models
Piaget further encouraged resistance to its acceptance. The use
of symbolic logic to describe development does not make for an easy
model: logicians (e.g Parsons, I960) have suggested that Piaget's
own grasp of the complexities of such a system is not beyond
criticism. By adopting this more metaphysical than scientific
model, there is little need for confirming the model against
external reality since internal consistency is sufficient proof of
the validity of the model. Even to the relatively new science of
psychology, this cannot be sufficient (see e.g Bruner, 1959)• Far
too much is assumed in the construction of this extremely complex
model of thought; argument too often takes the place of experiment
and the model moves further and further from requiring empirical
verification. The model threatens to become more important than
the phenomena it is supposed to describe and explain.
Despite these and other more practical objections to Piaget's
theorising (which I shall discuss later in this chapter), it will be
useful to look both at Piaget's descriptions and at his analysis of
the development of the object concept. His observations of the
behaviours involved have, as stated, survived varied and thorough
(3)
scrutiny over the years and though possibly an incomplete description,
(3) There are some researchers who feel that Piaget has
underestimated the number of stages involved and confused certain sub-
stages as real and separate stages. They blame the inadequacies of
Piaget's theory on an incomplete sampling of the developmental sequence
(e.g Moore, 1975)- There are others who feel that the more elaborate
descriptions of such researchers are essentially reducable to Piaget's
main stages, other 'stages' being an artefact of the testing sequence
(Miller, Cohen & Hill, 1970).
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are still an extremely useful tool for investigating the cognitive
status of any infant. Piaget's stage tasks will be used
extensively throughout this thesis. The dispute is rather over
what determines the behaviours of each stage and what they reflect
of the infant's cognitive structure. Since opposing accounts of
this period of development will be both considered and proposed in
later chapters, it will therefore also be necessary to consider
Piaget's own interpretation of these behaviours.
Piaget's description and interpretation of the six stages
It would indeed seem that the inference that an object has an
independent existence beyond our immediate perception of it is by no
means an instantaneous acquisition. A belief in the permanence of
objects is undoubtedly fundamental to any understanding of objects
and events. According to Piaget, object concept development in the
sensori-motor period may be classified into six clear stages (e.g
Piaget, 1936, 1937, 1972). With success at each stage, it is
assumed that the infant has a more comprehensive and powerful concept
of the object than in the earlier stage. The six stages are most
easily identifiable by the infant's reaction to objects which disappear
from his visual field. As with so many other aspects of cognitive
development, it would seem that we can learn more of the structure of
the infant's thinking from his failures than from his successes.
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STAGE I The exercising of ready-made schemata (0 - 1 months)
This is a period of reflexive behaviours only. These
inherited adaptations are the only 'given' in Piaget's account of
the development of the understanding of objects. Reflexes such as
sucking or grasping constitute 'a sort of anticipatory knowledge of
the external environment' but all other advances are and must be
constructed from action upon objects according to Piaget.
During this stage, there is 'no special behaviour relating to
vanished objects'. If, for example, a ball is held in front of the
baby and then dropped, the baby will continue to stare at the place
where the ball was. (This place error is also carried over to seme
extent into the next three stages).
STAGE II Primary circular reactions (1 — JU-g- months)
While in this stage of development, the infant uses reflex-based
schemas, integrating the reflex schemas of Stage I into habits and
perceptions. Actions are repeated for their own sake. The infant,
(h) The age-span for each stage varies somewhat in differing
presentations of the theory. The ages given here are taken from
'The Child and Reality' (1972). Age of attaining each stage can in
fact vary quite widely so these age-spans can only be taken as
approximate. In our sample of babies, the later stages in
particular are generally attained well in advance of Piaget's
guidelines to age of success. Order of passing through the six
stages is, however, not subject to individual variation and is rigid.
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for example, can now suck his thumb at will. For Piaget, these
circular reactions represent the first acquired adaptations of the
infant to his surroundings. His universe is still highly
egocentric, however, and he has no notion of objects as being
external to his actions.
The infant will now follow the trajectory of an object which
disappears from his visual field. For Piaget, this represents
only accommodatory adjustments of the sense organs and not true
search. It does not in any way reflect any real idea of objects
and their continued existence when not perceived. The infant is
merely 'pursuing the trajectory delineated by the movements of
accommodation peculiar to the immediately preceding perception' and
cannot therefore be said to be knowingly pursuing the disappearing
object. The fact that an infant in this stage will continue to
track a moving object when it stops has been taken to lend weight to
the validity of this interpretation. (This error is known as the
'movement' error).
STAGE III Secondary circular reactions (Uir - 8/9 months)
Here the infant's interest begins to expand to relations between
objects. We see the beginnings - but only the beginnings - of means-
ends behaviours. He knows how 'to make interesting sights last' by
reproducing sequences discovered by chance. Here we also have the
earliest indication of a primitive understanding of the permanence of
objects. If the infant is holding an object and it is pulled gently
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away frcm him, he will follow the beginning of its trajectory with
his hand, even if he cannot see where the object has moved to.
Similarly, if an object goes behind a screen, the infant will now
look back to the point of disappearance or the starting point of
the object's movement. For Piaget, neither of these latter
behaviours imply any awareness of the continued existence of the
object as such when behind the screen. It is only the 'beginning
of permanence extending the movements of accommodation'. It is
very much a subjective permanence; the object still exists only in
connection with the action itself - it is believed to be at the
disposal of the act. The tracking behaviours which follow the
disappearance of the object from sight are seen as actions which the
baby believes will make the object reappear. The baby's
understanding of the event is completely determined and limited by
his own, personal action-history up to that time. There is no
invention of new procedures for rediscovering_vanished objects and
accommodatory extensions are soon given up if not quickly
successful.
While in this stage, the infant will succeed in recovering a
partially covered object. He will, however, most likely pull it
from under the doth rather than remove the cloth as he has no real
understanding that the object is under the cloth. He will be unable
to recover a toy when it is completely covered by a cloth in his
sight. If in the act of reaching for it as it is covered, he will
stop in mid-reach and may show signs of distress. He acts as if the
object no longer exists; it is 'lost' as far as he is concerned.
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Such behaviour has been interpreted by many researchers as evidence
that 'out of sight is out of mind' for infants of this age.
Other hiding games at this stage lend support to Piaget's
theory that the infant's understanding of objects is firmly rooted in
his previous actions upon them. If, for instance, we play peek-a-
boo with a Stage HI baby, he will remove a cover from his own face
to find the adult but does not remove the cover if it is over the
adult's face. It is looking that is freed rather than the absent
object. The infant's knowledge of an object is inextricably tied
to his possible actions upon it. There is no true understanding of
the continued existence of any object when covered.
With Stages IV and V comes a new level of understanding of
objects. With co-ordination of the secondary schemas, subject and
object begin to be differentiated. This increasing differentiation
is evidenced by the appearance of imitation and play in these stages
and we also see the appearance of the first invariants of object
knowledge - size and shape constancy.
STAGE IV The co-ordination of secondary schemas (8/9 - 12 months)
When the infant moves into Stage IV, we see a true separation of
means and ends. The same secondary schemas may be co-ordinated as
means or as ends according to the demands of the situation. We get
a shift of interest from mere 'extension of the movements of
accommodation' to the effects of that action. Behaviour becomes
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intentional. The infant becomes interested in objects as such
rather than as mere fodder for his actions. He will apply
familiar schemas to new situations.
Unlike the Stage III baby, he can now recover a toy when it
is completely hidden by a cloth. This success, according to
Piaget, is attributable to the co-ordination of the visual
permanence and the tactile permancence evidenced in Stage III.
Although a Stage III baby will try to grasp an object which has
fallen from his hands or will follow the former trajectory of an
object which has disappeared frcm his visual field, these earlier
indicators of a primitive form of permanence are not co-ordinated.
He will not try to grasp an object that disappears from his visual
field unless it has been in contact with his hands immediately
before it disappeared. With the combination of visual and tactual
search, dissociation between object and action is fostered.
The infant still, however, conceives of the object in terms of his
behaviour patterns. On successfully finding a toy which has been
hidden in a given place on two or more trials, the Stage IV baby will
continue to search in that place on the next trial, even if he sees
it hidden in another different place:
"Jacqueline is seated on a mattress without anything
to disturb or distract her. I take the parrot from
her hands and hide it twice in succession under the
mattress on her left, in A. Both times Jacqueline
looks for the object and grasps it. Then I take it
from her hands and move it very slowly before her eyes
to the corresponding place on her right, under the
mattress, in B. Jacqueline watches this movement
very attentively but at the moment when the parrot
disappears in B she turns to her left and looks where
it was before, in A".
(Piaget, 1937. Obs. 1|0)
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This AAB or place error is commonly tested for by use of the




The Stage IV — V transition task: the object is
hidden twice under cup A and then under cup B.
Even although successful in the one cloth task then, the
Stage IV baby still has an incomplete understanding of objects -
the place (or AAB) error clearly reveals the inadequacy of the
baby's conceptualisation of objects at this stage. An object is
only an object in a very limited sense; the object
"is not yet, at this stage, a substantial thing
remaining in the place to which it was moved but
a thing at disposal in the place where the action
made use of it ... the child looks for and conceives
of the object only in a special position, the first
place In which it was hidden and found".
(Piaget, 1937)
He is seeking at a place rather than seeking an object. He still
has a subjective view of the object, confusing the reality of the
object itself with his actions upon it. For Piaget, he does not
imagine the toy in its absence; the object is still a practical
rather than a substantial thing. Having found the object in a
certain location on several occasions, he will repeat this 'successful'
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strategy even when he sees it hidden in an entirely different
location.
Another commonly occurring behaviour demonstrates how
egocentric and action-based the infant's conception of objects
and space is at this stage. If an object is placed on a cloth
such that the object but not the cloth is out of reach, a nine
month old baby will typically pull in the cloth and retrieve the
object. If, however, we now place the object out of reach but to
the side of the cloth, the baby will still pull in the cloth -
fully expecting the previously successful action to be successful
again (Figure 1.3)•
Figure 1.3 Although successful in
obtaining the object in the top
situation, the use of a support
to get an object which is out of
reach is still 'magic' at this
stage. The baby seems unable
to understand the spatial
relationship necessary between
cloth and object if this strategy
is to work.
STAGE V Tertiary circular reactions (12 - 18 months)
In this stage, the infant can modify familiar schemas to new
situations. Behaviours are varied rather than merely repeated.
New means are discovered through active experimentation. We see
the infant beginning to perform 'experiments in order to see'. The
stereotyped behaviour of the earlier stages is replaced by systematic
variations in behaviour as the infant investigates his world and the
objects that populate it.
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According to Piaget, however, he is still unable to represent
objects in their absence. He can only relocate an object where
he has actually seen it disappear. He can only make allowances for
observed displacements and positions in which the object has actually
been seen. He no longer makes the AAB error of Stage IV but is
unable to cope with an invisible displacement of an object, failing
to realise that the object must have shared the movements of the
occluder (Figure l.U).
The Stage V — VI transition task — the Aronson-
McGonigle 'switching*'test.
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STAGE VI Invention of new means through mental combinations
(18 - 2k months)
In this, the final sensori-motor stage, the infant's action
schemas are organised into reversible schemas and the infant can
represent himself and objects in a common space. Experience can
therefore be 'interiorised' and possible courses of action mentally
enacted prior to carrying them out. Invisible displacements no
longer cause problems. Systematic intelligence replaces
empirical intelligence in Piaget's terms.
By this stage, the infant's understanding of objects has come
a long, long way. It is much closer to the adult concept and must
represent a considerable cognitive achievement. From a fragmented,
episodic and overpopulated world of objects, the infant has moved
into an orderly stable world of objects where everyday appearances
and disappearances of objects are no longer totally mysterious and
unpredictable - his world is no longer centred about his own
activity. Objects are now substantial, permanent and constant in
form; they can interact both with the infant and each other without
altering their intrinsic nature.
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Table 1.1 summarises the characteristic failures and
successes of the six stages.
TABLE 1.1 Piaget's six stages of object concept development
ACHIEVEMENT FAILURE
No special behaviour in relation to objects
which have left the visual field
STAGE AGE IN MONTHS
I 0-1
II 1 - 1||
III - 8/9
IV 8/9 - 12
V 12-18
VI 18 - 2k
Will follow trajectory
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These then are Piaget's six stages. His original
observations, although undoubtedly thorough, were obviously not
strictly controlled; the occurrence and sequential!ty of all the
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stages have., however, been confirmed longitudinally, cross-
sectionally and cross-culturally in systematic experimental
studies using large numbers of subjects (Gouin-Decarie, 1965,
Casati & Lezine, 1968, Boyle, 1969, Corman & Escalona, 1969,
Piaget, 1972, Dasen, 1973j Kramer, Hill & Cohen, 1975* Uzgiris &
Hunt, 1975)- Woodward (l959) and Wohlheuter & Sindberg (1975)
have found that the same sequence of development also occurs in
severely retarded children although, not surprisingly, over a
(5) ^
longer period. GouAn-Decarie (1969) and Kopp & Shaperman (1973)
have found that infants with a severe degree of physical handicap
also evidence the same six stage pattern of development. Comparative
studies with monkeys and kittens show that the sequence is not
peculiar to the human infant, although the highest stages are less
readily demonstrable in non-humans (Gruber, Girgus & Banuazizi, 1971>
Vaughter, Smotherman & Ordy, 1972, Wise, Wise & Zimmerman, 197^)•
Accounting for the six stages: preliminary reservations on Piaget's
interpretation
There is then little argument that infants everywhere and of
every level of intelligence must pass both through the six stages and
(5) Recent work by Morss (1979) suggests that object concept
development in mentally retarded infants is not just simply 'slower'.
His longitudinal studies with Down's Syndrome infants show that
important qualitative differences underlie the poorer performance of
such infants, a finding which raises enormous difficulties for any
simple assessment programme.
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in the order I - VI; there is, however, considerable disagreement
and speculation as to what the problem actually is for the infant at
each stage, what produces the characteristic errors of each stage
and what exactly these stages represent.
Piaget has put forward his account of the development of the
object concept in many lengthy books and articles. Unfortunately,
as Piaget himself acknowledges, his theorising is very complex,
occasionally vague and often rather obscure (see e.g Lorenz, I960).
Much of it presupposes a fairly knowledgeable acquaintance with the
facts and principles of biology, psychology, philosophy and logic.
Such an interdisciplinary approach is not often found in present day
psychological researchers and must account for much of the
misunderstanding and misapplication of Piaget's theory. It must be
borne in mind that Piaget is primarily an experimental philosopher
rather than a psychologist. He studies the mental evolution of the
child in order to answer epistemological questions and his interest
in the developing child was always more theoretical than practical.
Although much educational research is done in the name of Piaget, he
himself has rarely commented on the practical implications of his
observations. He is much more interested in constructing a logical
model of thought which will have psychological validity.
It is also important to remember that Piaget's writings extend
to some UOO books and articles and cover a period of some 50 years.
It is hardly surprising then that there are occasional inconsistencies
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from book to book as emphases and terminology change. Some
present Piaget's theory as if it were cut and dried. On the
contrary, it is still evolving; as Elkind (1968) points out in
his editorial foreword to Piaget's 'Six Psychological Studies',
the date of Piaget's theorising is always a relevant variable and
any evaluation can never be absolute. Too many researchers base
their theoretical objections to Piaget's account of development on
his early trilogy only (1936, 1937> 19^6) and ignore his vast
output since then.
While bearing the above points in mind, there are still
however several points, relevant and important to this thesis, on
which it seems that Piaget's theorising on development in the
sensori-motor period is susceptible to criticism. These shall be
touched on below and considered more fully in the appropriate
sections of later chapters.
For Piaget, development of the object concept is the most
important advance of infancy and can be described and understood in
terms of the acquisition and co-ordination of behaviours into
progressively more mobile and complex action schemas. The
(6) In 19h0, for example, Piaget referred to the thought of
children under seven as being 'prelogical'. Many took this to mean
that children of this age were not logical. Piaget, on the
contrary, meant only that a child of seven is not in possession of
a complete logical system of thought. This term was later
corrected to 'preoperational'. It is easy to see how minor
terminological difficulties can lead to major misinterpretations of
Piaget's theory.
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increasing flexibility of the schemas allows the invariant
attributes of objects to be recognised and objects to be placed
in an external world. The practical and subjective notions of
the object of the early stages are gradually replaced by an
understanding of objects as being both substantial in space and
time and independent of the infant's own activity. By Stage VI,
the infant's conceptualisation is finally freed from immediate
perception and action alike by the advent of representation. The
'physical groping' for solutions to new problems can be replaced
by 'internalised groping', or what is more often called hypothesis
testing. Reality can now be manipulated, albeit initially in a
rather limited way, without recourse to overt action sequences.
"The child henceforth imagines the whole of the
object's itinery, including the series of invisible
displacements. Thus it can be said that the object
is definitely constituted; its permanence no longer
depends at all on the action itself but obeys a
totality of spatial and kinematic laws which are
independent of the self".
(Piaget, 1937)
This new ability to evoke objects and events in their absence is not
only of significance to the development of the concept of the
object. According to 'Piaget, emergence of the symbolic function,
and in particular the ability to imitate in the absence of a model,
makes possible the subsequent appearance of symbolic play (i.e games
of pretend), drawing, mental imagery and, most important of all,
language.
It seems to me that a theory of development in infancy which is
so totally dependent on the restructuring of knowledge through
schemas of actions is neglecting and underestimating the cognitive
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aspect of many of the advances of this period. For Piaget, there
can be no mental representation of objects until approximately 18
months, Stage VI. Object knowledge, until then, is entirely a
function of immediate perceptions and actions. On Piaget's
theory, the whole of infancy is characterised by doing rather than
thinking. I find this hard to accept.
The theory also seems severely to underestimate the initial
abilities the baby brings to the situation. Flavell, one of the
best known interpreters of Piaget, has even gone as far as
describing the neonatal infant as "essentially a vegetable with
reflexes" (Flavell, 1963). As mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter, however, neonates have been shown to be capable of both
imitation and intentional behaviour. On Piaget's analysis of the
process of development, neither should or can appear until
approximately 8 months of age. Similarly, Bower (l97Ua) has shown
that many of the problems of space perception and intersensory
co-ordination are also solved much earlier than Piaget's action-
based theory would allow. The implications of these findings will
be discussed more fully in Chapter 3-
According to Piaget's analysis, the infant cannot
differentiate between his actions on an object and the object itself
until his repertoire of behaviours in relation to that object becomes
sufficiently large and flexible for object invariances to be
recognised. Consequently, until then, there is neither understanding
of objects as existing independently of his activity upon them nor of
himself as one object amongst others in a spatially organised
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universe. Development is there!"ore seen as a progressive and
roughly synchronous differentiation of self and object.
"Intelligence thus begins neither with knowledge
of the self nor of things as such but with
knowledge of their interaction, and it is by
orienting itself simultaneously towards the two
poles of that interaction that intelligence
organises the world by organising itself".
(Piaget, 1937)
This thesis, on the contrary, will work towards establishing
that the infant's main problem in understanding the nature of
objects lies, not in discovering their independent existence and
thereby discovering the self, but rather in understanding the
spatio-temporal relationships which underlie the identity of any
object. The identity theory of object concept development will be
elaborated in following chapters and attempts made to justify it.
Essentially, I believe a basic understanding of objects to be
present very early in the sensori-motor period, as is a basic
notion of the self. The problem is assumed to be one of
elaborating these rather primitive and limited notions so that they
will be able to cope with the spatio-temporal transformations which
occur when any object (and here we must include the self)
participates in an event sequence.
It will be suggested that the infant works out a progressively
comprehensive set of rules for maintaining and recognising the
identity of an object over time. These rules will direct the
infant's attempts to relocate any object and, in their earlier forms,
are responsible for tie erroneous behaviour seen in the standard
object permanence tasks. Eventually, these rules will be
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sufficiently elaborated to allow an object to interact in common
space with any other object in virtually any event sequence without
risk to its unique identity; 'object permanence' type errors will
then disappear.
It will also be suggested that, during -this final stage in the
comprehension of object-object relations, the infant turns to the
problem of locating himself objectively in the physical world. To
say this does not imply that the infant does not have any
differentiated awareness of the self in earlier stages of development,
as Piaget believes. Recent studies of imitation, defensive
responses to approaching objects and other visual motor
co-ordinations clearly imply that this cannot be the case (Meltzoff &
Moore, 1977* Bower, Broughton & Moore, 1970a, Bower, 197Ua). It is
suggested, rather, that with an increasing understanding of the
spatial interrelations which are possible in the world of objects,
the infant will move on from these object-object relations to
elaborating his understanding of the ever-changing spatial relations
which exist between himself and other objects. The self is, after
all, only one other object in the physical world and holds no special
spatial privileges. This development of self-object understanding
seems to coincide with the period of greatest advances in mobility, a
time at which such understanding will become essential if the infant
is to interact successfully with the objects in his environment.
The importance of mobility to the construction of a truly objective
reality may well have been underestimated in previous investigations.
Not only does it allow elaboration of subject-object spatial
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understanding but it provides another source of confirmation of
object-object hypotheses.
A more fundamental question
Both the identity theory and other theories which have been
offered as alternatives to Piaget's analysis of object concept
development will be considered in more detail in later chapters.
Perhaps the more basic theoretical question to be addressed first,
however, is whether in fact there is one, underlying concept
involved in the characteristic sequence of errors displayed during
infancy. With most of the alternative theories forwarded, it is
assumed that the various behaviours involved do reflect and are
directed by a single, developing object concept. This assumption,
mild though it may seem, is not necessarily true. Certainly such
an assumption should be treated with caution in the absence of any
substantial body of confirmatory evidence. After all, the stimulus
conditions and responses used to reveal the errors typical of the
various 'stages' of development vary enormously frcm stage to stage.
Even within investigations of any single stage, the task used may
seem more a function of the particular theoretical bias of the
researcher than a direct descendant of the original Piagetian test.
Is it reasonable, then, to assume that the behaviours elicited in so
many different ways are in some basic way related? Labelling the
behaviours in terms of stages of a developing object concept may be
convenient but is it justifiable?
- 29 -
The next chapter will consider this fundamental problem and
present some evidence which may help towards its resolution.
(
- 30 -
CHAPTER TWO - A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION : IS THERE A DEVELOPING
OBJECT CONCEPT?
Are the behaviours of the six stages linked to a single, underlying
concept?
Is there a single concept underlying the behaviours described
by Piaget? For Piaget himself, there can be no doubt. The
construction of a concept of the object which is not tied to the
actions of the subject is the major attainment of the sensori-motor
period. According to Piaget, this concept of an object is
achieved via the stage-like development of an increasingly complex
and mobile repertoire of behaviours for the infant to apply in
interactions with objects. On achieving Stage VI, the baby is
finally freed from "a world of inconsistent pictures gravitating
around his own activity"; he moves into a more objective universe
where reality and his personal conception of the basic facts of that
reality will coincide.
"As the activity of the baby develops and the causal,
temporal and spatial sequences which this activity
creates becomes more complex, objects are detached
more and more, and the body of the subject becomes
one element among others in an ordered ensemble".
(Fiaget, 19^6)
Surprisingly, even though many researchers reject Piaget's
analysis of object concept development as inadequate, few bother to
question his basic assumption that the various age-linked behaviours
which can be so reliably demonstrated do, in fact, have a common
origin in a developing concept of the object. The behaviours which
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are taken as indicators of achievement of new levels of
understanding of this single concept vary enormously from stage to
stage, from no reaction to falling objects in Stage I to
successful reaching for and recovery of an object which has
undergone an exceedingly complex series of invisible displacements
in Stage VI. Many researchers have extended the tasks used to
investigate each stage but few have, in general, paused to question
whether it is valid to assume that the various levels of
'understanding' indexed at the different 'stages' by such diverse
measures as heartrate, sucking, reaching in the dark etc. are in
fact tied to a single, developing concept. Such an assumption may
be parsimonious and have commonsense merit but should not be
accepted on face value alone.
The acceleration paradigm
The problem of establishing a connection (at any level) between
an early behaviour and a later behaviour is one for which psychology,
in particular, has few available resources. In wishing to assert
the development of an object concept we have additional problems.
These are the apparent repetitions, at a formal level at least, of
the same errors at different stages in the sensori-motor period.
Bower & Paterson (1973) have demonstrated, for instance, that an
infant in Stage II will look for a 'missing' object (with his eyes)
in the place where he last saw it. If, for example, an object moves
regularly between two places,A and B (A<-»B), and then changes
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direction, moving off to a new location, C (C ■<—A <-->B), the Stage
II infant typically looks for the object at B, its usual position
on leaving A. An infant in Stage IV - V, in committing an AAB
error, is also searching for an object in the place where he last
saw it, this time with his hands. If we claim to be looking at a
unitary, developing concept, why should such errors occur again at
a later point of development? Bower, Broughton & Moore (1971) have
similarly shown that a 3 month old infant will anticipate the
reappearance of a moving object from behind a screen; why then does
an 8 month old act as if the object has ceased to exist when it is
covered by a cloth? Why is the knowledge which seems to be available
to the eye apparently not available to the hand if" the behaviours
are supposedly directed by the same underlying object concept? Such
repetitions may seem to weaken the case for a single, developing
concept. I would like to argue later, however, that this seeming
repetition is, in some cases at least, artefactual and arises from an
incomplete analysis of the early tracking behaviour. If, for example,
analysis in the screen situation is extended to cover the behaviour
after the apparently successful anticipation, the infant himself will
demonstrate how limited his understanding of the situation really is
(see Chapter 3)•
Leaving these formal repetitions aside for the moment then, how
are we to establish if early object concept behaviour is truly related
to later object concept behaviour? As Bower (l97^b) has cogently
pointed out, acceleration studies are, in fact, about the only
investigatory method we have at our disposal. If we attempt to
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accelerate a behaviour and that programme of acceleration (in the
absence of any further intervention which might be presumed to be
facilitatory) results in the accelerated appearance of a later
behaviour,, we can have some reason to believe that the two
behaviours are causally related (see e.g Zelazo, Zelazo & Kolb, 1972,
Bower, 1979)• The experiment below was designed to elucidate the
relationship (if any) between early object tracking behaviours and




Following the analysis of Bower (1971), Bower, Broughton & Moore
(l97l) and Bower & Paterson (1973), a tracking task was chosen which
it was assumed would facilitate co-ordination of the two earliest
responses to moving objects - continuing to track a moving object
which stops (known as the movement error) and looking for a moving
object in the place it is usually to be seen (the place error). In
cross-sectional samples, these errors normally disappear completely
(7) This study has already been published (Bower, T.G.R &
Paterson, J.G - see Appendix D).
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at around 23 weeks of age. According to the Bower analysis,
these complementary errors reflect the infant's early, primitive
conceptualisation of objects. In these early weeks, the infant
does not appear to realise that a moving object which stops is the
same object and vice-versa. This is a viewpoint which will be
discussed in considerable detail later in this thesis (see Chapter
U) but need not detain us here. The object search tasks used were




Sixty-six infants served as subjects. They were divided
into an experimental and a control group, matched for birth order,
sex and parental occupation.
(8) Subjects were chosen from our pool of babies. These babies
are volunteered by their mothers in response either to a leaflet from
their health visitor, the National Childbirth Trust or the maternity
hospital or to an advertisement in the 'Scotsman'. Being self-
selected, they tend to be from the more middle-class, better educated
sections of the community. This is a bias which we can




The object to be tracked was a 10 cm diameter bullseye,
painted in fluorescent pink, white and orange. It was mounted at
the end of an arm 30 cm in length, driven by a sweep generator at
.2h cycles per second, through an arc of 180° (Figure 2.1)
Fig. 2.1
Tracking task used in Experiment 1.
The infant sat on his mother's lap, at a distance of one metre from
the display. Object position was monitored by a T.V. camera
mounted behind the infant. Head and eye movements were monitored
by a T.V. camera mounted behind the display and out of sight of the
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infant. The output of the two cameras was combined and fed into
a VTR, thus providing a simultaneous record of object position and
head and eye position for subsequent frame-by-frame analysis.
The object was set in motion before the infant was brought in.
The presentation 'began' when the infant first looked at the display.
Twenty movement cycles were presented. The last cycle and a random
three others incorporated a stop in which the object stopped moving
for a period of ten seconds. These stops were always made in the
o
central 90 of the arc.
Frequency of tracking was scored for all trials. Behaviour on
the stop trials was scored on the following features:
1. Did the infant stop and fixate the stopped
object?
2. If yes to 1, for how long?
3. If yes to 1, did the infant after the time
given in 2,
(a) continue to track the trajectory of the
object, or
(b) look back to starting point, or
(c) look away?
h. If no to 1, did the infant continue to track
the trajectory of the object?
5. If no to both 1 and h, did the infant
(a) return to starting point of movement, or
(b) look away?
Records were scored by two observers.
The experimental group was given weekly exposure to the tracking
task from 12 weeks to 16 weeks. The control group was given an
- 37 -
equivalent number of laboratory visits that did not involve
tracking and then tested on tracking at 16 weeks.
After this test no further tracking experiments were carried
out with either group. All of the infants, however, were brought
in ten times to participate in experiments on reaching before the
object permanence testing was begun and repeated weekly. At this
point, 12 mothers felt unable to commit themselves to the extended
period of laboratory visits necessary for completion of the study.
The number of infants who were tested on manual object search tasks
was therefore reduced to
Object search tasks
Object permanence testing for the remaining infants began at
36 weeks. It was originally intended to continue this testing
until all of the infants had reached Stage VI. Unfortunately,
financial considerations forced us to stop at approximately 13> months.
As will be seen, all but U of the e:xq>erimental group had attained
Stage VI by this time although only 6 of the control group had done
so.
In the object permanence testing situation, the infant sat on
his mother's knee at a table which had a semi-circular cut-out on the
infant's side in order to facilitate reaching. Object permanence
testing was always begun with a simple Stage IV test in which the
object was covered by a cloth in view of the infant. If necessary,
the infant would be restrained by his mother from attempting to take
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the object before the hiding sequence was completed. No other
time restraint on onset of search was applied. If the infant
succeeded in obtaining thehidden object, the Stage IV - V
transition test was given. Two cloths were placed on the table,
one to the right of the infant and one to the left, at equal
distances from him; the object was then hidden under one of them,
A. After the infant had successfully retrieved the object, it was
recovered from him and hidden under the same cloth, A. After
retrieval and recovery a second time, the object was then hidden
under the second cloth, B. After this, new cloths and a new toy
were introduced, and the AAB procedure repeated. After each AAB
sequence, different cloths and toys were introduced. Any toy which
failed to produce any signs of interest in the infant was discarded
and a new choice made. Six AAB sequences were run thro/ugh, three
in the order LLR, three in the order KRL. The side chosen as the A
side was varied randomly from trial block to trial block.
Stage V - VI testing was begun when the criterion of six
errorless B trials in the AAB test situation was reached. On each
week thereafter, the infant was given one AAB trial before the
testing proper began. The testing procedure was as follows. Two
cloths were again placed on the table, one to either side of the
infant and at an equal distance from him. With the baby watching,
an object was placed under one cloth. The positions of the two
cloths were then transposed. Six trials were given, with starting
position (left or right) being varied randomly from trial to trial
(with the restriction that there be three instances of each).
Testing was terminated after two sessions without errors .
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RESULTS
As can be seen from Table 2.1, the experimental group showed
accelerated performance in all three parts of the study. Their-
advantage over the control group in the tracking study was
maintained in the Stage IV - V testing and was even increased in
the Stage V - VI testing.
TABLE 2.1 Development of stages of the object concept in
experimental and control groups of infants
Accelerated Control
Probability of errors in
tracking at 16 weeks
Number reaching Stage V
Mean age of attainment (in weeks)
of Stage V
Number reaching Stage VI












On closer examination, the data from this study provided an
unexpected confirmation of Piaget's belief that development in this
period is discontinuous and stage-like. Table 2.1 presents the
results as a hybrid of measures, probability of errors at a
particular age in the tracking study and age of attainment of zero
- ho -
errors in the object permanence study. It was originally
intended to treat the results in terms of errors at a particular
age only; examination of the raw data showed however that such a
summary would be misleading. Such a comparison necessarily assumes
that performance will improve continuously with age and that errors
will decrease steadily until performance in perfect. The pattern
of errors found in this study did not fit with such an assumption.
Figure 2.2 shows a typical infant's performance in the weeks up to
and including the last error in the Stage V - VI transition test.
Contrary to expectations, there is no continuous decline in errors.
Figure 2.2
5 4 3
Visit no. prior to success in
stage 5—6 transition test
Table 2.2 shows the distribution of errors for all infants on
the last day on which they made an error in the Stage IV - V
transition test; it also gives the expected distribution on the
assumption of random responding.
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TABLE 2.2 Expected and obtained distributions on last error
trial of Stage IV - V transition test







chi-square = 2.09, .90 > P> .75
Table 2.3 shows the expected and observed distribution of errors
on the last error trial of the Stage V - VI transition test for those
infants who reached Stage VI. In neither case is the difference
significant.
TABLE 2.3 Expected and obtained distributions of errors on the






















chi-square *=6.9, • 25 p .10
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DISCUSSION
The above results lend support to the hypothesis that a
developing object concept does in fact underlie four of the
behaviours frequently assumed to index different levels of the
object concept. They demonstrate that facilitatory intervention
at one point in the process will accelerate development of later,
higher levels of understanding. The pattern of errors found prior
to success in the various tasks also lends support to Piaget's
contention that development is stage-like and discontinuous. This
study also highlights the need for caution in interpreting data in
simple terms of reduction of errors over time. Lumping data
together may result in a completely false picture of a continuous
decrease in errors, masking a true step-like progression which only
finer analysis will reveal.
Are the six stages truly related?
Experiment 1 seems to indicate the presence of a genuine
relationship between the tracking behaviours of Stages II - III and
the hiding tasks of Stages IV - V and V - VI. What other evidence
is there to support the contention that Stages I - VI represent six
stages of a developing concept of the object? Unfortunately, very
little. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the
relationship between the stages is all too often taken for granted.
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Bower (l97^a) would appear to have found evidence of a single
process underlying Stages II and III. In his cross-sectional
study, the two errors typical of Stage II, continuing to follow a
moving object which stops and looking for a stationary object
which has moved in its usual place, showed a remarkably similar
pattern of decline, a similarity suggestive of a common underlying
developmental process (Figure 2.3)
Fig 2.3 The decline in place and movement
errors
Age (in weeks)
0 = Probability of continuation when object has stopped moving
O = Probability of searching for a stationary object that has moved
in the place where it has been
There is little other evidence in the literature of studies
designed to elucidate the relation between Piaget's six stages.
Gouin-Decarie (pers. comm) has found that training in
intersensory co-ordination will promote accelerated development of
the later Stages of the object concept. White has made similar
claims (White, 1969). Both of these studies will be considered in
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a later section (see pp 61; - 68). Experiment 5> of this thesis
will attempt to show that training at Stage II has facilitatory
effects on all later stages of object concept development.
Experiment 6 will hope to show that, in addition to facilitating
the articulation of a fully—fledged object concept, such training
also facilitates the overcoming of the infant's egocentric notions
of space.
Is development stage-like?
Although not overwhelming, the evidence does seem to point to
the behaviours of the six stages being truly related. What evidence
do we have then that Piaget's other contention - that development is
stage-like - is tenable? This aspect of Piaget's theorising is far
less rapidly accepted than the first. Our natural intuition is to
believe that cognitive development, like physical development, is
continuous - cumulative and gradual. Piaget, on the contrary,
insists that development is step-like; development is stationary for
a period with no new responses occurring. Development consists of:
"successive steps or levels of equilibrium,
separated by a phase of transition or crisis, and
each characterised by a momentary stability".
(Piaget, 1956, in
Tanner & Inhelder, I960)
While in any given stage, performance will not essentially change;
there will be no regular decline in errors until perfection is
reached. Alternate methods of responding will be applied more or less
randomly until the infant recognises the inherent contradiction between
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the opposing responses to the same situation, co-ordinates the
responses and moves suddenly into the next, higher stage.
"Reaction to a stage n are released by the
dissatisfactions, conflicts or disequilibria
belonging to the previous stage n - 1".
(same source)
Alien though such a description of development may seem, it
nevertheless seems to have some empirical support in relation to
cognitive development in infancy. Experiment 1 showed that
progression through Stages IV - VI of the object concept was indeed
stage-like and discontinuous. Bower (197^-ia) similarly found that
although average performance in terms of reduction of errors showed
a steady decline in Stage II - III tracking tasks, individual records
again showed discontinuities of performance. Gratch & Landers (1971)
also found evidence of random-like application of alternate strategies
in their longitudinal study of the developmental course of the Stage
IV (AAB) error, a finding confirmed by Butterworth (1977). The stage
model of development does, therefore, seem to have some validity
within the sensori-motor period although its more general applicability
is still very much a matter of controversy (see e.g Tanner & Inhelder,
I960, Wohlwill, 1966, Pinard & Laurendeau, 1969, Strauss, 1972,
Brainerd, 1973).
The dynamics of development
The evidence presented above may be taken then to support two of
Piaget's claims about development:
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1. that there is a concept of the object which develops
2. that development of this concept is stage-like and
discontinuous.
His third claim, that the mechanism of development is a process of
progressive equilibrium with its twin components of assimilation
and accommodation working towards an ever-increasing level of
stability, is not so easily validated.
Although on a simple level, equilibrium is a most useful and
acceptable concept in most sciences, Piaget's use of the term has
come in for a great deal of criticism. Bruner, for example, has
accused it of being inherently circular (Bruner, 195>9): development
is seen by Piaget as occurring as a result of recognition of a state
of disequilibrium (or conflict) between the processes of assimilation
and accommodation - but the structure must be sufficiently developed
in the first place if it is to recognise the inadequacies of the
existing structure. Others, while recognising the descriptive
usefulness of Piaget's notion, have criticised its inadequacies and
vagueness as a dynamic model, claiming that it cannot be used to make
any useful predictions about development (e.g Carey, 1969). This
seems to be a valid criticism. Since each new advance is necessarily
constructed out of the preceding structures, any reconstructionist
(9)(or 'revolutionary') model of development will have trouble in
(9) Piaget's view of development has been summarised as a process
of 'conceptual revolution rather than gradual evolution' (Bower, 197Ua).
This seems to capture the essence of Piaget's thinking very well
although there are occasions when he tends to discuss development in
more 'capitalistic' (Riegel, 1972) terms.
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making anything other than short-term predictions. This is a
fairly severe limitation to be built into any developmental
theory and makes wholehearted acceptance of Piaget's model
difficult.
To go into the dispute over the notion of equilibrium in
detail would be a thesis in itself. I myself find aspects of
Piaget's model of development to be extremely useful. main
concern will be to clarify what the problem is for the infant at
each successive stage of the object concept. Once we have a better
idea of this, the mechanisms of transition from stage to stage may
be easier to identify. It is interesting to note, however, that
some support for the importance of conflict to cognitive development
comes from a stucfy" by Bower (l97ha). Two different forms of
tracking training were given to two groups of Stage II infants. The
first group was given weekly exposure to a continuously moving object
while the second was given weekly exposure to an object which both
moved and stopped, a presentation specifically designed (as in
Experiment 1) to induce conflict between the infants' two early (and
inadequate) definitions of objects - objects as places and objects as
movements. The first group did not show any acceleration of Stage
III behaviour; the second group did. From these results it would
seem that conflict does play a role in cognitive development. More
research is needed, however, before we shall have a clearer idea of
the importance and exact nature of that role.
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Now that we have established that there is an object concept
that does indeed develop, we can go on to examine further the
nature of that development. It has already been suggested in
Chapter 1 that Piaget's theory of the development of the object
concept does not fit with the findings of more recent developmental
studies. The next chapter will consider more closely the
implications of these studies. Alternative accounts of this
period of development will then be discussed and evaluated.
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CHAPTER THREE - ALTERNATIVES TO THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS OF
OBJECT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
Reasons for rejecting the traditional analysis
The preceding chapter would seem to indicate that Piaget has
correctly identified a process of stage-like development in the
acquisition of the concept of an object. We should now turn to
attempting to identify the reasons for this step-like progression in
understanding - in other words, to discovering what exactly it is in
the nature of objects that poses such a problem for infants at each
level of development.
Piaget, as we have seen, believes the notion of permanent,
independent objects to be the end product of an inherited process of
adaptation, one which increasingly differentiates and equilibrates
the twin functions of assimilation and accommodation. According"to
Piaget, as the behavioural repertoire of the infant grows, he will
enter into increasingly more complex interactions with his
surroundings; these self-object interactions will in turn lead to an
increasing comprehension that objects have an existence quite
independent of the activity of the observer. Development in the
sensori-motor period is thus seen as a general decentering process,
with the infant eventually realising that he himself is only one
other object in a spatially and temporally organised universe.
Why should we reject this analysis of the problem? It does,
after all, fit well with Piaget's observations of infants and would
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seem to explain many otherwise puzzling instances of behaviour
reliably found during this period. The reason is simply that it
no longer fits the facts as we now know them. It must be borne
in mind that the theory was originally constructed very much on the
basis of observation, with experimentation of only a very limited
sort being employed. Examples of behaviour (either observed or
elicited) were always used more as illustrations to the theory than
as attempts to confirm its validity. The ratio of theory to example
was always high and in the case of the early stages, many of the
statements are no more than educated guesses extrapolated backwards
from observations and theorising on subsequent stages. In common
with most researchers of his time, Piaget believed early infancy to
be beyond experimental investigation.
Unscientific though Piaget's investigatory methods may seem to
present-day researchers, it is important not to underestimate the
skill and vision which Piaget brought to his observations. Few
psychologists today could match the quality of Piaget's observations
if stripped of film or video records of their test sessions.
Although much of his theorising is now regarded as inadequate, Piaget's
valuable insights into development still hold good on many aspects and
in their time, represented a truly remarkable achievement.
Nonetheless, it is hardly surprising that at least some of Piaget's
notions of development seem to have been overtaken by today's research.
There now exists a considerable body of experimental findings which
cannot be accommodated by Piaget's intricately constructed model.
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Many researchers in addition feel that such an action-
oriented account of the development of object knowledge is too
narrow, overestimating the directive role of maturational processes
and underestimating the importance of environmental variables. It
would seem that experience can be much more efficient than Piaget
would acceptj every thought need not at some stage have been an
action, as Piaget would have it.
Although Piaget insists that development is the result of an
interaction between subject and environment, experience would indeed
seem to have been given a rather ill-defined and secondary role in
his model. This is hardly surprising. Piaget would maintain that
experience cannot simply be categorised, being, as it is, selectively
transformed according to the structures in existence in the particular
infant at any given time. Experience must be considered in the
historical context of the individual and attempts to evaluate
experience without such referents would be necessarily misleading and,
indeed, futile. Development for Piaget is a process of adaptation
with the organising activity of the subject the major influence on that
process.
Many see this approach as resulting in an ill-advised and
unwarranted neglect of the role of both social and physical
environmental variables on development. Piaget's interpretation of
the failure of young infants to react to objects which fall out of
sight provides a good example of the consequences of such neglect. As
both Bower (1967) and Michotte (1955, 1962) have demonstrated, stimulus
variables can be an all-important factor in determining both infant and
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adult responses to disappearing objects. It would seem that all
disappearances are not cognitively equivalent, a possibility which
Piaget does not seem to have considered; rate as well as manner
of disappearance seems influential in determining responses.
Piaget's somewhat vague and rather anti-empiricist position would
deny that any great attention need be paid to such precise
descriptions of environmental variables, a feature of his theory
which also has the effect of making it very difficult to pin down in
any useful way. The same criticism could apply to the notion of
equilibration, a notion central to Piaget's theory and one which
seems to me almost inaccessible to experimental investigation, to be
accepted on face value alone. Others admittedly have reinterpreted
the concept in more practical and meaningful terms and found it to be
useful (e.g Bower, 197^a - see p lj.7 ) but this in itself cannot
excuse the problems inherent in the original definition of the concept.
The above remarks could perhaps be dismissed as matters of
theoretical taste. The findings below, however, are, in general,
accepted facts and cannot be so easily set aside by any would-be theory-
builder. They were obviously unavailable to Piaget in the initial
formulations of his theory but there is little evidence in any of his
writings, including his most recent works, of any attempt to interpret
and incorporate such work into the body of his theory. Such
insularity is a rather long-term failing of Piaget and his co-workers
and, coupled with his difficult style and complex model, has furthered
resistance to its acceptance. As a result, much that is excellent is
rejected with that which no longer fits the experimental facts.
- 53 -
Some of the work on early infancy which contradicts a
Piagetian position was alluded to in the introductory chapter. I
shall deal with four areas of research which seem to me to have
unfortunate implications for the theory. These examples are by no
means exhaustive but are in themselves sufficient to necessitate a
re-thinking of the object concept problem. Two of them, imitation
and intentional behaviour, are central to the construction of
Piaget's model. The other two, the perceptual constancies and
behaviour towards unseen parts of objects, are typical of much of
today's research in that they demonstrate the early presence of some
knowledge of objects, knowledge which should not, on Piaget's
analysis, be present until much later in infancy.
Imitation and intentional behaviour
On Piaget's analysis, imitation of unseen parts of the body
cannot appear until after a long apprenticeship with much lesser
levels of imitation, not in fact emerging until Stage IV and soon
thereafter becoming the primary means of acquisition of new
behaviours. Such imitation has, however, been unequivically
demonstrated in neonates (Dunkeld, 1978) and even in a baby who was
only 60 minutes old (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). Carefully controlled
experiments such as those of Meltzoff & Moore and Dunkeld have shown
that this behaviour is truly imitation and not, as has been
suggested, the artefactual result of the mother first imitating the
baby (Papousek, 1976, Uzgiris, 1978). Since imitation plays a
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central role for Piaget in the unfolding of development, such
findings are not a minor embarrassment to the theory.
The notion of intentionality is also important to Piaget's
account of the development of the object concept. For Piaget, the
growing intentional!ty of behaviour is a direct indicator of the
developing differentiation between subject and object. In order to
attribute intentionality to any behaviour, Piaget insists that it
should fulfil three requirements:
1. the behaviour should be outward-directed, i.e
oriented towards influencing the external world
2. there should be the possibility of other actions
intervening between the means and the goal (as in
e.g 'detour' behaviours)
3. it should represent a deliberate adaptation of
behaviour rather than a simple repetition of
previous behaviour.
Contrary to Piaget's account, evidence of behaviour fulfilling
all three of those requirements has been found in studies of learning
ability in very young infants - again at an age far earlier than
Piaget's analysis of development could allow.
Take, for example, the behaviour of the babies described by
Papousek (1969). Babies in his conditioning experiment soon learned
that, if they made the appropriate head-turn, a light would come on
(Piaget's first criterion is therefore fulfilled). Quite complex
series of head-turns could in fact be learned by even veiy young
infants (Criterion 2 fulfilled). In addition, if the requirements
of the situation were changed, e.g the light no longer came on as a
result of a left - left sequence, but now required a right -
right - left sequence, the babies soon coped with the new
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demands, thereby showing themselves able to fulfil all three of
Piaget's criteria for intentional behaviour. According to Piaget,
such intentionality, implying as it does a differentiation of means
and end (and therefore differentiation of the immediate actions of
the subject from the eventual activity of the object) just cannot be
possible at such an age. It seems to me impossible for the theory
to be stretched to cover such findings.
The perceptual constancies and behaviour towards unseen parts of
objects
Even if the late appearance of imitation and intentionality were
not crucial to Piaget's model of development, there is a good deal of
other experimental evidence which undermines his position. In
particular, very young infants have demonstrated a far greater
knowledge of the inherent properties of objects than Piaget's analysis
of development in this period could possibly allow. I shall take
only two examples - the perceptual constancies and behaviour
towards unseen parts of objects.
On Piaget's analysis, size and shape constancy can only develop
as a result of the co-ordination of vision and touch, a co-ordination
(10) To be fair to Piaget, these abilities, as with many of the
others which do not fit with his analysis, could never have been
detected in younger infants by simple observation. Sophisticated
recording apparatus and strictly controlled presentations are
essential to this type of investigation.
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which does not take place until Stage IV. By acting on objects
and simultaneously observing these actions, an infant can build up
notions of those aspects of objects which in fact remain constant
in the face of contrary perceptual information. The theory allows
for no earlier appearance of such understanding. Using a
conditioning paradigm, Bower (1966), however, found evidence of
shape constancy in 6 - 8 week old babies. He found that a response
that had been conditioned to a given object would be shown again in
response to that same object when presented in different
orientations, even although the retinal images produced in such cases
were entirely different from that of the conditioned stimulus. A
different object presented in such a position as to project the same
retinal image as the original conditioned stimulus did not produce
the conditioned response. Such behaviour could be taken to
demonstrate an ability to recognise the real shape of an object
irrespective of its orientation and retinal image. Habituation
experiments by Day & McKenzie (1973) confirm this finding, as does
work reported recently by Caron, Caron & Carlson (1977). A further
conditioning experiment by Bower (1966,op.cit.) similarly
demonstrated the apparent presence of size constancy at around the
same age.
Objections have been made that these experiments may demonstrate
only differentiation of the associated mediating proximal variables
and not true discrimination of the distal stimuli involved. If,
however, infants are induced to act on the basis of their
discriminations and a distally appropriate behaviour is produced, it
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is reasonable to assume that the infant is responding to distal- and
not proximal variables. By making use of reaching and grasping,
responses which occur naturally in neonates given adequate postural
support, Bower (1972) found evidence of true perception of solidity,
size and distance in infants of only two weeks. Reaching was
adjusted to the true distance of the object and finger-thumb
separation showed anticipatory adjustment to the true size and shape
of an object seen at a distance. Bruner & Koslowski (1972) also
noted this phenomenon in 10 week old babies, an age again too young
to fit with Piaget's analysis.
It is interesting to note that Piaget himself observed instances
of distally appropriate behaviour prior to Stage IV. He observed
that an infant who is just learning to reach will refrain from
reaching xiihen the object is far away but will begin to reach out as
soon as the object comes within reaching distance. As such
observations did not fit with Piaget's conceptions of the nature of
early perceptual experience - a viewpoint which emphasised sequential
perceptual tableaux and the undifferentiated nature of experience -
these responses tended to be ignored in the theory-building and
instances of inappropriate behaviour centred upon.
In his experiments on size constancy, Bower attempted to isolate
the factors that determine the infant's response. It seemed that
motion parallax and binocular parallax were being used. This
suggests that the infant's perceptual system is already organised to
allow for a three-dimensional world long before reaching and grasping
is truly established. Such activity does not therefore seem
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essential to the construction of reality, as Piaget would maintain.
Order is already present in the infant's perceptual system. It is
pre-organised to specify basic invariants directly; there is no need
for the infant to construct order out of perceptual flux via action.
Such 'structuralism without genesis' would obviously be anathema to
Piagetians.
There is also reason to dispute Piaget's interpretation of his
observation of the inability of the young infant to rotate a feeding
bottle into the correct position unless some part of the nipple is
visible. According to Piaget, success in this task coincides with
acquisition of Stage IV. From this behaviour Piaget inferred that
the Stage III baby has no knowledge of unseen parts of objects.
Recent research again indicates that Piaget has underestimated the
understanding present in the young infant.
Bower (l966, op.cit.) has shown that infants of six weeks of age
who are conditioned to respond to a black wire triangle with a bar
over it will also produce the conditioned response in the presence of







The response is far less likely to be carried over to any of the
three other test stimuli shown in Figure 3.1, however, despite the
fact that 3 and look most like the original conditioned stimulus.
In a similar vein, it has been shown that infants of k - 5 months
will appropriately shape their fingers in anticipation of contact
with the far side of an object which they are trying to grasp, even
although they obviously cannot see it (Bower, 1975). Such
experiments strongly suggest that Piaget is wrong in believing that
the infant does not understand that the parts of objects he cannot
see nevertheless exist. An experiment will be presented later in
this thesis which hopefully demonstrates that out of sight is not
indeed out of mind for infants in Piaget's Stage III, even if the
whole of the object disappears from view (Experiment 3 - p 110 ).
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
If, then, there are rather too many experimental findings which
embarrass the Piagetian analysis of the problem of understanding the
nature of objects - and the above is only a fairly representative
sample of these - what alternative explanations have been offered by
other researchers? Alternatives fall into four main categories:
1. intersensory co-ordination explanations
2. motor skill/action explanations
3. representation/memory explanations
1;. identity explanati ons.
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I, myself, favour the last of these categories and will attempt to
justify this in later chapters. The other three categories of
explanations and experiments undertaken in relation to these will be
presented below.
It should firstly be pointed out, however, that although these
four categories have been described as alternatives to Piaget's
account, this is not strictly speaking an accurate description.
They are neither truly discrete categories nor are any of them
entirely distinct from Piaget's own formulations of the problem
facing infants in this period of development. All four are, in fact,
derived to a greater or lesser extent from Piaget but seek to
emphasise one particular feature of his description of the
developmental sequence, while denying, or at least underplaying,the
role of other possible factors.
There is therefore a certain degree of overlap between the
various theories. As will be seen below, evidence which seems to
refute one of the four main classes of explanation also usually has
negative implications for at least one of the other contenders.
Finding positive evidence in support of one or other explanation is
considerably more difficult than disproving any of the alternatives.
Temporary ascendancy of any particular theory is more often by default
in the others than on the basis of its own merits.
The problem with Piaget's theory perhaps lies in its very multi-
facetedness. Almost every facet seems to have some validity but it
seems impossible to reconcile them all in the one theory. Even
without the embarrassment of todays research data, this presented a
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problem to Piaget himself. His viewpoint would tend to shift
focus according to the particular topic under consideration and,
to many, such shifts of perspective come too close to undermining
the integrity of his carefully constructed model for comfort.
1. INTERSENSORY CO-ORDINATION EXPLANATIONS
Failure to retrieve a desired object when it is covered by a
cloth is indeed a strange and most unexpected error to discover in
otherwise extremely competent infants. Perhaps because of this,
Stage III - IV of the object concept has received more than its fair
share of attention from researchers. Many seem to feel that if they
can elucidate the Stage III - IV problem, the problem of explaining
all subsequent errors will be a relatively minor one - that is, that
understanding of the infant's difficulty with the Stage III - IV test
will illuminate the entire sequence of development. This does not
seem an unreasonable assumption and is, indeed, a necessary one if we
are to maintain the notion of a single concept underlying the six
stages. So far, however, none of even the more plausible
explanations of the Stage III - IV error have proved to have any
usefulness when it is attempted to extend them to the more complex
errors found later in development. Explanations in terms of
intersensory co-ordination suffer from this pitfall, as do
explanations in terms of both motor skill deficits and
representational problems, as we shall see later.
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Adherents of the intersensory co-ordination hypothesis of the
object concept problem would maintain that, in some way, the
fragmentary items of object knowledge acquired by the various
separate senses come together with development to form a more
complete and satisfactory object concept. Piaget himself
suggested that success with the Stage III - IV test meant that the
infant somehow appreciated that although the object had disappeared
from the visual field, it was still available to the hand.
Observations of infant behaviour would seem to support such an
interpretation. A longitudinal study by Schofield & Uzgiris (1969),
for example, noted an increase in combined manual and visual
inspection of objects just prior to achievement of success in the
manual search tasks while Piaget himself found a period just before
this success when the infant will not search for an object unless
he has been touching it before its disappearance. More direct
evidence that the object concept is derived from the co-ordination
of schemas is, however, thin on the ground. A significant
correlation between performance on a ring-and-cube test of visual-
manual co-ordination and performance on object search tasks at 8
and 10 months of age was found by Kohen-Raz (1966) but little other
work has reported any significant relationship to exist between the
two.
Such intersensory explanations have, however, the virtue of
being able to account for the seeming contradiction between evidence
of early object knowledge in eye tracking tasks and lack of what seems
to be the very same knowledge when the task is later presented
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manually" (see Chapter 2). On the basis of evidence frcrn
discrimination studies, Schaffer has suggested that the
disjunctive nature of human development results in the appearance
first of a self-contained perceptual learning mechanism which is
not immediately" capable of exerting control over productive
behaviour (Schaffer, 1971, 1975., Schaffer & Parry, 1969, 1970).
The knowledge available to the eye control system is in some way
'compartmentalised1 and not initially available to the infant's
hand control system.
Such an explanation, tempting though it may be, is not without
problems. How, for instance, can such an interpretation cover the
results of acceleration studies such as that presented in Chapter 2?
Experiment 1 found that training on tracking tasks from 12 - 16
weeks accelerated appearance of Stages IV - VI of the object concept.
Such transfer would not be possible if the knowledge indicated by
tracking performance was compartmentalised in the absolute fashion
Schaffer would have it. We have already seen that b - 5 month old
infants will show differential and appropriate hand shaping to the
invisible side of an object (see p £9 ). How could this be
possible if eye and hand are controlled by different cognitive
subsystems? Experiment 3 of this thesis will also demonstrate that
such separation of object knowledge does not occur. Infants in this
experiment were able to reach out in darkness and find an object which
had been visible but was no longer so, evidence surely that the
perceptual learning system communicates with and can control reaching
behaviour.
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Other researchers (e.g Harris, 1971) have adopted a less extreme
position on the role of intersensory co-ordination but
nonetheless maintain that intersensory- co-ordination is a
prerequisite for achievement of the higher levels of object
understanding.
Acceleration studies
Supporters of the intersensory- co-ordination explanation have
used acceleration studies in an attempt to validate their hypothesis.
As was discussed in Chapter 2, this would indeed seem to be the only-
valid investigatory tool available. Behaviours which are assumed
to encourage the co-ordination of information from the various senses
are promoted and the effects of this intervention on subsequent
development of the object concept examined.
On the basis of longitudinal observations of the behaviour of
institutional infants in the first six months, White (1969) carried
out an experiment in which he varied the rearing conditions of a
group of such infants. He suggested that simple modifications stich
as increased handling, the introduction of viewable and touchable
objects and the routine placement of the infants in the prone
position from the third month on would produce acceleration in the
appearance of later object-related behaviour by providing greater
opportunity for exercise and co-ordination of the infant's early
action schemas.
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By introducing such variations into the infants' normal
environment, White produced differences in the age of appearance
of viewing behaviour (i.e holding an object and glancing at it),
of bringing an object to the mouth and of what he called 'mutual-
monitored play', i.e bringing an object to the midline where it is
simultaneously viewed and factually explored by the other hand.
Each of these behaviours involves two or more schemas, according
to White.
Although all of these behaviours undeniably involve objects,
it is not necessary to insist that they are related to the
development of the object concept. White neither tested the
longevity of his experimental group's superiority nor ascertained
their level of competence•on less contentious indicators of object
understanding, e.g recovering a partially covered object. The
fact that the appearance of visually-guided reaching was
accelerated by two months in his experimental group is interesting
and obviously related to the topic of intersensory co-ordination but
it is in no way evidence for the role of intersensory co-ordination
in the development of the object concept. The infants may well have
followed the course of development described by Piaget, and in an
accelerated manner, but this does not prove the importance of these
behaviours to object concept development. Indeed, the work of Gouin-
Decarie (1969) and Kopp & Shaperman (1973) with thalidomide infants
would suggest that the co-ordination of looking, reaching and grasping
does not in fact play an irreplaceable role in this development.
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A student of Gouin-Decarie has recently completed an
acceleration study designed to study the effects of the early
promotion of intersensory co-ordinations on later object concept
development (Sobey-Simoneau, 1978). Three groups of infants were
used, two experimental groups and one control group. All three
groups were given a 7-item object permanence test at three months;
there was no significant difference between the groups at this
point. For the next month; one group were given training on a
tracking task in which a train moved round an oval track; passing
through a tunnel and occasionally stopping either in the tunnel or
at seme point close to the tunnel (i.e in sight). The other
experimental group were given training designed to promote
co-ordination of the schemas of vision; prehension and sucking.
This training consisted mainly of reaching practice; both passive
and voluntary. When retested on the object permanence tests at
four months, this second group were found to be significantly
superior in performance to both other groups whose performances were
approximately equivalent.
At first glance, this training study may seem to give strong
support to the intersensory hypothesis. However, there are several
points which should be considered. For reasons of convenience, the
period of development studied was limited to 3 - U months (cf. Exper.l).
This meant that the object permanence testing was, of necessity,
restricted to Stages II and III of the object concept. These stages
are generally characterised by poor or absent response to disappearing
objects; what can be accepted as more positive indicators of these
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stages is highly controversial. The items chosen try Sobey-
Simoneau were drawn from a variety of sources - Piaget (1937),
Gouin-Decarie (1965), Uzgiris & Hunt (1975), Corman & Escalona
(1969) and Gratch (1972) - all theorists who have emphasised the
importance of intersensory co-ordination to object concept
development. At present, there is no direct experimental evidence
that such items necessarily indicate Stage II and Stage III object
knowledge. That these behaviours co-exist at this time cannot be
disputed but their relevance and importance to the construction of
the object concept has yet to be demonstrated. The tests of object
permanence used by Sobey-Simoneau are therefore open to the
criticism that they are derived from the very theory she is using
them to prove. Item 3, for example - interrupted audition - is a
direct test of intersensory co-ordination. Success on this item
in no way implies a direct link between intersensory co-ordination
and development of the object concept, as is suggested, but only
that training in the co-ordination of schemas promotes intersensory
co-ordination, a fact which should not surprise us.
An additional and similar problem lies in the fact that three
of the seven items used to test the level .of object concept
development before and after training involved reaching - the very
behaviour being promoted in the co-ordination of schemas training
group and one which would not otherwise be expected to be either
common or proficient in infants of only 1± months. It is also
interesting to note that, even in spite of this training, the two
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least contentious items in the test battery - recovery of a
partially covered object and removal of a cloth from a hand which
is holding an object - were passed by only 8.9% and b.h%
respectively of all subjects at 1; months.
Taking these points into account, it does not seem to me that
this study can, therefore, be taken as evidence either that the
co-ordination of schemas is essential to object concept development
or that perceptual experience is irrelevant to that development.
Less contentious indicators of early object knowledge or a longer-
term study which could empirically attest to the validity of these
early measures would be required.
The amount of acceleration found in the two above studies is
neither impressive nor proven to be lasting. This suggests that
the role played by intersensory co-ordination in the development of
the object concept is in fact minor. As intersensory co-ordination
is an extremely difficult, if not impossible, variable to isolate and
control, it is possible that what these studies in fact provide is no
more than a general increase in experience with objects, promoting
the infant's interest and thereby stimulating development. To
design an experiment which excludes this possibility seems to me to
be impossible.
- 69 -
Other experimental studies relevant to the intersensory
hypothesis
A cross-sectional study by Harris (1971) which has been taken
to lend support to the intersensory hypothesis is also subject to
the above criticism. Harris found that prior visual-manual
inspection promoted persistence of search -in 8 month olds whereas
visual-only inspection did not. Both conditions were effective in
promoting search in older infants. These results could be
interpreted as evidence that visual-tactual experience of an object
is necessary for search in young infants. Such a strong conclusion
is not necessary, however] it is equally likely that it is only
interest itself which is promoted. Although Harris claims that
there was no significant effect of duration of visual-manual
examination on persistence of search, his data in fact show that
for both younger (7 - 9% months) and older (ll - 13J months) groups,
a 20 sec. presentation of an object for visual-manual inspection
resulted in almost double the amount of subsequent search behaviour
when compared to relocation efforts shown after a 5> sec. inspection
period.
There is another factor to be considered in evaluating Harris 1
experiment. Search in the punger age group used often may occur
only in the context of extension of a previous reaching movement
(see p 12 ). There is, however, no indication of any attempt to
equate behaviour in the two conditions in the period immediately
prior to withdrawal of the object. It is therefore not surprising
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that the inspection situation which encouraged reaching (i.e the
visual-manual condition) should result in more persistent search
in young infants. Harris later described the results of this
experiment (Harris, 1975) as evidence that manual search cannot at
first be guided by visual data alone, that tactual inspection is 'a
precondition for search', that search involving the manual system
requires a 'manual prime stimulus'. Data is, however, only
presented in terms of persistence of search; there is none
presented on what would surely be more relevant to the intersensory
co-ordination hypothesis, comparative number of search attempts in
the two situations. Inspection of the data shows that search must
in fact have occurred in the younger group to the visual-only
presentation, albeit not persistent search.
Gratch, too, seems determined to prove that intersensory
co-ordination is a prerequisite for manual search (Gratch, 1975).
He believes that the difference found by Harris between persistence
of search in visual versus visual-manual conditions could be
attributed to the &§• month olds not appreciating that the visible
object was in fact 'handleable'. He noted with interest that the
older infants in the longest visual-only inspection period (80 sees.)
appeared to search longer than older infants who had a chance to
handle the toy for the same amount of time. This, he suggests,
could be attributable to the development of the ability to represent
objects cross-modally and to more rapid onset of boredom in the
visual-manual condition. Ingenious though such an explanation may be,
it seems equally likely that the various differences in behaviour
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found by Harris could be traced back to the extremely unnatural
conditions of presentation in both conditions. There seems little
need to resort to complicated intersensory explanations.
Gratch also seems determined to fit his own data into the
intersensory co-ordination hypothesis. Gratch discovered during
the course of a longitudinal study of object concept development
that infants who were at the stage of being able to retrieve a
partially hidden object but who could not yet uncover a fully
hidden object (Stage III - approximately 6 months) were also unable
to retrieve an object when it was covered immediately after they
had grasped it, i.e if it was in their hand but both their hand and
the object were covered (Gratch & Landers, 1971)•
"When the infants failed to remove the cover from
the hand which had just grasped a toy, they held
onto the object and looked about, as if unaware
that they had an object in hand, or they dropped
the object, removed their hand and made no effort
to gain the object. However, the infants
immediately reached for and grasped the object
upon seeing it".
(Gratch, 1972)
This seemed, and is, contrary to Piagetian and traditional views
of the role of touch in the development of reaching (Piaget, 1937,
Gibson, 1966), views which seemed to have been confirmed by Bruner
(1968), White (1969) and White, Castle & Held (1961+)- It was, of
course, possible that the infants' inconvenient difficulty was the
result of motor skill problems or attributable in some way to the
action of covering their hands. A further, well-designed experiment
using both transparent and opaque cloths was therefore carried out
and eliminated both of these possible explanations of the infants'
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problem. Stage III infants succeeded with transparent cloths but
continued to fail to obtain the object when opaque cloths were
used (Gratch, 1972).
It seems an almost unavoidable conclusion that the difficulty
in the opaque cloth situation must be due to the invisibility of
the object, the continued visibility in the transparent cloth
situation helping the infant to success. Bruner (1969) observed
similar behaviour in 7 month old babies, finding however that the
infant did not maintain his grasp when his hand was covered by an
opaque cloth but withdrew the hand and began the reach again, this
reach stopping in'mid-track, the result, according to Bruner, of the
loss of visual contact. Gratch insists, however, on the basis of
the behaviour of only three babies, that 'looking and manual
touching are relatively poorly co-ordinated at this age' and that
'the infants' failure to remove the opaque cloth in response to the
feel of the tcy in their hand was the result of their being visually
and not tactually attentive' - and not due to any simple failure to
derive object information from tactual cues. Maintaining the
intersensory hypothesis is indeed a difficult process.
Attempts have been made to elucidate the role of intersensory
co-ordination from the other direction. Instead of focusing on
evidence of the presence or absence of co-ordination of information
from the various senses, these experiments investigate the
possibility of any loss of competence being shown in response to a
visual search task when the task is altered in such a way that eye-
hand co-ordination comes prematurely - and presumably inefficiently -
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into play. If the problem for the Stage III infant is a problem
of co-ordinating the activity of the eye and the hand, then the
competence demonstrated in visual search tasks from an early age
should be disrupted if co-ordinated activity is encouraged during
the visual task.
Experiments by Neilson (1977) attempted to investigate the
intersensory hypothesis in this way.
Two conditions were used. In the first condition, the object
moved from the central window, behind screen A, reappearing at A1
and stopping there for 7 seconds (Figure 3.2)
Fig. 3.2
screen
The Neilson (1977) apparatus.
It then returned to the central window, via screen A. This sequence
was repeated. On the third trial, the object moved off in the
opposite direction, passing behind screen B and reappearing at B1.
Tracking responses to each disappearance of the object were noted.
-Th¬
in the second condition, the apparatus was appropriately
reduced in all relevant dimensions and moved closer to the infant
so as to be in such a position that the infant could reach
positions A1 and B1 if he wished. The sequence was as in Condition
1 with the difference that the infant was allowed to reach for and
touch the object on the two occasions it stopped at A' and on the
catch trial, at B1. Again it was tracking responses which were
scored.
Following the analysis of Bower (1971)^ we would expect young
infants to fail to anticipate a reappearance of the object from
behind either screen A or screen B while older infants would succeed
in anticipating the reappearance from behind A but not from behind B,
in all likelihood looking in the direction of A* for the object.
Condition 1 is theoretically the easier task, involving only eye
movements. Condition 2, however, encourages the activation of both
visual and manual schemas of coping with objects and should therefore
prove more difficult for infants who are in Stage III.
Unfortunately for intersensory co-ordination explanations of object
concept difficulties, no differences were found in level of responding
in the two conditions in babies of 6-g- - 8-g- months of age. Condition
2 neither disrupted the behaviour of the youngest infants who were in
Stage III nor improved the performance of the older infants who were
already in Stage IV.
It is always possible that such experiments are taking the
intersensory co-ordination hypothesis too literally, assuming that
co-ordinations cannot be made centrally and must be expressed overtly
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in action. In the experiment above, it could be argued that it
was impossible to ensure that only visual schemas were in
operation in Condition 1, particularly if, as Piaget would have it,
a Stage III infant would not appreciate the difference in distances
used. Such a criticism is difficult if not impossible to refute and
is a retreat increasingly being adopted by supporters of the
intersensory hypothesis. Other evidence, however, makes it
unnecessary to linger long over such defences of the intersensory
hypothesis.
Reasons for rejecting the intersensory co-ordination explanation
of object concept problems
Firstly, there is an increasing body of evidence which points
to the early appearance of intersensory co-ordinations, far earlier
than Stage IV. Visual-tactual co-ordination, for instance, has
been demonstrated in neonates5 they reach to touch objects and show
surprise and distress if the visible object has no tangible
properties (Bower, Broughton & Moore, 1970b). Auditory-visual
co-ordination is now well established as existing very early on
(Aronson & Rosenbloom, 1971, Alegria & Noirot, 1978, Turkewitz,
Birch, Moreau, Levy & Cornwall, 1966) and has, in fact, been
demonstrated at birth (Wertheimer, 1961). Auditory-manual
co-ordination is similarly evidenced at a very early age in both
normal (Wishart, Bower & Dunkeld, 1978) and blind infants (Urwin,
1973).
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Less direct but equally persuasive indications of the
presence of early intersensory co-ordination comes from
experiments on imitation and classical conditioning in neonates.
The appearance of imitational abilities in neonates is now well
documented and points to the presence at a very early age of rather
complex intersensory co-ordinations (Valentine, 1930, Zazzo, 1937?
Gardner & Gardner, 1970, Maratos, 1973? Meltzoff & Moore, 1977?
Dunkeld, 1978). Similar evidence comes from studies of classical
conditioning. If the conditioning situation involves association
of the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the unconditioned stimulus
(UCS) across different modalities, it should not be within the
capacities of young infants and certainly not neonates, according
to supporters of the intersensory hypothesis (e.g Sameroff, 1971) •
Just such CS - UCS association has however been shown in day old
babies (Clifton, 197U? Stamps & Porges, 19750 •
A second reason for rejecting this type of analysis is that
any explanation of the solution of problems of object permanence in
terms of the development of intersensory co-ordinations does not
seem to fit in with the general picture of that development itself.
All of the co-ordinations mentioned above in fact decline with age
(Bower, Broughton & Moore, 1970c, Wishart, Bower & Dunkeld, 1978?
Maratos, 1973). The developmental history of the intersensory
co-ordinations seems to be one of initial integration of the senses
(Dunkeld & Bower, 1976, MacFarlane, 1977), soon to be replaced by a
process of progressive differentiation - in other words, a process
exactly opposite to the requirements of this explanation (Bower, 197Ub).
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This differentiation could account for some strange
behaviours found around six months. Bruner (1969) noted that 7
month old infants would often close their eyes to reach for an
object, particularly if the previous visually-directed reach had
failed. I have myself noted a similar phenomenon in object
permanence testing situations. Younger infants will often watch
the hiding event but look away to perform the reach. This
behaviour could easily mistakenly be attributed to inattention and
the consequent successful search discounted because the infant was
not watching what he was doing. Such behaviours point to the
importance of not judging infant behaviour by adult criteria. In
addition, such behaviours suggest to me an attempt to reduce
information overload and focus the infant's (limited) attentional
capacities; they certainly lend no support to claims for the
importance of intersensory-co-ordination to success in such
*
situations.
Even if an explanation in terms of intersensory co-ordination
had been semi-feasible for Stage III - IV - and it would seem that
the pattern of decline in the various co-ordinations sets in either
well before or at this very point in object concept development -
there is no way such an explanation can cover the other errors
which occur so reliably in subsequent development. How, for
example, could one explain the place (or AAB) error of the Stage
IV - V infant in terms of developing intersensory co-ordinations?
How could the switching problem possibly be interpreted to fit in
with this type of analysis? As with the traditional analysis of
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the infant's problems, it seems that we must also reject the
intersensory co-ordination explanation on the grounds of
inadequacy. Any explanation which could only hope to account for
such a small part of the developmental sequence will clearly not do.
2. MPTOR SKILL/ACTION EXPLANATIONS
Motor skill explanations
The same problem crops up with motor skill explanations of the
object concept. If we try to maintain that the reason that the
infant fails to recover a desired object when it is covered by a
cloth is because he cannot yet perform such a response, we will have
great difficulty in explaining the Stage IV - V error in similar
terms. If, after all, the infant can now show us that he is
capable of removing a cloth in a Stage III - IV situation, why should
a new location of the object under an identical cloth pose
additional problems for him?
Although Piaget's theory is couched in terms of elaboration and
co-ordination of schemas of action, he himself never adopted the
rather simplistic viewpoint that the source of the infant's problem
lay only in his inability to perform the requisite action. He
carefully observed that an infant who was quite capable of lifting
up a cloth when it only partially covered an object would not do this
when faced with a completely covered object (Piaget, 1937, p 30)-
There have been others, however, who have attempted to dismiss the
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infant's problems as being essentially motor rather than
conceptual (e.g Charlesworth, 1969).
As with the intersensory hypothesis, adoption of motor skill
explanations allow reconciliation of the apparent contradiction
between the demonstration of early object knowledge in tracking
situations and failure to demonstrate that same knowledge in later
manual search tasks. It is not the case that the older infant no
longer knows that the object which has disappeared continues to
exist - what he does not know is how to remove the cloth to obtain
the object. Using transparent cups to 'hide' the object, Bower (1967)
presented some evidence which seemed to favour such an interpretation.
Infants who failed in the traditional test also failed if a
transparent occluder was used. If the object is fully visible under
the transparent cup, failure to recover the object cannot be
explained, as many of Piaget's interpreters would have it, as a result
of 'out of sight being out of mind' . Lack of success, it is argued,
must be due to motor failings rather than conceptual problems.
Others have attempted to replicate Bower's finding without
success (Yonas (pers. comm to Bower), Gratch, 1972), their infants
failing with opaque covers but succeeding when transparent ones were
used. No one, however, has presented conclusive and systematic
evidence to substantiate one or other set of findings. Experiment 2
is designed to fill this important gap.
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EXPERIMENT 2 ^
Object permanence testing is usually done under somewhat relaxed
conditions, elicitation of appropriate behaviour depending very much
cn establishing rapport between the subject and the experimenter.
It is therefore essential to have very precise definitions of what
constitutes a failing or a passing response. Performance in the
Stage III - IV task is particularly difficult to assess. The infant
will still be relatively unskilled in reaching and may well knock
over the occluder in his excitement; it is not therefore enough that
the infant at some point ends up with the object that was hidden in
his hands. We must devise criteria which will allow us to separate
accidental retrievals of the object from truly intentional recovery
behaviour.
First of all, of course, we must be certain that the subject can
in fact pick up an object from a flat surface. If the baby cannot
pick up any object at all, there is little point in checking whether
or not he can pick up an occluder to get at another object. If the
subject can pick up an object, then it follows that he can pick up an
(ll) This study has alreadv been published (see Bower, T.G.R. and
Wishart, J.G. - Appendix D.)
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occluding object, provided it is not too large. Picking up an
occluding object is not, however, the same thing as picking up an
occluding object in order to get at an object that has been hidden
underneath that occluder, and it is the latter action that we wish
to consider criterial in this situation. Piaget himself has never
denied that infants who do not have object permanence can
nevertheless pick up objects; as mentioned above, he also does not
seek to deny that such infants have been seen to remove a cloth from
a partially covered object. In such a situation, however, Piaget
maintains that the more typical behaviour found is pulling the toy
from under the cloth, a behaviour with implications very different
from the first in terms of object understanding. The special,
characteristic of picking up an occluder in the Stage III - IV test
is that the occluder is not picked up for its own sake but is
removed in order to allow the infant to get at the object that has
been occluded. It is this ability to conjoin actions rather than
the mere ability to pick up an occluder which Bower (1967) thought
was lacking in the infants who failed the standard object
permanence test. The problem is thus to decide whether an infant
who picks up an occluder is picking it up for its own sake or in
order to get at the object inside or underneath the occluder.
The criterion decided on was as follows. Prior to the
beginning of object permanence testing, the infants were presented
with a tcy placed on the table top before which they sat. The time
frcm presentation to successful capture of the object was recorded;
this time interval will be referred to as free capture time. It
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was determined that if an infant removed an occluder and then
picked up the object that had been under the occluder, with the
time from removal of the occluder to picking up the object less
than that infant's free capture time, the infant would be recorded
as having picked up the occluder to get the object, a successful
response. Picking up an occluder without getting the object that
had been occluded or only succeeding in getting it after an interval
longer than free capture time was scored as a failure. This
represents a rather strict criterion for success but, in attributing
intentionality to the responses of infants, it is perhaps better to
be conservative.
Subjects
16 twenty-one week old infants served as subjects, 8 male, 8
female.
Procedure
Subjects sat on their mother's lap at a plain brown wooden table.
A stylised doll, painted fluorescent pink and measuring J4..O cm high x
1.5 cm in diameter, was used as a toy. Previous work had found this
to be a desirable enough toy. The transparent occluder was a plastic
cup 6 cm high x 3 cm in diameter, with a transmission ratio of .7
(this allowed both the object within the cup and the cup itself to be
clearly seen). The opaque occluder was a white, plastic cup of equal
proportions and perfectly opaque.
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The infants were presented with the toy, placed within reach,
and their free capture time recorded. After 15 seconds, the toy
was taken away from the baby and one of the occluders placed in the
same location, the opaque for 8 babies, the transparent to the
remaining 8. Free capture time for the occluder was also recorded.
The occluder was then taken away and the toy replaced in its
original location. Before the baby could take the toy again, the
opaque occluder was placed slowly over the toy. The baby was then
given three minutes to recover the object before the trial was
terminated. If the infant was unsuccessful, the occluder was
removed at the end of the trial, revealing the object which the
infant was then allowed to pick up and retain for 15 seconds. At
the end of this time the toy was removed and replaced in its original
location, this time being covered by the transparent occluder.
Trial duration was again three minutes, save that if an infant had a
hand on the occluder at the end of the three minutes, he was given a
further two minutes to complete his response. If at the end of this
period the infant did not have the toy, the occluder was removed and
the infant allowed to take and retain the toy for 15 seconds. A
second opaque occluder trial vias then conducted, with a trial duration
equal to that given with the transparent occluder.
Results
The results are summarised in Table 3.1.
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TABLE 3-I Results of Experiment 2
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As can be seen, the hypothesis that there is no difference between
an opaque and a transparent occluder as obstacles in a manual search
task can clearly be rejected. The opaque occluder was far more
difficult than the transparent occluder. On the other hand, it
cannot be concluded that the transparent occluder presented no
difficulties at all. As can be seen, latency of picking up the
transparent occluder when there was a toy inside it was far greater
than latency of picking up the occluder itself, indicating that the
conjoined response was more difficult. In addition, only 8 of the
14 infants who successfully removed the transparent occluder
succeeded in picking up the object within their free capture time, 1+
of them failing entirely to pick it up at all.
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Discussion
The above experiment demonstrates clearly that the problem for
the Stage III infant is not simply reducible to lack of the
appropriate motor skills. Behaviour sequencing, on the other hand,
does seem to play a role but again the results suggest that this role
is a secondary one. The more important difference between the two
object search tasks used seemed to be the visibility or non-visibility
of the object to be recovered. It is, of course, possible that this
difference does not necessarily mean that 'out of sight is out of
mind' in the standard Piagetian object permanence test. The
difficulty shown in such a situation could be attributable to motor
difficulties summing with the difficulty created by the fact that the
object is no longer visible, which is not the same thing. The role
of visibility will be discussed extensively in the next major section
of this chapter; further consideration of the implications of the
results of this experiment will therefore be postponed until then.
Other motor skill experiments
Three other findings are relevant to the role of motor skill in
object permanence situations. In a continuation of the experiment
above, babies were given intensive practice in removing the
transparent cups. No transfer of success to opaque cups was seen;
no matter how long the infants were given, they did not remove the
opaque cups. The experiment of Gratch (1972) has already been
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mentioned. He found that 6 month old infants who were able to
remove a transparent cloth if it was placed over their hand as
they grasped an object merely sat and looked about if an opaque
cloth was used to cover the object; it was as if they were unaware
that they had an object in their hand. Obviously lack of
appropriate motor skills alone cannot be held responsible for the
infants' difficulties in either of these experiments. Thirdly, as
Experiment 1; of this thesis will demonstrate, behaviour very
similar to that seen in the standard Stage III - IV task appears in
a task in which the infant must recover an object which has been
placed on top of a platform. Retrieval of the object in this
situation obviously does not involve removal of any occluder and the
object is perfectly visible throughout; nonetheless, infants may
stop in mid-reach and do not seem to realise that the object is still
available to be reached for. As there is very little difference in
terms of motor requirements between reaching for a dangling object -
something well within the capabilities of these infants - and picking
up an object from a platform, it is unlikely that lack of the
appropriate motor skill can be blamed for the apparent difficulty in
this situation either. Some more complex problem clearly underlies
this apparently simply task.
Action explanations
Piaget's attitude to the role of action in development is
considerably more complex than has so far been considered.
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According to Piaget, object knowledge is firmly rooted in action;
an object only exists in connection with an action as far as the
infant is concerned. The infant has, as yet, no way of recreating
his world except via the repetition of his personal action schemas.
This incomplete understanding of the relationship between his
actions and the activity of the objects around him results in some
very peculiar behaviours.
"Laurent, at 0 -J (3) loses a cigarette box which
he has just grasped and swung to and fro.
Unintentionally, he drops it outside the visual
field. He then immediately brings his hand before
his eyes and looks at it for a long time with an
expression of surprise, disappointment, something
like an impression of its disappearance. But far
from considering the loss as irremediable, he begins
again to swing his hand, although it is empty;
after this he looks at it once more. For anyone
who has seen this act and the child's expression it
is impossible not to interpret such behaviour as an
attempt to make the object come back".
(Piaget, 1937j Obs. 16)
The inappropriateness of the infant's search behaviours are, for
Piaget, the best indication of the limitations and inadequacies of
his conception of reality. Objects only exist when being acted
upon and are not conceived of as having ary existence outside the
infant's direct interactions with them.
The Stage IV (AAB) error is very important to the integrity of
Piaget's model. His explanation is not implausible and gives a
reasonable account of what is a most peculiar but firmly
established error (Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975, Gratch & Landers, 1971j
Butterworth, 1975). Emphasising, as always, that the construction
of knowledge is a process rooted in the activity of the infant,
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Piaget maintains that the Stage IV error appears as a result of
the infant's failure to assimilate the new position of the object.
The object is identified entirely in terms of the infant's previous
successful search activity and the position in which that activity
occurred (A); the movement of the object to a new position (B) is
not even registered. The object is defined as 'the-object-I-find-
at-A' - even although the infant quite clearly sees the object being
moved and hidden at B. According to Piaget, this is a result of
the infant's inability to hold in mind a sequence of actions, itself
the result of his inability as yet to relate them to a single coherent
spatial and temporal structure.
EXPERIMENTS FOCUSING ON THE ROLE OF ACTION IN OBJECT CONCEPT
DEVELOPMENT
Several attempts have been made to find empirical support for
Piaget's belief that action is central to the construction of the
object concept. Boynton & Uzgiris (1975), for example, found that
infants of 8y - 9y months did not make the expected AAB error if the
object was hidden successively in near (reachable) space and a delay
of 2 seconds interposed between hiding and search. If, however, the
object was hidden at a location out of reach of the infant, the hiding
apparatus then moved into reach and a 2 second delay in search again
imposed (the method generally adopted by Gratch and his co-workers),
performance was significantly poorer. This finding was interpreted
as supportive evidence of Piaget's contention that formation of
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coherent spatial relationships (a process intimately bound up
with object concept development) is first achieved in near space,
the result of the infant's direct interactions with objects in his
immediate (near) surroundings. A further result of the study,
that a hiding task in which the object was hidden successively in
two locations which stood in a vertical spatial relation to each
other proved to be more difficult than a task in which the object
was relocated in another, horizontally different location, also
seemed to point to the role of experience in the organisation of
search behaviour, vertical spatial relations presumably being more
unfamiliar than horizontal ones.
Further work by ELory & Uzgiris (1975), however, pointed to
these results being an artefact of the apparatus used by Boynton &
Uzgiris. The hiding apparatus used was a replica of the Gratch
box. This consists of a rectangular box (26" x 16" x 2"),
containing two hiding wells (7" x 7" x !■§•") spaced 12" apart.
Two identical white wash cloths (12" x 12") are used to cover the
wells after the object has been placed in one or other of them.
If, as in the Boynton & Uzgiris experiment, this apparatus is used
at a distance, the perceived separation of the two wells will
obviously be reduced. Flory & Uzgiris therefore made use of a
skeletal apparatus: two wells - identical in dimensions and
separation to the Gratch apparatus - joined together by a thin
metal rod. Using this, the difference in success between the near
and far conditions was virtually eliminated.
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Failure to control for perceptual discriminability between
the two locations could also account for Boynton & Uzgiris'
results with horizontally and vertically aligned locations.
Although the horizontally arranged locations were separated by a
distance of 12", the vertical hiding box which was used had
essentially no spatial separation between the two locations.
Such an arrangement is almost bound to lead to confusion in infants
who have as yet only poorly formed notions of space. It is quite
unnecessary to invoke theories of action to explain such results.
Other experiments also suggest that action is not, in fact,
the major determining factor in object concept development.
Harris (1973), for example,pointed out that AAB errors need not
necessarily result from the infant conferring an absolute position
on the object on the basis of his previous actions, as Piaget would
claim. The AAB task confuses two types of position change, absolute
and relative. Searching again at A when the object is hidden at B
could be the result of the change in the relative (left-right)
position of the container hiding the object rather than being the
result of the infant defining the location of the object absolutely,
i.e as that position in which he last successfully searched for it.
By moving the containers between trials at A and trials at B, Harris
found that a change in absolute position did not, as Piaget would
predict, lead to error in nine month olds - provided the relative










Harris' (1973) variation of the AAB task
Butterworth (1975) rightly criticised Harris on two points
which he suggested could account for the apparent reversal in
competence found by Harris:
1. there is evidence that MB errors occur only
after a delay between hiding the object and
allowing search (Gratch, Appel, Evans, Le Compte
and Wright, 197k) - Harris allowed immediate search
2. it is possible that some or even all of the infants
used might not have made errors in the standard
situation either - Harris used only one age band of
infants and did not compare their performance with
performance in a standard situation.
When these factors were taken into consideration, Butterworth found
that infants tended to err in both a condition where relative
position was held constant and a condition in which absolute
position was held constant, a finding lending support to neither









Butterworth's (1975) variation of the AAB task
Butterworth himself attributes the infant's difficulty in the Stage
IV - V test to a conflict between two co-existing spatial location
codes, one egocentric and one allocentric. This conflict, he
believes, gives way with development to reliance on broader, visual
frames of reference which remain invariant with movement. This
interpretation of the AAB error will be considered more fully later
(see Chapter 6).
As we have seen, Piaget's account of the AAB error contains
two interlinked elements: (l) response perseveration and (2) place
perseveration: the infant searches for the object in the location
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at which it was last found. We have already seen that Harris'
belief that place perseveration alone could account for the errors
found in standard testing situations cannot be upheld. Breinner &
Bryant (1977), on the other hand, contend that it is in fact
response perseveration which lies at the base of the errors shown
in Stage IV; spatial reference systems, whether interpreted in
relative and/or absolute terms, are not involved.
In their experiment, infants were given two A trials in the
normal manner. After the second A trial, they were then moved
round to the other side of the table and the toy again hidden in
position A (Figure 3-5). Infants, however, tended to search for
the object in B on this trial, even although the absolute position
of the object was constant over the three trials. They therefore
conclude that 'perseveration (in the AAB test) is of responses
rather than to places'.
Fig. 3.5
Bromnor & Bryant's (1977) 'AAB' task
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Evans & Gratch (1972) also believe that the AAB error could
be explained in terms of repetition of a successful action. They
found that infants would search at A on the 'catch' trial even
when a totally different toy was hidden at B, thus seemingly
disproving Piaget's suggestion that the AAB error is a result of
the infant identifying an object in terms of the place where he
last successfully searched for it. They conclude that position A
in some way represented a 'toy-box' to the infant, and that search
there would always provide an object.
The findings of both these experiments are perhaps more
limited in their implications than the authors would like to think
and in no way justify their firm conclusions that the source of the
AAB error lies in response rather than place perseveration. Gratch
Sc. Evans in particular would like to maintain that the AAB error is
simply a place-going error which occurs irrespective of the
particular object involved. To my mind, substitution experiments
such as theirs can give at best only ambiguous results. Returning
to A when a new toy is hidden at B is as likely to reflect a
perfectly reasonable attempt to locate the original (and, who knows,
possibly preferred) toy as search for the new toy at the old hiding
place. If, too, we were to take Gratch & Evans' interpretation to
its logical conclusions, how could we ever explain why all the
infant's search activities are not restricted to one particular
place?
Bremner & Bryant's study is also not without problems. They
too wished to explain the occurrence of the AAB error in terms of
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simple response perseveration. Unfortunately, however, in
attempting to hold place constant, they failed to take account of
an important factor. Although the absolute or geographically
defined location of the object would not have changed between trials,
any egocentric coding (i.e to the left or right of the baby) or
relative coding (i.e to the left or right of the other cup) of that
location would in fact have changed. Their results therefore
cannot provide definitive support for their conclusions. As far
as I know, no resolution of the place versus response argument has
yet been made - nor, I believe, can it be. I shall return to this
problem in Chapter 6.
Other researchers have investigated the role of action in an
even mare direct fashion. In regard to Stage III - IV behaviour,
we have already considered Harris' (1971) experiment in which, at
first glance, it seemed that visual-manual inspection of the object
was a precondition for search. It was decided that Harris' data
did not warrant such a strong conclusion (see p 69 )• In
considering Stage IV - V, if prior successful action is assumed to
be the determining factor in producing errors, one might expect to
find differences between infants who make large numbers of
successful searches at A before the object is hidden at B and
infants who merely observe the A hidings before being required to
search at B. Although Piaget is careful not to commit himself on
this point, it would seem that looking and doing are not given
equivalent status in development.
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landers (1971) varied the number of A trials (2, 8 or 10)
for three groups of nine month old infants; two further groups
were given 6 or 8 observation-only A trials which were then
followed by two standard, active A trials. Although all groups
tended to err on the first B trial, the group who had 8 or 10
active A trials made longer runs of searches at A on the B trials
than the other groups.
It is important to note, however, that in this experiment the
infants were in fact given the toy after it had been uncovered in
the observational-only trials and also on erring on B trials. It
is therefore possible that observational trials were not as 'inactive'
as Landers might like to think. Observation may still elicit a
rehearsal of overt search or active orientation and it could even be
maintained that, from the infant's point of view, this (albeit
limited) action was successful since the experimenter eventually
uncovered the toy and gave it to the infant. Without a clearer
definition of what constitutes activity, it is impossible to rule out
such objections. The longer run of errors found in the active 8 or
10 trials at A groups could simply be a result of their becoming set
in their ways of searching - wrong search still resulted in
obtaining the object, thereby reinforcing an already well established
habit of going to A, even when the object was seen being hidden at B.
The major flaw of Landers' study is, of course, that no group
was given exclusively observation-only A trials; all groups had at
least two active A trials. A study by Evans (19710 attempted to
replicate Landers' findings, using all active or all observation-only
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A trials, thereby making it possible, subject to the reservations
outlined above, to evaluate more clearly the role of active
experience in determining the appearance of the Stage IV error.
Infants were not given the toy if they erred. Evans found that
comparable numbers of infants in both groups tended to err on the
first B trial and runs of errors on subsequent B trials were also
very similar in length, a finding confirmed by Butterworth (197U,
1977)- To my mind, runs of errors in any condition in themselves
weaken the action argument in its strong form. If search is
directed on the basis of previous successful actions, why should
the infant continue to respond at A after, say, h unsuccessful
searches there? Further evidence of search at a prior location in
8 month olds in a situation in which 'action perseverance' theories
could not be forwarded is given by Lucas & Uzgiris (1977).
How should we define 'action'?
Perhaps the most striking - and problematic - evidence on the
role of action in object concept development canes from Gouin-
Decarie's (1969) study of its development in thalidomide babies.
Obviously these babies could not have had the same kind or indeed
amount of active experience that normal infants have. Nonetheless,
their development of the object concept was more or less on par with
the normal ages of acquisition of each stage. Similar results have
been found by Kopp St Shaperman (1973).
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This brings us back to the problem of the ambiguity of the
notion of activity in the sensori-motor period. How literally do
we define 'action'? Gouin-Decarie herself would maintain that
the normal development of the object concept in thalidomide
children does not embarrass the Piagetian formulation of the source
of the infant's problems in this period, that Piaget was
emphasising central activity rather than peripheral actions. From
such a stance, the above results are not irreconcilable with the
importance of action in object concept development. This is not,
however, a position which Piaget himself has clearly taken as far
as I know. As I have already said, it is not at all clear whether
looking and doing can perform the same functions in the construction
of notions of reality - this period of development is, after all,
referred to as the sensori-motor period and is never discussed as if
this could be taken to include sensori-perceptual in its meaning.
The concept of action as used by Piaget is indeed rather vague
and ill-specified. Particularly during his analysis of the sensori¬
motor period, there is little indication whether 'activity'
literally means physically-expressed actions or whether it is a more
subtle notion, involving more covert, centralised organisation of
behaviours. The looseness of the concept is no doubt intentional.
Piaget considered activity as being ultimately involved in all
levels of cognitive functioning; the form and nature of this
activity in fact constitutes the main defining characteristic of each
of the stages. Development seems to be described as progressing
from organisations of mainly overt, sensori-motor activity to more
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internalised schemas which., with development, are capable of
becoming totally abstract in nature. Even this highest level
of functioning is, however, rooted in simple sensori-motor
beginnings.
Interpreters of Piaget have attempted to shake off evidence
of the irrelevance of simple overt action in early cognitive
development with accusations of insensitivity to the complexities
and subtleties of Piaget's notion - simple coarse action was never
what Piaget intended at all. Whether this stance is defensible
in relation to the sensori-motor period is however questionable.
In this period, the infant is assumed to have no differentiated
awareness of self and objects; it therefore seems an unavoidable
conclusion that all object knowledge must be constructed via
direct interactions with objects. In particular, Piaget's
explanation of the Stage IV error is hard to interpret in terms of
other than overt motor response and more central possibilities are
neither elaborated nor hinted at. It would therefore seem to me
that although Piaget may not have meant to give such a literal-
interpretation to the notion of activity in sensori-motor
intelligence, this is in fact what it comes out as, particularly
when it is considered in relation to his treatment of the nature
of activity in later stages. It is the very overt nature of
activity in this period that distinguishes it from the later phases
of development.
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Reasons for rejecting motor skill/action explanations of
object concept problems
On the whole the evidence seems to point to action, as commonly
defined, being of relative unimportance in the development of the
object concept. Action and motor skill obviously have roles to
play in development but what seems to be more important is the
ability to control and appropriately apply newly acquired motor
behaviours once established. Certainly, the experimental evidence
would seem to undermine the importance of the role of straightforward
physical action to development. As Gouin-Decarie would suggest,
however, such negative conclusions may be the result of our inadequate
definitions of what constitutes activity. Mien it comes down to it,
the main objection to present motor skill/action theories of
cognitive development is probably that they place too much emphasis on
overt actions without sufficient regard to the less obvious,
(12)internalised activity which undoubtedly takes place in search tasks.
It is always possible that more sensitive interpreters of Piaget's
position may come up with a more acceptable and less vague version of
the action hypothesis. In the meantime, however, this theory too
must be set to one side.
(12) Take, for example, the behaviour of a baby who has just made
an AAB error. Having confidently picked up what turns out to be
the wrong cup, the baby may well examine this cup thoroughly, shaking
it and putting his hand inside it to check that the object is
definitely not there, looking most surprised throughout. Such
behaviour does not merely represent the repetition of a previously
successful action; it is surely evidence that the baby 'thought'
that he would find the object under that cup.
- 101 -
3. REPRESENTATION/MEMORY EXPLANATIONS
The third and probably most popular category of object
concept explanation assumes that the problems shown in object
permanence tasks stem from either representation or memory
difficulties. Recent evidence suggests, however, that these forms
of explanation are also inadequate.
Representational analyses
According to Piaget, the culmination of development in the
sensori-motor period is the appearance of the ability to respond
to the environment without having to resort to overt action. The
infant's "sensori-motor apprenticeship" (Flavell, 1963) is over and
new means are now invented through internal, mental co-ordinations.
This ability to represent frees the child spatially and temporally,
allowing reorganisation of earlier schemata without recourse to
externalised actions. Graduation from the sensori-motor stage is
a direct result of the appearance of this ability.
Many interpreters of Piaget have maintained on the basis of
this that the problems that the infant has in object concept "tasks
must be due solely to his inability to represent objects in their
absence (see e.g Hunt, 1969). In its simplest form, this argument
would maintain that 'out of sight is out of mind' for the sensori¬
motor infant, his behaviour in search tasks being based on
repetition of actions which have previously led to successful
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recovery of the object. Depending on the complexity of the
search task and the level of development of the infant, these
behaviours will or will not be appropriate.
The infant's inability to represent an object in its
absence could in theory account quite satisfactorily for the
behaviours seen in traditional object permanence situations. If
the infant's understanding of objects is inextricably linked to
his actions upon them, he would not, while in Stage IV for example,
understand that an object can change position without there having
been some activity on his part. This view could be modified
later to allow the object to change position as long as it had been
seen to move but would not, until Stage VI and the advent of
representation, allow for invisible displacements of objects.
It should be immediately pointed out that Piaget's complex
theorising on development in the sensori-motor period is by no means
reducible to one element, not even one so important and central to
his model as representational ability. As was stated at the
beginning, although the alternatives to Piaget's account of this
period have been divided into four categories, all are essentially
extensions or modifications of ideas which Piaget himself
considered in constructing his theory and none of which was given
absolute importance in his presentation. He has at no point
stated a belief that 'out of sight' is 'out of mind', more guardedly
stating that the infant in such situations 'acts as if the object
no longer existed'.
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Nevertheless, many investigators have concentrated on the role
of representation in object concept development, assuming that the
infant's difficulty in the search tasks must be attributable to
their inability to represent the object in its absence. It is
perhaps understandable how researchers arrived at the conclusion
that visibility/invisibility must be the key to object concept
problems. Information of object location given through any of the
other senses does not seem able to compensate for loss of visual
information. Ringing, squeaking, rattling or similar* audible clues
from the hidden object do not persuade the Stage HI infant to
attempt to relocate it (Fraiberg, Siegel & Gibson, 1966, Freedman,
Fox-Kolenda, Margileth & Miller, 1969, Piaget, 1937)- Tactual
information as to object location is similarity ineffectual (Piaget,
1937, Gratch & Landers, 1971, Gratch, 1972, Brown, 1973).
"At 0.7 (28) Jacqueline tries to grasp a celluloid
duck on top of her quilt. She almost catches it,
shakes herself, and the duck slides down beside
her. It falls very close to her hand but behind
a fold in the sheet. Jacqueline's eyes have
followed the movement, she has even followed it
with her outstretched hand. But as soon as the
duck has disappeared - nothing morel It does not
occur to her to search behind the fold in the sheet,
which would be very easy to do (she twists it
mechanically without searching at all).... I
then take the duck from its hiding place and place
it near her hand three times. All three times she
tries to grasp it, but when she is about to touch
it I replace it very obviously under the sheet.
Jacqueline immediately withdraws her hand and gives
up. The second and third time I make her grasp
the duck through the sheet and she shakes it for a
brief moment but it does not occur to her to raise
the cloth".
(Piaget, 1937, Obs. 28)
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Such findings do not, however, mean that visibility by default
must be crucial to the maintenance of object knowledge in early
infancy. Visibility of the object will obviously simplify any
object problem, particularly if that problem involves relocation
of the object. As Experiment 2 showed, however, making the
object visible does not entirely remove the infant's problems in
search tasks. Lifting the occluder in the transparent cup
situation still took approximately twice as long as it normally
would.
Memory explanations
Other researchers have emphasised the role of visibility
because they believe the errors shown in the standard test
situations to be attributable to simple memory deficiencies in the
young infant. Such researchers deny the need for recourse to
any over-elaborate theory of a developing object concept. In the
Stage III - IV situation, for example, they would maintain that out
of sight is literally out of mind, the Stage III infant simply
having no memory of the object to direct his search. In the
Stage IV - V task, search at A when the object has been moved to B
is due to a lapse of memory, a sort of absent-mindedness. Put in
more technical terms, the AAB error is the result of proactive
interference between visual memory of a recent event and action-
based memory for a successful action (Harris, 1973, Webb, Massar &
Nadolny, 1972); it is not, as Piaget would have it, caiised by the
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infant's failure to register the hiding at B - it is registered
but is then forgotten. Such seemingly straightforward
explanations can also account for residual errors in the Stage
IV - V task, errors found when search in the correct, new location
is unsuccessful or frustrated. On the memory hypothesis,
unsuccessful search leads to 'a resampling of the available cues'
and the infant quite naturally looks in the object's prior location.
It is important to note that such explanations do not concern
themselves with the possibility that the infant has problems in
understanding the nature of objects - his only problem is
remembering where to find them.
Attractively simple though memory explanations of the infant's
difficulty in object concept testing situations may be, they somehow
lack conviction. They seek to deny that a misunderstanding of the
nature and properties of objects is at the base of the inappropriate
search behaviour shown and yet it seems unlikely to me that mere
forgetting could explain away all the infant's difficulties in such
tasks. Common, everyday observations of the behaviour of even
young infants suggest that memory just cannot be so short-lived.
Gratch, Appel, Evans, Le Compte & Wright (197b), for instance, found
that although a delay between hiding and search was necessary for
elicitation of the AAB error, that delay need not be greater than 1
second. Observations in the Stage IV - V testing situation suggest
further that the error is not a result of lack of attention.
Infants who are raptly attentive to each part of the hiding sequence
nevertheless go straight back to A on the catch trial. Surely
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infant memory cannot be so limited nor proactive interference so
powerful as to eradicate entirely the memory of an object seen
only an instant beforehand? Evidence that memory for an object
which has been occluded is of at least 5> seconds duration in
infants as young as 8 weeks has been presented by Bower (1967)
while Fagan (1973) has found evidence of recognitive memory of a
static visual array still being present in 3 month old infants
(13)
after a period of two weeks.
Memory experiments
Gratch et al (197^) performed a series of experiments to test
the memory explanation of the AAB error. If errors are a result
of forgetting the new hiding place, the length of the delay in
onset of search should be a significant factor in production of
errors. They found, however, that 9 month old infants were likely
to err equally in all of their delay conditions (l, 3 and 7 seconds),
although errors were virtually absent in an 0-second delay condition.
(13) Such a finding could be taken as embarrassing both Piaget's
and Bruner's theories of memory. It is difficult to see how memory
for a static visual display could be based on motor schemas or
enactive representation. One could resort to insisting that eye
movement activity is at the base of such memory. As no comparisons
have as yet been made of the relations between visual scanning
patterns during first exposure and those during subsequent recognition
or non-recognition, it is impossible to refute such an explanation
(Haith & Campos, 1977).
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This latter fact does seem, to suggest that the infant does in
fact register the new hiding place and then forgets but the authors
suggest that success in the no-delay condition is an artefact, a
result of 'motor set' or the infant being frozen into the correct
orientation. As soon as this set is broken (and this can only
happen when there is a delay in search), the infant will assimilate
the hiding of the object at B into his schema of finding the object
at A. Such an interpretation represents an attempt to maintain
the essential features of Piaget's description of the Stage IV - V
problem.
Harris, one of the original proponents of the memory
hypothesis, also found that a delay was necessary for elicitation
of the error and further maintained that the error was only
produced when a particularly distracting hiding sequence was
employed: toy hidden in new position, that position covered and then
the former position covered (Harris, 1973). Gratch et al (197^0 did
not, however, find that such a complicated and distracting sequence
was necessary for production of the error while Butterworth (l97^)
has even found that it is not necessary to hide the object at all to
produce evidence of confusion.
As I have said, attentiveness does not seem to influence
behaviour in the AAB situation at all. Gratch et al (197^) found
no evidence of correlation between attention during presentation or
delay on the B trial and errors on that trial. Direction rather
than amount of attention seems more important in determining success
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or failure in young infants in the Stage IV - V task. Forgetting
in the traditional sense does seem to play a role in older, less
attentive infants but it is not at the base of the errors when
first manifested.
Harris (1975) has suggested a modification to the memory
hypothesis which might make it more acceptable. He suggests that
it is not the invisibility of the object in itself which causes
problems but the fact that the object was visible and then became
invisible. Piaget (1937) and White (1969) have noted that an
object which is put in the infant's hand while outside the visual
field will be carried into the visual field for inspection. Yet
both Bruner (1969) and Gratch (1972) found that a 6 month old infant
would typically be unable to retrieve an object if his hand was
covered by an opaque cloth as he grasped it. Success in both of
these tasks would seem to depend on derivation of object knowledge
from tactual information yet in one case, the infants are
successful while in the other they fail. Harris believes that it
is the fact that the object was at first visible to the infant and
then became invisible that ca^^ses the difficulty in the second
situation. In support of his claim, he cites Gratch's finding that
infants could easily cope with this problem if a transparent cloth
were used to cover the hand that was grasping the object. This
finding fits in with the result of Experiment 2 although the infants
in that task, while succeeding with transparent cups, by no means
found it an easy task, a fact which surely casts some doubt on
claims that loss of visibility alone causes the infants problems in
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the standard situation. Since Experiment 2 showed that the
problem did not lie in motor skill deficiencies either, this
surely suggests the presence of a third factor. I shall return
to this in the next section on identity.
Experiment 2 was ambiguous on the point of whether out of
sight is out of mind for Stage III infants. The in-sight
condition, the transparent cup situation, still proved to have
associated difficulties, albeit less disabling than those
associated with the opaque condition. We have seen that these
could not be dismissed as mere motor problems. To assess the
true importance of visibility/invisibility it is necessary to
have an out of sight condition which carries with it near minimal
behavioural problems. If out of sight is indeed out of mind, the
absence of behavioural problems will be of no help to the infant.
If on the other hand, out of sight is merely an (additional)
problem in retrieving the object, then the absence of the
behavioural, problems posed by the standard situation might allow





12 twenty week old infants, 6 male, 6 female, served as
subjects.
PROCEDURE
The subjects were given a standard Piagetian object permanence
test as described in Experiment 2 (p 83)- All of them failed to
remove the occluder. A different out of sight condition was then
presented. The table used in the standard situation was removed
and the doll was presented on the end of a string, dangling in
front of the baby. The infant was restrained by his mother from
reaching out for the toy (a precaution necessary to ensure that any
subsequent reaching could not be dismissed as mere 'extension of the
movements of accommodation') and the room lights were extinguished.
Since the room was light-tight, this left the baby in total
darkness. The toy was thus out of sight, as was everything else in
the environment.
(ill) This study has already been published (Bower, T.G.R. &
Wishart, J.G - Appendix D).
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The babies' behaviour was recorded with an infra-red T.V.
system, the vidicon of which was sensitive to light between 8^0
and 875 millimicrons. Illumination in this spectral band,
which is totally invisible to the human eye, was provided by a
specially constructed light source using multiple crossed
polaroid filters.
The babies were left alone in the darkness for three minutes
unless persistent distress warranted termination of the experiment
prior to the elapse of that time. The standard object permanence
test was then repeated.
RESULTS
None of the infants passed the standard object permanence
test on either presentation. All of than were able to reach out
to obtain the object out of sight in darkness. The reaching in the
dark was accurate (Figure 3-6). The hands went straight to the
object locus even after initial periods of distress lasting as long
as 90 seconds.
Figure 3.6 The 20 week old infant shown
here is sitting in complete
darkness. Despite this, he
is able to reach out and
obtain the object he had seen




The above experiment seems to demonstrate that out of sight
is not out of mind, not even that part of mind that controls
hand movements (see p 32 ), provided the transition to out of
sight is accomplished by plunging the room into darkness.
The first published account of this experiment caused two
objections to be raised to the claim that success in this task
demonstrated that out of sight was not out of mind for the Stage
III infant (Haith & Campos, .1977). Both, I think, can be shown
to be invalid. The criticisms were:
1. the infants may have been in the act of reaching
when the lights wSnt out, in which case successful
capture in the dark would merely be an instance of
of the "extension of the movements of accommodation",
a recognised Stage HI accomplishment
2. some tactile groping to retrieve a perceptual
experience may occur even in Stage III. (Obs. 17,
Construction of Reality (Piaget, 1937) was cited as
evidence for this claim).
As can be seen from the account given above, infants were in
fact restrained from reaching until the lights were extinguished.
Although this makes it unlikely that subsequent reaches represent
no more than extension of accommodatory movements, it is not
possible to refute the suggestion that the reaching schema had
nevertheless been activated centrally pin.or to the lights going
out. It would be difficult to design any experiment which could
refute such objections - it would be equally difficult to design
an experiment to prove that this was in fact the case. I feel,
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however, that the latency in some cases of the initial reach very
much diminishes the force of any such argument.
The second criticism is, I feel, based on a rather
inadequate inspection of Piaget's observation 17, one of five
observations which Piaget groups together as instances of response
to 'interrupted prehension'.
"Obs. 17. As early as 0.1; (6) Laurent searches
with his hand for a doll he has just let go. He
does not look at what he is doing but extends his
arm in the direction toward which it was oriented
when the object fell.
At 0.1; (21) also, he lowers his forearm in order
to find under the sheet a stick he held in his
hand and which he has just let go.
Same reaction at O.J? (2I4) with all sorts of
objects. I then try to determine how extensive
his search is. I touch his hand with a doll
which I immediately withdraw] he is satisfied to
lower his forearm without really exploring the
surrounding area ..."
The tactile groping in this observation is not to retrieve a
perceptual experience but, more specifically, to retrieve a tactual
experience - instances of what Piaget later refers to as 'tactile
permanence'. As none of the infants in this experiment were
allowed to touch the object prior to the lights going out, the
behaviour shown in the dark cannot legitimately be compared to this
form of behaviour.
These criticisms aside, one could infer from this experiment
that out of sight is not out of mind in the standard situation
either, the difficulties of the motor task simply summing with
difficulties created by the fact that the object is no longer
visible. One should, however, be beware of equating all the changes
in stimulation that result in disappearance of an object. Michotte
- im -
(1955, 1962), as we know, has given a careful account of the
psychophysics of disappearance, an account which has not
unfortunately been given the attention it deserves by many infant
psychologists (including Piaget). Michotte clearly demonstrated
that, in adults, all disappearances are not perceptually and
conceptually equivalent. He has specified in some detail the
necessary stimulus conditions for existence constancy. An abrupt,
wholefield disappearance (as in this experiment), for instance,
will lead to existence constancy whereas an abrupt, local
disappearance (such as that caused by an explosion) will not.
Bower (196?) found evidence that babies operate in a similar
fashion to adults on at least ii of Michotte's categories of
disappearance. It could be argued that disappearance under a
cloth is a disappearance of the second sort (i.e abrupt and local)
in the hands of an experimenter who covers the object too quickly
for the infant's information-processing apparatus to register
those very aspects of the disappearance sequence which will allow
for existence constancy. Bower found evidence of existence
constancy in 7 week old infants in a task in which a moving screen
occluded an object. This existence constancy disappeared, however,
if the speed at which the screen moved over the object was raised
from 25 to 75 crn/sec., a fact which suggested to Bower that the
infant's visual system had a rather low temporal resolution. It
seemed to be unable to detect such an occlusion as gradual,
registering it instead as abrupt. It seems unlikely, however,
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given the evidence that Bower presents on the rapid development
of capacity to process occlusion information and the age of the
babies used in this experiment,that the slow, gradual covering of
the object used in the traditional testing situation did not allow
for processing out of the requisite information. Obviously some
other factor, absent frcm the reaching in the dark situation, must
be contributing to the infant's difficulty in the standard
situation. This factor seems to be reducible to neither motor
problems, problems presented by the invisibility of the object nor,
as was suggested in Experiment 2, to a combination of these.
Further evidence that invisibility alone is not the source of the
infant's problems
The above experiment lends weight to the view that invisibility
and the associated problems of memory and representation are
secondary in any analysis of the infant's problem with objects.
When it comes down to it, all memory and representation explanations
depend on the errors occurring only when the object is out of sight.
Obviously, if the object is still in sight, neither memory nor
representation difficulties can be responsible for the failure to
produce appropriate search behaviours. We have already seen in
Experiment 2 that an object 'hidden' inside a transparent cup
presents a measure of difficulty which is not attributable to motor
skills alone; it can obviously not be attributed to failure of
memory either.
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There is an increasing body of evidence which suggests that
focusing on problems of representation in sensori-motor
development has led to an over-emphasis on the study of infant's
reactions to objects which have disappeared. An object which is
out of sight seems only to be a special case of a more general
problem infants have in constructing a working object concept.
We shall now consider some of this evidence.
We have already seen that infants are able to demonstrate
functionally some knowledge of those parts of an object which
they cannot see (see p 58 ). There is also evidence from tracking
studies that very young infants can represent the path of an
object which goes behind a screen (Bower, Broughton & Moore, 1971,
Gardner, 1971). The experiment of Mundy-Castle & Anglin (1973) is
perhaps the most impressive of such studies and the most damaging
to those who would wish to assert that object problems can be
reduced to either memory or representational deficits. The
apparatus used by Mundy-Castle & Anglin is shown in Figure 3.7-
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Fig 3.7 The ITlundy-Castle R flnglin apparatus
The object would move up through the left window, disappearing
at the top of this window, reappearing at the top of the right-hand
window after a time delay of variable length and moving down through
that window. This cycle was repeated several times. Young
infants would typically respond only retroactively, following the
trajectory of the object to the top of the left-hand window and
staring at that point until noticing the reappearance in the right-
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hand window. With development, anticipatory looking across to
the second window would be shown on disappearance at position 2.
Finally, and most interestingly, infants of around 16 weeks
would interpolate a curvilinear trajectory between positions 2 and
3 of the display which would match the speed of the object and
vary in height according to the length of time the object was out
of sight. This is a truly remarkable achievement. Since the
trajectory is not simply a continuation of the trajectory the object
was on before going out of sight, it is not possible to dismiss this
behaviour as 'mere extension of the movements of accommodation', as
has been suggested (Haith & Campos, 1977). It surely reflects an
ability to infer the position of the invisible object frcm the
information given and severely undermines any claims that infants
are unable to represent an object in its absence.
Let us look now at behaviour in standard object permanence
testing situations. Here too we see evidence that the source of
the infant's problems does not lie in the invisibility of the object.
As mentioned, Gratch & Landers (1971) noted that infants who err in
the AAB task will often look across to A before the object is fully
hidden at B, i.e while it is still perfectly visible at B. Bower
(l97^a) also noted that if, after several hidings, an object is
placed beside the cup rather than inside it, Stage IV infants will
lift, examine and shake that cup, even although the desired object
is in full view and easily obtainable. Butterworth (1977)
similarly found that MB errors were shown in a situation in which
the object changed position but remained perfectly visible
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throughout the entire sequence - the containers into which the
object was placed were not covered and yet, on the B trial,
infants would still search at A.
Equally unfortunate for memory/representation explanations
are those experiments which modify the standard test situation by
using transparent cups or cloths. All essentially come to the
same conclusion: search tasks in which the object remains visible
throughout the entire 'hiding' sequence still pose problems for the
infant, although such problems do tend to be solved earlier than
their opaque counterparts.
Experiment 2 has already been discussed. It was found that
hiding an object under a transparent cup, while easier than a
similar task using an opaque cup, still presented difficulties to
Stage III infants. Gratch (1972) found no trouble with transparent
cloths but used older infants (6-7 months) and gave no indication
of how long it took the infants to succeed in the transparent
situation.
A cross-sectional study of object concept development using
both transparent and opaque cups was carried out by Neils on (1977).
She used infants of 7 - 15 months of age and compared their
performance on both tasks. Success with transparent cup problems
followed exactly the same sequence of development as success with
opaque cups. While the majority of infants were in the same stage
with both opaque and transparent cups, 5 did better with transparent
than opaque cups while no infants showed the reverse pattern.
These results suggest that while disappearance plays a role in
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Stages III - VI of object concept development, that role is a
minor one. Butterworth (197^4) has replicated and confirmed
these results. His finding that runs of B errors in the Stage
IV - V transparent condition were less consistent than runs of B
errors in the opaque condition lends support to the view that
visibility of the object can facilitate search but is not the whole
answer to the infant's difficulties in these problems.
Harris (l97h) also examined the role of visibility in object
search and was forced to modify greatly his view of the role of
memory in object concept development. Using fixed transparent
screens and an MB procedure, Harris found that one year old
infants, although attempting to search first at the new location of
the object (B), would then approach the prior location of that object
(A), even when the object was still perfectly visible in its new
location. (Three infants were in fact seen to approach this
visibly empty location first). Residual errors such as these
obviously cannot simply be the result of memory problems since the
object was clearly in view throughout. They seem to indicate that
the infant does not treat the two positions of the object as mutually
exclusive. Such a finding supports the view that the errors shown
in object concept tasks result from conceptual naivete and are not
reducible to mere memory deficiencies.
Although it seemed unlikely that approach to the visibly empty
location was an artefact of the experimental procedure, the
experiment was repeated with both doors now openable and door B
opaque. This control dealt with any objection that approach to the
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visibly empty location was caused by the fact that it was
impossible to open door B. When the object disappeared at B,
it was removed by the experimenter in order to see if residual
errors could still be elicited. In this situation too, infants
were found to approach door A on B trials even although it was
quite obviously empty.
All of the above points to visibility/invisibility playing
only a secondary role in object concept problems. Experiments
focusing on infant reactions to disappearing objects, while
yielding useful information, cannot tell us the whole story. The
infant's difficulties in traditional object concept tasks seem to
be determined by some much more general misunderstanding of what is
happening in these situations. These difficulties are not simply
attributable to the object having disappeared from sight.
Perfectly visible objects still cause the infant problems. As a
result, it seems that representation/memory explanations must,
along with intersensory co-ordination and motor skill/action
explanations, be rejected as unsatisfactory. The next chapter will
consider the fourth alternative, the identity hypothesis.
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CHAPTER FOUR - IDENTITY THEORIES
A shift of emphasis - the rule-forming infant
The preceding chapters would seem to suggest that the problems
that infants have in dealing with objects are not simply reducible
to problems of representation or motor skill. It also seemed that
neither the absence of intersensory co-ordination nor deficiencies
in memory could satisfactorily account for the surprising
behaviours so reliably found in standard object permanence testing
situations.
All of these explanations were in part derived from Piaget's
analysis of development in this period. However, the explanation
which,centred on the most essential ingredient of Piaget's
theorising - the importance of the infant's own activity to his
construction of reality - was the one theory which could not be
emphatically rejected. It seemed as though the ambiguity inherent
in the notion of 'activity' ensured that no firm, negative conclusions
could be drawn from any experiments seeking to demonstrate that
sensori-motor activity was not important to object concept
development.
As was pointed out, it is doubtful whether Piaget himself
would have considered it legitimate to dismiss these results by
claiming object knowledge in the sensori-motor period to be a
construction of more 'central' activity than was (or could be)
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examined by such experiments. It is doubtful in fact whether
even visual activity could be substituted effectively for more
direct action on Piaget's formulations (see p 98 ). Perception
for Piaget is only a 'figurative' process and cannot specify
important object properties directly: it is the action schemas
which provide the source of any continuity and meaning in perceptual
experience. Bearing this in mind, it does not seem feasible to
assume that he would have been willing to extend his notion of
activity to include mental activity of a productive and directive
nature during this period.
It is this unwillingness to entertain the notion of
constructive mental activity in the young infant which makes Piaget's
theorising hard to accept. His central tenet - that the infant has
no differentiated awareness of self from objects - makes it
impossible (or so it seems to me) for any meaningful knowledge of
reality to be constructed from perceptual experience alone; the
infant must interact directly with objects if he is ever to
understand their true nature.
By emphasising the role of activity in the construction of
reality, the level of object understanding attributed to infants
prior to the development of the behavioural skills necessary to such
interactions (i.e prior to Stage III) must be minimal on Piaget's
theory. As Experiment 1 of this thesis has already shown, such
pessimism is unjustified; Experiment 5 (to be presented later) will
hopefully add weight to the evidence that an infant does not have
to participate in an event sequence in order to be able to learn
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something about the nature of the objects involved in that sequence.
All of the evidence from anatomical and neurophysiologies! research
points to the visual system being relatively mature at birth in
comparison to other systems (see e.g Mann, I96I4); this alone should
lead us to suspect that visual activity would be an important source
of information for the young infant.
Following the analysis of Bower (1971, 19?Ua), I would like to
maintain that the infant's difficulty lies, not in differentiating
himself and his actions from other activity in the external world,
but rather in understanding the unique nature of objects themselves.
Firstly, and surprisingly, he will have to discover the relationship
between the spatio-temporally separated appearances of any single
object; having achieved this, the infant must then work towards an
understanding of those spatial relationships which can exist between
any one object and another without affecting the independent and
continuing existence of either. In working towards such an
understanding, it is suggested that the infant will formulate a
series of increasingly elaborated identity rules. Eventually,
these rules will enable him to maintain the unique identity of an
object throughout any event sequence. This theory of object concept
development will be elaborated below and attempts made to justify it.
On the identity analysis, the baby is not seen to have any
problem in differentiating himself from objects; there is evidence
that his understanding of the differentiated properties of single,
static objects is present very early on and may even be innate, (see
below). Nor does he have problems in understanding the continuing
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existence of objects when unperceived; again, it seems that at a
very early stage in development, an object is attributed an
existence which is quite independent of the baby's perception and
actions upon it. The problati which arises in 'object permanence
type situations is seen rather as one of maintaining this
understanding in an event sequence which contains another object.
This problem can be reduced to a problem of maintaining the identity
of a particular object throughout any event sequence in which it
interacts in and/or shares common space with another object. Direct
activity on the part of the baby is secondary in this understanding
process although it must serve a useful confirmatory function in
many instances.
It is important here to distinguish between the concept of
activity and the question of the role of experience in object concept
development. Wo one would seek to deny that experience must play a
role in all cognitive development. I wish only to maintain that
direct action upon objects is not the necessary source of all
experience pertinent to object concept development in infancy. It
is to be hoped that the experiments to be presented in this and
following chapters will throw some light on the role of experience
in object concept development and allow us to derive some practical
implications from it.
The interpretation of the infant's difficulties in dealing with
objects outlined above is obviously not compatible with Piaget's
analysis. On this analysis, the source of the problem does not lie
in lack of differentiation of the self from objective reality nor is
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direct, overt activity on objects seen as the only route to a
true understanding of objects and their defining properties. As
we might suspect by now, however, the element central to such an
interpretation - the notion of object identity - can be found in
Piaget's original theorising; Piaget, however, believed it to be
of only secondary importance in understanding the infant's
behaviour.
Piaget first introduced the notion of identity in his
analysis of the Stage IV error. In making the AAB error, the
infant is primarily seen by Piaget as repeating that action which
had previously been successful in recovering the object - i.e
search at A. While unwilling to relinquish the importance of
activity to all stages of the construction of the object concept,
his analysis of the Stage IV error suggested that another factor
might also be influencing the infant's bizarre behaviour, the
infant's failure to realise that an object retains its unique
identity when in a different location. He suggested that the
Stage IV infant identifies the object simply as the object-I-found-
at-A, the object and its location being inseparably linked in the
same definition, in terms of the infant's previous successful
activity. Identification and location of an object by means of
such restricted rules of identity would obviously lead to error in
an AAB situation.
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Bower and the identity hypothesis
Although it seems very likely that spatial factors do play a
very important role in the infant's developing rules of object
identity, it seems rather less likely that these are so necessarily
linked to the infant's activity. Bower (1971, 197^a) was the
first to suggest that the infant's problems did not lie, as Piaget
would have it, in differentiating objects from the self via a long
apprenticeship of interactions between self and object, but rather
in understanding the continuing identity of an object throughout an
event sequence. On Bower's analysis, it is immaterial whether
that event sequence actively involves the perceiver or not. The
infant's problem is one of understanding, for example, that an
object seen in one position and then seen to move to another position
is one and the same object when in that second position, that an
object when hidden inside a cup does not lose its unique identity and
is still recoverable even although occupying the same space as
another object (the cup), and so on.
Bower's view of the development of the object concept as being
development of increasingly" comprehensive notions of object identity
does not necessitate direct actions on the part of the infant (although
direct action may, of course, be used at later stages of development
to test out the validity of newly-formed identity or search rules).
Development of the object concept is seen rather as a process of
conceptual development. The first identity rules arrived at by the
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infant are., unsurprisingly, inadequate; they are responsible for
the characteristic errors we see in object permanence tasks.
Nevertheless, each new rule obviously signifies some advance in
cognitive organisation and out of these identity rules
probabilistically-determined search strategies will emerge. This
emphasis on the development of rules and strategies rather than
errors makes Bower's theorising compatible with our knowledge of
the competences shown by the young infant in so many other areas
of development (see e.g Chapter l).
In contrast, Piaget defined development in this period very
much in terms of failures - failure to follow moving objects,
failure to recover partially covered objects etc. In addition,
his belief that infants prior to Stage VI are unable to represent
an object in its absence caused him to concentrate on the
development of infant reactions to objects that went out of sight
in one way or another. All simple out-of-sight conditions were,
however, considered to be equivalent - a ball falling to the ground
under the force of gravity was taken as presenting the same
disappearance problem as an adult passing through a doorway or an
object being covered by a cloth. No allowance was made for the
differential information-processing and response demands such
differing stimulus situations might present.
Piaget's emphasis on the role of activity in development does
not allow him to make any clear distinction between competence and
performance - performance is the only possible expression of
competence. Poor performance in the early stages was taken as
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prima facie evidence of lack of object knowledge. Any behaviour
which might superficially - or even more easily - have been
explained in terms of awareness of an external reality was quickly
dismissed as involving 'a most improbable power of spatial
representation and intellectual construction' (Piaget, 1937).
After all, if the infant at 9 months cannot be taken to show any
differentiated awareness of self from object or knowledge of the
independent existence of objects, how could his behaviour at,say,
three months possibly indicate any such understanding? As a result,
development in the first two stages was given only minimal attention.
Bower believed that Piaget had seriously underestimated the
amount of object -understanding present in young infants. By using
test situations which were not sufficiently sensitive to their
limited response and information handling capacities, Piaget had
given them little opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge. In a
series of interlocking experiments, Bower produced a new analysis
of the source of the infant's difficulties in the standard tests and
forced a revision of our estimates of the cognitive capacities of
young infants.
Object perception and object permanence in the first six months -
a re-assessment
According to Piaget, young infants act as though objects only
exist when perceived. Even then, it is not really 'objects' that
are perceived.
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"During the first months of existence, there are
no permanent objects, but only perceptual pictures
which appear, dissolve, and sometimes reappear".
(Piaget, 1970)
As if this wasn't -bad enough, this unstable world of perceptual
tableaux shows no differentiation between the self and the outside
world; no distinction is made between perceptual impressions which
originate from action of the self and perceptions which should
properly be attributed to independent events in the outside world.
For the young infant then, objects cease to exist the instant they
leave the perceptual field and even those objects which remain in
view do not exist in any differentiated, three-dimensional way.
According to Piaget, it is only by acting in and on the real world
that the infant will gradually impose order on this random and
undifferentiated experience and construct a surrounding world of
objects, existing in three-dimensional space and interrelated
temporally and causally. Only through his own physical efforts
will the child arrive at the concept of an ordered and permanent
universe from these elusive and jumbled impressions, a world which
will be accorded an existence independent in space, time and
causality from the perceiver.
Piaget's evidence for the existence of such limited perceptual
organisation in young infants is suspiciously circular and at best
indirect. His main contention is that there is no way young
infants could have any understanding of the three-dimensional
arrangement of the world or of the continuing and independent
existence of objects while unperceived. Their limited behavioural
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repertoire means that they are not yet capable of interacting in
any positive fashion with the external world; they simply cannot
therefore have had the experience necessary for attainment of that
understanding. The inadequacies and inappropriateness of their
later behaviour is taken as evidence that this is indeed the case.
Such backward inference is extremely risky. It requires three
basic assumptions, all of which can be questioned. It must
assume:
1. that development is necessarily cumulative -
i.e that a younger baby will necessarily perform
more poorly than an older baby in equivalent
situations
2. that the test situations which produce evidence
of little or no object knowledge in young infants
(situations which require visual search for an
object which has gone out of sight) are in fact
equivalent to those test situations which produce
evidence of at least some understanding in older
infants (situations requiring manual search for a
hidden object), and
3. that perception of the third dimension can only be
acquired through active experience within that
dimension.
Bower (197^-b, 1976) has presented and reviewed a great deal of
evidence which undermines the first assumption; I shall return to
this topic later but it need not be considered further at this
point. Assumptions of the equivalence of the various object
permanence tests has already been questioned and the need for
tasks which are within the behavioural and information-processing
capacities of the infants to be tested cannot be over-emphasised.
It is very possible, for example, that Piaget's test for object
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permanence in Stage II (holding an object in front of the baby
and then dropping it) is quite inappropriate for the response
skills available to babies in that age group. Work by Bower
(1967) pointed to the importance of both rate and manner of
disappearance of the object to production or non-production of
evidence of existence constancy. An object falling under the
force of gravity may well be moving too quickly for the young
infant to track successfully; the rate of information change may
in addition be too fast for the infant to process in a meaningful
way. Because the infant does not act in this situation as if the
object continues to exist does not mean that he is unable to
understand a hiding event when presented in a more appropriate
manner (see e.g Experiment 3)- Under certain conditions, Bower
in fact found evidence of existence constancy in infants as young
as seven weeks.
Piaget's last assumption - that the third dimension must be
constructed - has already been touched upon (Chapter 3). Under
certain circumstances, infants are able to demonstrate distally
appropriate behaviour within the first few weeks of life - long
before they can possibly have had enough experience to construct a
third dimension through interactive experience with objects.
Newborns, for example, reach out to touch and grasp objects. They
seem visually to identify objects as solid although they must have
had little or no opportunity to learn to associate visual clues
with tactile impressions, a process which Piaget considers essential
to the construction of such knowledge; if presented with virtual
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objects, objects which look perfectly real but are in fact
intangible, they soon begin to fuss and cry (Bower, Broughton &
Moore, 1970c). Early reaching behaviour is also adjusted to size,
shape and distance (Bower, 1972) - a finding which surely confirms
that the infant is responding to the veridical dimensions of objects
and not to flat retinal images. Young infants will not, however,
reach for an object if it is not defined parallactically, nor if it
does not have well-specified front and rear boundaries (Bower, 1966,
1972, Bower, Dunkeld & Wishart, 1979).
Other evidence that the third dimension need not be constructed
comes from studies investigating defensive responses to approaching
objects. Week old babies will pull their heads back and interpose
their hands between an approaching object and their face, again
even if the object's approach is defined only visually (Bower,
Broughton & Moore, 1970a, Ball & Tronick, 1971^ Dunkeld & Bower,
1979). If the young infant's world consisted only of everchanging,
2-dimensional perceptual tableaux, as Piaget would have it, no such
response should occur; the approach of an object would be seen only
as a series of visually similar but essentially unrelated pictures
which were increasing in size, a sequence which could hardly be
interpreted as threatening. The presence of such behaviours so
early in life led Bower to suggest that perception of real objects
seen in an external, three-dimensional space must be built into the
organisation of the human nervous system at birth. From the start,
an object is identified as a bounded volume of space (Bower, 197Ua);
there is no need to postulate any laborious process of construction.
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If the three assumptions underlying Piaget's argument for
poor and undifferentiated object knowledge in the first six
months are all suspect then, how should we view this period?
A series of experiments by Bower suggest that this is indeed a
very busy period in terms of conceptual organisation. Since
Piaget believed both young and old infants to be incapable of
representation and limited to understanding objects in terms of
their own activities with respect to these objects, it is not
surprising that he emphasised differentiated search behaviour for
a hidden object as the criterion for the attainment of true object
knowledge. This emphasis on the visibility or non-visibility of
the object has, as we have already seen, led us off in completely
the wrong direction. Hidden objects undoubtedly cause infants
problems. Perfectly visible objects can, however, as we shall
see, cause equal and very similar problems throughout this entire
segment of development (see Experiments 2, b and 5). According
to Bower, these difficulties all stem from the rules which the
infant has developed for identifying an object throughout an event
sequence; these identity rules determine the infant's search
activity, in certain circumstances producing very similar responses
in both situations in which the object disappears from view and
situations in which it does not. This approach to understanding
the infant's difficulties has become known as the identity theory of
object concept development. Bower's work on this can conveniently
be broken down into two main parts:
1. the development of object knowledge prior to
six months, and
2. the development of object knowledge after six
months.
The identity theory of object concept development in the
first six months
If the mistakes that older infants make in the later manual
object permanence testing situations are surprising, the visual
behaviour of infants under six months to apparently simple
movements of perfectly visible objects is even more unexpected.
Take, for example, an object which moves and then stops. Although
apparently perfectly able to follow the movement of an object and
perfectly able to stop with that object when it stops, a 12 week
old will nevertheless then go on to look along the path on which
the object would have continued to move had it not stopped - even
although the object he had been tracking is very obviously still
stationery (Bower & Paterson, 1973). This error is known as the
movement error. In another, related situation, a baby of the same
age may soon learn how to keep track of an object which moves
regularly from the centre of a track to the right, pausing a few
seconds there before returning to the centre again. If, however,
after its usual pause in the centre location, the object moves off
in the opposite direction (to the left), the infant will typically
again look to the right, as if fully expecting to see the object in
its usual place after movement from the middle (Bower, Broughton &
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Moore, 1971, Bower & Paterson, 1973). He will ignore its
perfectly obvious location at the opposite end of the track,
making what is known as a place error.
These are most peculiar errors. How are we to explain them?
Bower has suggested that babies of this age identify an object
only in terms of either its location or its motion; its features
are completely ignored. According to these early identity rules,
an object is a bounded volume of space in a particular place or on
a particular path of movement. Such limited rules for identifying
objects, although representing an early attempt to organise
information into more manageable and meaningful units, would
obviously lead to the place and movement errors seen in the
situations described above.
The place rule for identifying objects: According to the place
rule, an object is the same object as long as it is in the same
place. Such a rule does not allow the baby to understand that the
same object can appear in different places and still be the same
object. Adoption of this rule would also mean that all objects in
the same place are the same object, regardless of featural
differences.
If this is indeed the case, young infants should show no
surprise when a stationary object is completely transformed before
their very eyes. This is in fact exactly what happens. If shown
such an event sequence, they make no attempt to relocate the
original object and seem happy to accept the totally transformed
object as the same object (Bower, 197lia - see Figure U.l).
- 137 -
Fig 4.1
When the tunnel containing the ball is
illuminated and the tunnel on the right is
dark, the baby sees the ball through the
half-silvered mirror. If this light is put-
out at exactly the same moment as the RH tunnel
is illuminated, the baby sees the ball
mysteriously transformed into a cube.
Similarly, if a static object is defined solely by its place,
simultaneous appearance of that same object in several locations
should also be possible on the place rule. As we have already
seen, babies below six months of age indeed show no surprise on
presentation of such a display - even when the object in question
is his own mother (see pi; ).
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This emphasis on place in the infant's early definition of
objects should not surprise us. Work by Michotte (1962) showed
that continuity of place plays a role in adult identification of
objects and can even override a simple featural change in the
object being watched. If, however, more than one feature of the
object is changed, adults, unlike infants, will no longer believe
that they are looking at the same object. The adult version of
the place rule is not as limiting as the infant's rule; it is not
an all-or-nothing rule.
The movement rule for identifying objects: The other rule which
Bower suggests young infants seem to apply in identifying an object
as the same object is the movement rule: an object is the same
object as long as it continues on the same path of movement. Such
a rule would mean that all objects on the same path of movement
must be the same object.
Four month olds behave exactly as if working in, accordance with
just such a rule. If a moving object changes all its dimensions
in mid-track - size, colour and shape - these infants will ignore
the changes and continue to track the completely transformed object
as if it were the same object they were originally tracking. If,
however, the characteristics of the movement change, it is an
entirely different matter; the infant will look back and forth
between the old and new trajectory as if searching for the 'original'
object (Bower, Broughton & Moore, 1971).
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The net result of the two above mutually exclusive rules is
that the infant below six months of age does not identify a
stationary object with itself when moving nor a moving object with
itself when stopped. Although well able to register featural
differences between objects (Fantz, 196U, Carpenter, 1975), any
change in features in a stationary or moving object is seen as a
change in one and the same object, however impossible such a
transformation might be; infants below six months of age do not
seem to consider the possibility of a new object having entered the
sequence. Such a strategy may reduce to information-processing
limitations; this is a possibility we shall return to later.
This initial neglect of distinctive featural characteristics
is not perhaps as illogical as it may seem at first glance. Even
for adults, featural identity alone is no guarantee that an object
is the very same object as one which was seen previously in either
the same or a different location - it could equally well be another,
identical object. Any attribution of true identity between two
appearances of an object can only be an educated guess; spatio-
temporal criteria seem to carry more weight in any such decision
than simple, featural identity, no matter how distinctive these
features may be (Michotte, 1962).
The co-ordination of place and movement rules: By around twenty
weeks, the infant seems to have co-ordinated his place and movement
rules for identifying (and consequently re-locating) objects. He
now seems able to understand that an object can move from place to
place and yet remain the same object at all times during this
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sequence. This may not seem to represent a great advance in
object knowledge but it must simplify the infant's experience
considerably. Events become unified sequences involving fewer
'objects'. Previously, the limitations of the infant's rules for
identifying objects meant that a simple event, say an object moving
from A to B, was seen as an event involving three separate objects:
the stationary object at A, the object that moved from A to B and
the stationary object at B.
What evidence is there for this claim that the infant
co-ordinates his place and movement rules around this time? For
a start, both the place and movement errors described above
disappear around the same time (Bower & Paterson, 1973)- Their
decline shows a very similar pattern (see Figure 2.3). The
multiple mother display now produces upset (Bower, 1971* Shiomi, pers.
comm). Transformation of the features of a moving object begins to
elicit search behaviours for the original object (Bower, Broughton &
Moore, 1971* Gardner, 1971* Moore, Borton & Darby, 1978), as will
substitution of a replacement object for the mother in a stationary
display (Bower, 197Ua). Neither place nor movement now suffices for
identification of an object. The infant will be forced to depend on
featural characteristics to differentiate between two objects seen on
the same path of movement or in the same place at different times.
The most conclusive evidence that some amalgamation of place and
movement must have taken place comes, however, from the changes in
behaviour in the Mundy-Castle situation (see Figure 3-7). Around
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five months of age, anticipatory side-to-side (place) tracking is
replaced; instead of simply looking to the other porthole when
the object disappears, infants begin to interpolate a trajectory
between the two portholes - evidence surely of awareness that an
object can move from place to place and in order to do so, must
follow some sort of pathway. As we have seen, if the time
between disappearance and reappearance is lengthened, infants will
increase the height of the interpolated trajectory while
maintaining a speed of tracking consistent with the speed of the
disappearing object. The object knowledge which such behaviour
reflects is indeed quite sophisticated; it shows not only an
awareness of the continued existence of the object while out of
sight but also rather exact knowledge of where it must be while
unseen, a fact which can only be inferred from the information
present before disappearance. Piaget, remember, suggested that
such high-level cognitive activity was not possible prior to Stage
VI.
Bower suggests that the co-ordination of place and movement
rules may be attributed to the infants increasing attention to the
featural information contained in any display. Once, for example,
the baby is able to notice not only that the moving object has
stopped, but that the stopped object is featurally identical to the
moving object, he will soon arrive at the economical conclusion that
the moving object and the stopped object are one and the same object.
He will therefore have arrived at a Stage III definition of an
object incorporating the following elements:
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"an object is a bounded volume of space of a
particular size, shape and colour which can go
from place to place along a path of movement".
(Bower, 197Ua)
Such a rule implies two corollaries:
1. two objects cannot be in the same place at the
same time
2. two objects cannot be on the same path of
movement at the same time.
The development of object knowledge after six months
Can the postulation of the identity rule and its two
corollaries given above account for the difficulties found later
in development? It would seem that it can. Take the Stage III -
IV task for example: if we cover a toy with a cup, two objects are
now in the same place at the same time. There is therefore nothing
in the Stage III infant's identity rules which will allow him to
maintain a belief in the continued existence of the original object.
There is nothing in such a rule to help him to re-locate the object
in the Stage IV - V task either; it has effectively been replaced
by another object, the cup, and to further confusion, there are now
two cups in the visual field. The Stage V - VI task represents an
even greater violation of the infant's identity rules; by hiding the
object under a cup and then transposing the two cups, not only are
two objects in the same place but they also share the same path of
movement at the same time. It is small wonder, then, if the infant
does in fact work on such rules, that such hiding events are
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totally incomprehensible to him. His identity rules place
severe limitations on the type of spatial relationships that one
object may go into with another while retaining its individual
identity.
It is all very well to postulate such an explanation for the
difficulties shown in object permanence situations. How though
are we to explain eventual success in these situations? Even
babies raised in what would be considered impoverished environments
succeed in coping with the highest level tasks approximately on
schedule (Golden & Birns, 1968, Corman & Escalona, 1969). Nor does
severe mental or physical handicap prevent acquisition of the final
stages of object knowledge (Woodward, 1959, Gouin-Decarie, 1969).
This would suggest that simple, commonplace experience, be it
passive or self-initiated, must be sufficient to account for the
progress found.
On Bower's analysis, the main obstacle to completion of object
concept development seems to be acquisition of the knowledge that
one object can, for example, go inside or under another object
without being 'lost'; in other words, that an object continues to
exist and retains its unique identity while in a spatial relationship
to another object. Although the infant's identity rules lead him to
believe otherwise, his expectations must be frequently confounded.
If, for instance, the covering object which so mysteriously replaces
the original object is removed, either deliberately by some other
person or accidently by the infant, the 'lost' object will be
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re-revealed. The infant, remember, already uses features to
identify objects; he can therefore recognise the reappearing
object as being the same as the object which disappeared earlier
in the area of that cup. Eventually, the infant must come to
understand that it must have been somewhere while out of sight,
that it was not in some way annihilated when covered by the cup,
that one and only one object is involved in the entire event
sequence.
Common, everyday situations must,then,provide endless
instances of objects disappearing inside, under and behind other
objects and yet reappearing unchanged at some later point in time.
This, it is suggested, could lead to the formation of a search
rule of the sort:
"to recover an object that has disappeared
mysteriously, remove the object which replaced
it".
Such a rule necessitates no comprehension of the spatial relationship
between the object and occluder but would lead to success in the
Stage III - IV task. In order to succeed in the Stage IV - V task,
however, experience would have to modify such a rule to take into
account the presence of two, featurally identical occluders in the
visual field. Since the object has disappeared in the area of both
of these occluders on different occasions and their identifying
features are the same, the rule would have to be something of the
sort:
"to recover an object that has disappeared
mysteriously, remove the object which is now in
the place where it was last seen".
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Prior to this modification, the infant will be thrown into
conflict when presented with an MB type task. There are two
identical objects in view, both of which have been seen to replace
the original object. Should he look for the object in the place
where he has previously been successful in finding it (a) or should
he look for it in the place where he last saw it (B)? Such a
conflict would lead to just the equiprobable pattern of search that
was found in Experiment 1.
The rule above, though highly efficient in Stage IV - V type
hiding situations, is far from helpful in the Stage V - VI task.
Looking for the original object where it was last seen will
obviously make no allowance for the fact that both occluder and
object have been moved. An identical cup now stands in the original
position and there is nothing in the infant's identity rules to allow
him to understand that the original cup and object have moved
together to a new location. Again, experience will lead the infant
to integrate the relevant information; he recognises the uncovered
object as the same object but in a different position and will
eventually deduce that in order for this to be possible, not only
must the object have continued to exist in the same place as the
cup but that it must have shared its movements during the
transposition. Two objects can be in the same place and can move
on the same path of movement provided they bear an appropriate
spatial relation to each other; in this particular case, the
appropriate relationship is 'inside'.
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Does this reduction of the infant's problems to problems of
maintaining the identity of an object throughout spatio-temporal
transformations represent an advance over the alternative
explanations for the behaviour found in this period of
development? For a start, unlike its competitors, the identity
hypothesis attempts to provide an explanation which can be applied
to all six stages of object concept behaviour. This is an
essential requirement of any explanation since, as Experiment 1 has
demonstrated, the behaviours of the six stages do reflect some
single, common underlying process. The early stages, frequently
neglected by other theorists, are seen as representing the infant's
first attempts to impose identity rules on the events in his
environment. From early primitive definitions focusing only on
paths of movement or spatial location, the infant moves, through
the use of featural information, to identity rules which
co-ordinate the place, movement and features of any object into
one definition. Thereafter, an object that disappears mysteriously
is recognised as the same object on reappearance. It is this
ability to recognise an object as being the same that will lead the
infant through the later stages of the object concept. Although
unable to understand that an object retains its identity when in a
spatial relation to another object, the equally mysterious
reappearance of that very same object when the spatial relationship
no longer holds will cause the infant to produce progressively more
elaborated rules of search. Eventually, through passive
experience and/or active experimentation, he will arrive at the
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understanding that an object must continue to exist while in a
spatial relation to another one, retaining its unique identity
throughout the period.
Support of this interpretation does not necessitate denying
any importance whatsoever to those other factors which have been
suggested as being at the root of the infant's problems - factors
such as motor skill, interactive experience and difficulties of
intersensory co-ordination, memory or representation. According
to the identity hypothesis, however, none of these factors alone
can account for the characteristic series of errors found during
this period of development. Evidence of the secondary nature of
these factors has already been presented. Experiment 1, for
example, showed that visual training could accelerate manual
success; direct interactive experience with objects cannot
therefore be all-important to development. Similarly, Experiment
2 showed that simple motor difficulties could not alone account
for the characteristic errors seen early in development. In
Experiment 3, infants in Piaget's Stage III showed themselves
perfectly able to recover an object that had disappeared from
sight, even after a delay of 90 seconds between disappearance and
search, a finding which also therefore undermines any attempt to
invoke either memory, intersensory co-ordination or representation
difficulties as the determining factor in object permanence
behaviour.
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Conceptual versus perceptual analyses of object concept problems
Both Experiment 1 and an acceleration study which will be
presented later (Experiment f>) also suggest that development is
not merely reducible to any straightforward increase in capacity
to process the relevant perceptual information involved at each
level of testing, a viewpoint which has recently been gaining
considerable support. It has, for example, been suggested that
the source of the infant's difficulties lies in the fact that each
stage of object concept testing represents an increase over the
previous task in terms of the amount of information the infant
must handle in order to relocate the object: The Stage III - IV
task, for example, only involves one object and one cup; Stage IV -
V, one object and two cups; Stage V - VI, one object and two
moving cups. Attractively simple though such a theory may be, it
implies that there is no conceptual development underlying the
sequence of behaviours commonly found. It would deny, for example,
that the infant is unable to understand the spatial relations
involved in the Stage III - VI tasks, asserting rather that his
problems arise only from the fact that his capacity to process the
relevant information is overloaded by these tasks; his performance
will not therefore reflect his true competence.
Although the view presented here does not support Piaget in
maintaining that the infant must construct his entire body of object
knowledge, it nevertheless insists that truly conceptual
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development does occur during this period. Problems of
perceptual processing are not considered to play a primary role in
the infant's difficulties. The identity theory would also agree
with Piaget's that development is stage-like in character. On an
information processing model, however, processing capacity should
(15)
simply increase gradually with age. How then would such
theories explain the fact that a 9 month old is as likely to make
an MB error as a 6 month old? Experiment 1 also poses problems
for the information processing argument. In that experiment,
early visual experience was found to accelerate acquisition of the
later stages of the object concept. How could this be explained
in terms of information processing ability? It could conceivably
be argued that such experience acted to increase information
processing capacity. Why then did the same amount of experience in
(15>) Pascual-Leone (1970) is one of the few information
processing theorists whose model will allow for stage-like
development. His theory also allows for assessment of the complexity
of the task from the subject's point of view, a novel feature in an
information processing model since such models typically seek to
downgrade the role of the perceiver. Pascual-Leone postulates the
existence of a central computing space, M, (or mental operator),
which is responsible for the transfer and co-ordination of all
information. This mental capacity construct is not far removed from
Piaget's (1928) notion of 'attention span' or 'field of centration'
but the emphasis in Pascual-Leone's theory is on functioning schemas
rather than general structures. He is attempting to provide a
quantitative measure for the qualitative phenomena described by
Piaget (whose influence he readily acknowledges). M is a measure of
the maximum number of schemas that can be activated and co-ordinated
by the child at any one time; this capacity is assumed to grow in an
all-or-none manner (if M = a + n, M = a + 1 at age 3, M = a + 2 at
age 5 and so on - where n = the number of activated schemas which can
be combined and a = the space taken up by the executive schema which
effects the co-ordination). Work by Pascual-Leone & Smith (1969) has
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a tracking situation which was perceptually similar in terms of
information processing demands but conceptually very different -
practice on a tracking task in which the object did not stop -
not also produce acceleration? (Bower, 197^a)
Information theorists are not alone in suggesting that
perceptual processes can adequately explain 'object concept' errors.
Butterworth (1978) has recently suggested that attention-to
immediately present perceptual clues will help the infant to
overcome the difficulties presented by the Stage IV - V test. Like
Bower (and, to some extent, Piaget), he suggests that the infant's
problems lie in his limited understanding of spatial relations.
Unlike Bower, however, he does not see the problem as being one of
understanding the spatial relations between the objects themselves.
shown growth in M to coincide with the major substages of development
described by Piaget. It is also claimed that the theory has proven
predic tive value in relation to childrens' performance on Piagetian-
type tasks (see e.g Case, 1972).
So far as I know, only Case (1978) has attempted to apply this
type of approach to the sensori-motor period. (it would indeed
appear impossible for Pascual-Leone to do so since there seems to be
no positive measure of M before the age of 3). On Case's 1;-stage
model of object concept development, each new stage is interpreted
as representing an increase in the size of the infant's 'working
memory'. Case admits, however, that he has as yet no empirical
justification for his unit-ty-unit analysis of the increasing demands
on memory of each of the Piagetian search tasks and it does seem, to
me at least, somewhat arbitrary. His 1;-stage model in addition
appears to neglect the well-documented problem that infants have in
dealing with invisible displacements. Until further work on this
type of approach has been completed, however, it seems impossible to
evaluate its usefulness and validity.
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While not agreeing with Piaget that the infant is unable to
distinguish between external reality and his own activity, he
does agree that the AAB error may be explained by reference to the
spatial codes being used by the infant at this stage to identify
an object. According to Butterworth, while in Stage IV, the
infant, as on Piaget's analysis, is beginning to shift from
subjective to objective notions of spatial position. He makes
equal use of two codes - an egocentric code (in which object position
is defined in relation to himself) and an allocentric code (in which
object position is defined in terms of a visual frame of reference
which remains invariant with movement of either object or observer).
The latter frame of reference is stable for all positions of an
object; the former, on the other hand, will require updating with
any change in object position. It is the conflict between these two
codes which causes the equiprobable pattern of search generally found in
the Stage IV - V task. Butterworth found that the AAB error could
in fact be eliminated if the two positions A and B were made
distinctively different (by using a blue cover at A and a white
cover at B) and were connected by a common, continuous background













Butterworth & Hicks' tasks
Variations of AAB task used by Butterworth & Hicks (1978)
Does this finding embarrass the identity hypothesis? We
already know that background information influences the ability of
infants to maintain visual contact with a moving object (Harris,
Cassel & Bamborough, 197U). It should not therefore surprise us
then that continuity of background should be relevant to success in
a manual object location task. Nor should we be surprised that
different coloiired covers also improve performance. It has, after
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allj been suggested that the Stage IV infant's identity rules lead
him to adopt a search strategy of the form 'to recover an object
that has disappeared mysteriously, remove the object which replaced
it'. Use of this rule in the Butterworth & Hicks situation would
obviously lead to success since there can be no room for confusion
between the two occluders.' This is clearly not the case in the
standard task; there, we would fully expect - and reliably do find -
clear evidence of confusion. Butterworth seems to suggest, however,
that success in this situation must be due to the fact that the
infant can update his egocentric code by reference to the original A
cover which, being quite different from the B cover, will serve as a
landmark for monitoring the change in object position from A to B.
This monitoring is presumably also facilitated by the presence of the
common background to both positions. By this means, the infant can
co-ordinate egocentric and visual space. For Butterworth, this
means that processes in immediate perception can lead the infant to
success in the AAB task. Presence or absence of a fully developed
concept of the object is irrelevant to understanding of the infant's
performance in this task.
Highly plausible though such an explanation may first seem, it
will have enormous difficulty in explaining those Stage IV - V
errors found in situations where the object is perfectly
perceptible in its new location - as in the case of transparent cups,
a phenomenon which has been investigated and confirmed by Butterworth
himself (I97h, 1977). Furthermore, work by Lucas & Uzgiris (1977)
has shown that the presence of a distinctive marker at the original
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location of an object is far frcm helpful at this age in a
situation which is less readily open to alternative explanations.
Another point should be considered. Butterworth found runs of up
to 5 errors on repetition of unsuccessful B trials in the standard
situation. Although a non-correction procedure was used, it is
unlikely that the infant did not see.the experimenter retrieve the
object from B before replacing it there for another B trial.
Research already reported (including Experiment 1 of this thesis),
has shown just how useful such visual information can be. If the
problem is one of updating the egocentric code of reference, why
should repeated B trials produce continued search at A?; the
infant has already seen the object retrieved from B at least once
and on Butterworth's analysis should have updated his egocentric
code on the basis of this experience to cover this new position of
the object.
Any analysis of the infant's responses to objects that go out
of sight which focuses purely on perceptual processes will also have
difficulty in explaining away the findings of Michotte (1962). He
found adults to have conceptual override over perceptual input;
their reaction to the transformation or disappearance of an object
was very much determined by their knowledge of the type of object
involved. Since it has already been shown that the infant seems to
behave in a very similar way to adults when faced with Michotte-type
displays (Bower, 1967), it would seem possible that his behaviour
may also be conceptually rather than perceptually directed, a
function of how the infant defines the identity of the object.
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BOUNDEDNESS AND THE RELATION 'PLACED UPON'
Recall the definition of an object which Bower suggests the
infant of Stage III works with: 'an object is a bounded volume of
space of a particular size, shape and color which can go from
place to place along a path of movement'. It was suggested that
the corollaries to this definition - 'two objects cannot be in the
same place at the same time' and 'two objects cannot be on the same
path of movement at the same time' - could account for the failure
to relocate the object both in the Stage III - V tasks (where the
object has been covered by a cup - violation of the first corollary)
and in the Stage V - VI task (where the object is moved to another
location while inside the cup - violation of both first and second
corollaries). It was suggested, therefore, that all of the
infant's problems in these later standard object permanence tests
could be reducible to a problem of understanding the spatial
relations between the objects involved in these tasks. Certainly,
on the basis of Experiments 2 and 3, it seemed unlikely that these
difficulties stemmed from an inability to represent an object when
no longer visible.
At this point in the discussion, the important part of the
identity rule given above is 'an object is a bounded volume of
space'. If this is the sort of definition being used from Stage
III on, any close spatial relation between two objects in which
they share common space should be problematic. Since 'boundedness'
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is assumed to play an essential part in the identification of
objects, any object will lose its unique identity if it shares
its spatial boundaries with another object. If this is the case,
the infant will obviously have difficulty in relocating an object
in any such situation. Whether entering into the spatial
relation results in the loss of sight of the object or not should
be secondary in importance and possibly even irrelevant.
The importance of boundaries in determining visual behaviour
is already well researched, both in adults (Michotte, 1950, Gibson,
1966) and infants (Salapatek & Kessen, 1966, Kessen, Salapatek &
Haith, 1972, Karmel & Maisel, 1975)' Adults and children, for
example, almost invariably perceive the stimulus array shown in
Figure I4.3 as consisting of two, separate parts; the boundary is
considered to belong to the figure while the ground is seen as
extending in existence indefinitely behind this. Boundaries also




Newborns will fixate the contour of a display within 3 to U seconds
of its presentation, and it is not until the age of Ij. - 10 weeks
that internal detail will be attended to (Salapatek, 1969).
Haith (1976) puts forward an impressive argument that the
newborn infant in fact enters the world with certain rules of
perceptual functioning which will cause his visual activity to focus
on contours. Such an analysis, besides being able to cover most of
the findings of visual behaviour in this period, makes sound
neurophysiological sense. It will ensure a high rate of visual
cortical firing, activity believed to be crucial to the growth and
maturation of neural pathways (Riesen, 1961, Hubel & Wiesel, 1962,
Wiesel & Hubel, 197U)• In addition, application of such rules
would, according to Gibson (1966), expose the infant to what are
generally the most highly informative aspects of any visual
stimulus, its edges.
The importance of boundaries in determining reaching behaviour
has also been examined. MLchotte has demonstrated how both the
position in space and even the shape of rear (and therefore
indirectly perceived) boundaries of unfamiliar objects can be
accurately predicted by adults (Michotte, 1962); he also
demonstrated, however, that an object which does not have such
properties will not be seen as graspable - i.e in order to be seen
as obtainable, an object must have discernible or inferable
boundaries. It seems likely that texture and parallax variables
provide the information necessary to perception of the potential
graspability of objects in both infants and adults. Infants will
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not reach for a representation of an object - only for an object
that is defined parallactically (Bower, 1966, 1972, Bower, Dunkeld
& Wishart, 1979). Nor will they reach for a luminous disc having
no texture (Bower, Broughton & Moore, 1970c).
Miehotte's work also suggested that an object will only be
seen as a separate, obtainable object if it is perceptibly separate
from any other object in its locality; this depends in turn on the
amount of common boundary shared by the two objects. A sphere
sitting on a platform, for example, should be more readily perceived
as a separate (and therefore obtainable) object than a cube in the
same situation since the common point of contact is minimal.
Bearing all this in mind, the obvious candidate for
examination now is the spatial relationship 'on'. If the infant's
problem is understanding spatial relations between objects, 'on'
should also pose problems - even although the object will not be out
of sight. In investigating the spatial relationship 'on', we can
examine not only the validity of the identity rules postulated above
but also the claim that object concept development is a perceptual
rather than conceptual problem. By varying the amount of contact
between the two objects, it will also be relatively easy to
investigate the importance of amount of common boundary to the
infant's definition of object identity.
As early as the 1920s, it was noted that retrieval of an object
which had been placed on top of another object caused problems
(Szuman, 1927* Baley, 1932). Piaget himself confirmed that this
spatial relationship presented infants with difficulty.
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"At 0.6 (22) Laurent tries to grasp a box of
matches. When he is at the point of reaching I
place it on a book; he immediately withdraws his
hand, then grasps the book itself. He remains
puzzled until the box slides and thanks to this
accident, he dissociates it from its support".
(Piaget, 1937, Obs. 101)
He attributed this difficulty, as we would expect, to the fact that
the infant can only understand objects in terms of his own actions
upon them. As a result, spatial understanding is limited to rather
elementary practical interrelations between self and objects. The
infant has no understanding of interrelations between objects which
occur without his intervention. He has not yet achieved the notion
of himself as being only one object in a space that is ccmmon to
both himself and the objects he perceives around him.
Piaget paid slight attention to the parallels between the
behaviour in the placed upon situation and behaviour in the standard
cloth situation, save to re-emphasise how limited a value we should
place on success in that task in the light of behaviour in the
placed upon situation. Piaget's main purpose was to establish that
the infant's problem lay in differentiating between himself and the
external world and he was particularly keen to establish that this
came about as the result of the development of representational
ability, an ability which would free the infant from the limitations
of his purely practical intelligence. Understanding of
interrelations between objects was therefore very secondary to his
purpose. Furthermore, problems in retrieving an object which was
perfectly visible could be construed as an embarrassment to a theory
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whose main tenet was that inability to represent absent objects
was responsible for the retrieval difficulties found when an
object was covered by a cloth. As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3,
focusing on the visibility or non-visibility of objects has been
a red herring; a perfectly visible object can cause all sorts of
problems throughout the sensori-motor period.
Although Piaget's analysis of object difficulties in 'The
Construction of Reality' focused on representation, his analysis
with Inhelder (19U8) of the development of spatial concepts dealt
more specifically with the spatial factors which might influence the
infant's search patterns. This work is probably far more relevant
to the viewpoint forwarded in this thesis than the more frequently
quoted account of object concept development given in the three
infancy books. According to this, the young infant is limited to
understanding relations between objects in terms of their topological
properties (e.g proximity, closure, spatial succession etc).
Proximity in particular seems to dominate the infant's early
understanding of the spatial relations between objects, indeed to
such an extent that two neighbouring objects may be fused into a
global, syncretic whole. Such a viewpoint is obviously not
irreconcilable with the notion that the infant's identity rules, by
emphasising the 'boundedness' of any object, will constrain the spatial
circumstances in which an object will retain its unique identity. The
latter analysis too would maintain that in certain situations, tx*o
objects will be treated as a single, new object by the infant.
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It is, of course, possible that any problems caused by placing
one object on top of another will be of a lesser nature than those
found in more standard object permanence situations. There are
three possible reasons for this. In the case of spatial
relationships such as 'inside' 'under' or 'behind', the object is
not only in a mysterious relationship with the other object but is,
in addition, out of sight. There are therefore no featural clues
left behind as to the possible location of the object. In the case
of an 'on' relation, however, the object is still visible; although
the infant may not understand that it still represents the same,
separate and obtainable object, the 'new' object now present - the
platform-and-toy - does at least have some features in common with
the original object. While seeking to deny that non-visibility of
the object lies at the source of the infant's difficulties, it would
be foolish to deny that visibility of the object could be
helpful in arriving at a solution (though not necessarily an
understanding) to the problem. Experiment 2 showed that while an
object 'hidden' inside a transparent cup produced difficulties which
could not be put down to motor problems alone, this task was easier
than a search task in which an opaque cup was used. Work by
Neilson (1977) indicated that the 'inside' relation with transparent
cups was also problematic in the later stages of object concept
development. Her finding that passage through Stages III - VI was
faster with transparent cups suggests, however, that visibility of
the object does influence eventual success. Both Neilson's study
and a related study by Brunskill (1971) in which a special,
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distinctively colored opaque cup was used to provide an
additional visual clue to the location of the object further
suggest, however, that such clues, while leading to success, do
not lead to any true understanding of the spatial relations
involved in these tasks; there is no transfer of success when
tested with identical opaque cups (see also Experiment 2).
It is also possible that differential motor requirements
might lead to a 'placed upon' spatial relationship between two
objects being easier than an 'inside' relationship. Recovering
an object from a platform does not require any motor behaviour in
relation to the platform. In order to recover an object from a
cup, however, the cup must first of all be removed; behaviour
sequencing problems could therefore adversely affect age of
achievement of success (see Experiment 2). It could not, however,
be held responsible for any differences in age of achievement
between the two situations in a Stage IV - V type task since by
then any behavioural difficulties would have been overcome.
The third - and obviously favoured - possibility is that any
evidence of accelerated success in object concept type tasks using
an 'on' relation could arise from the fact that the amount of
boundary loss is minimal in such a situation - only the boundary in
contact with the platform is lost. We might still expect some
evidence of identity confusion but would suspect that this particular
spatial relationship would pose fewer problems.
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It is always possible of course that an object placed upon
another object may not actually be visible to the baby, that, as
far as the baby is concerned, it effectively disappears in such a
situation. This would be quite likely, for example, if the
contrast between the two objects were minimal or if the perceptual
system, were relatively insensitive to contrast relations, as the
infant perceptual system probably is.
The purpose of the next experiments conducted was therefore
two-fold:
1. to examine the suggestion that the spatial
relationship 'placed upon' would pose problems
to infants
2. to investigate whether these difficulties are
conceptual, perceptual or motor in origin.
EXPERIMENT Ii
SUBJECTS
A. Cross-sectional. lU infants between 16 and 32 weeks served
as subjects. All were able to reach out and touch a dangling object.
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APPARATUS AND PROCEDURE
The platform for all objects was an 8" x 8" x 2" piece of
unpainted chipboard. The objects presented were:
1. a 2-|-" diameter sphere
2. a cube of side 2jr" presented on one
vertex
3. a cube of side 2-jjr" presented on one
surface
U- a section of an identical cube,
2§" x 2jr" x llf" presented on one of
its 2§" x 2§" surfaces
5. a cube of side presented on one
surface
6. a hemisphere of a 2-g-" diameter
sphere presented on its flat surface.
All of the objects were painted fluorescent red. The baby sat on
his mother's lap at a white table which had a semi-circular cut-out
on the baby's side to facilitate reaching. The objects were placed
on the platform out of sight of the infant and positioned so that
their top edge was visually within the frame of the platform. The
platform-and-object was then presented to the baby. Order of
presentation of the six objects was random.
RESULTS
A successful trial was defined as one in which the baby took the
object from the platform within one minute of presentation. The
latency of grasping was measured for each baby with each presentation
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frcm the time when the object on the platform was presented.
Table U.l shows how many of the six objects each infant
succeeded in recovering frcm the platform. Although the two
youngest infants were perfectly able to reach, both failed
completely to remove any of the objects from the platform. Despite
obvious interest in the object and platform when first presented,
they made no attempt to remove the object, typically fingering or
pushing at the platform for a short time and then either losing
interest or attempting to interact with the experimenter. The 20 -
22 week olds paid even more attention but, despite this and a great
deal of accompanying arm movement, these infants still succeeded in
removing only two of the objects, failing in most cases to even
touch the other objects. By 2U weeks of age, however, all infants
tested were able to remove all of the objects from the platform.
Table l|.l Success rate of infants in Experiment U
Subject 1 2 3 k 5 ' 6 ■ 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Hi
Age in
weeks 16 18 20 20 21 22 23 2b 26 29 29 29 31 32
guc0055
rate 0/6 0/6 2/6 6/6 2/6 2/6 k/6 6/6 6/6 6/6 6/6 6/6 6/6 6/6
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It is obvious from the above that all six objects did not
present the infants with equal retrieval difficulties; success
rates did not shift suddenly with age from zero to complete success
and latency times for the different objects varied enormously. In
an attempt to determine the relative difficulty of recovering each
object from the platform, the latency scores were placed in rank
order for each infant and then summed across infants for each of the
six objects. (Scores were ranked from 1-6, with 1 representing
the shortest retrieval time; tied latencies were given the average
of the combined ranks). These summed ranks were then meaned and
ranked again in order of difficulty. The ranks thus obtained are
shown in Table h.2.
TABLE jj.,2 Order of difficulty of retrieval of the six
objects used in Experiment U
Object Order of difficulty
(l = easy, 6 -= difficult)
Sphere ' 1





From this it would seem that there is no straightforward
relationship between ease of retrieval and amount of common boundary.
Although, as might be expected on the Michottian hypothesis, the
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ball proved easiest and the jr ball most difficult, the cube on its
vertex proved to be the second most difficult presentation, a
finding which is quite contrary to such an hypothesis. The data
presented in Table h.2 is, however, perhaps deceptive. Inspection
of the latency scores showed enormous individual differences in
relative difficulty of the six objects, the \ cube, for example,
proving to be the easiest object for one 20 week old but the most
difficult presentation for the 22 week old. It was therefore
considered prudent to investigate the problem more closely in a
small longitudinal study.
Before considering the results of the longitudinal study,
however, one other finding from the cross-sectional group is worth
discussing since it casts doubt on any claim that success in the
above tasks is determined by purely perceptual factors. After
completion of the trials already described, the objects were re¬
presented to four of the younger, unsuccessful infants, this time
with the placing of the object on the platform being done in full
view of the infant, care being taken that the infant attended to the
entire placing upon procedure. The assumption was that seeing the
two objects separately prior to reaching would assist understanding
of the possible separability of the two objects when in the placed
upon relation; if this turned out to be the case, it would point to
success being conceptually rather than perceptually mediated. In
the case of the two youngest Ss (l6 and 18 weeks), this procedure
made no difference to their success rate; thqy were still completely
unable to remove any of the objects from the platform. The 16 week old
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did, however, behave quite differently in the presentation in
which the transformation was seen. Previously unconcerned, he
now became quite agitated, flapping his arms up and down and
scrabbling at the platform. The behaviour of the two older Ss
was even more interesting. In both cases, seeing the transformation
led to success in presentations which had previously resulted in
complete failure to remove or even touch the object. The
longitudinal study will also therefore investigate further the
possibility that seeing the act of 'placing upon' facilitates
success.
SUBJECTS AND PROCEDURE
B. Longitudinal group. Seven infants were run longitudinally,
from the time they were first reported as starting to reach at home
until the point at which they could successfully retrieve all six
objects from the platform. Age of onset of testing varied from 17 -
22 weeks and age of termination from 22 - 27 weeks. Number of test
sessions varied from three to eight with mean number of sessions
being five. Procedure was as above, with order of presentation
varied each week. Where possible, all infants went on to repeat
the series, this time with the transformation seen.
With this group an additional object was occasionally used. It
was a cone, height 6", of which the top 2" was removable. When the
top was on, in place, it was perceptually inseparable from the rest
of the cone, even to an adult eye. It thus represented a problem
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which development of perceptual acuity alone could not possibly solve.
RESULTS
Once again, all infants showed retrieval difficulties in a
placed upon situation. These difficulties persisted over several
weeks. Order of difficulty of retrieval of the six objects was
determined in the same way as in the cross-sectional group. Table U-3
shows the order of difficulty on that week in which each infant was
first successful in retrieving all six objects from the platform within
the given time limit.
TABLE h.3 Order of difficulty of retrieval in the longitudinal group
Object Order of difficulty on first
all-successful week"
Sphere 1
Cube on vertex 2
Cube 3
■§■ cube 6
Small cube ' h
Hemisphere 5
This order of difficulty fits well with claims that amount of common
boundary is relevant to success in object retrieval tasks. The two
objects which had essentially no surface in common with the platform
(the ball and the cube presented on its vertex) proved less difficult
to remove than those objects which did share extensive boundaries with
the platform. Other, simpler perceptual factors seemed less
important; diminutions in the amount of parallactic contrast with the
platform, for example, did not appear to influence greatly the
difficulty of the tasks (see, e.g cube v. small cube).
It could be claimed that Table h.3> like Table h-2, is deceptive.
In this group too, order of difficulty for some of the objects did show
wide individual differences. Unlike the cross-sectional group, however,
some statements about the relative difficulty of at least some
individual objects can legitimately be made since they did hold true for
most infants. The ball, for instance, invariably proved to be the
easiest object to recover. It was equally true that the y cube and y
ball were always amongst the most difficult of objects. This patterning
of difficulty also held true to a lesser extent in the weeks prior to
successful removal of all six objects. More rigorous statements about
order of difficulty are not, however, possible. These results cannot,
therefore, be said to provide conclusive evidence for Michotte's claim
that amount of common boundary determines whether an object will be seen
as separable and obtainable or not. They do, however, fit well with the
lesser claim of the identity hypothesis that boundary violation influences
performance on object search tasks. •
The effects on performance of seeing the act of placing upon also
lend support to a conceptual analysis of the infant's difficulties in the
placed upon task. Table I4..I4. shows the effects of perception of the
placing upon at various stages in the study.
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TABLE Ii-.ii The effects of perceiving; the transformation at
various ages
NUMBER OF INSTANCES OF CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE
Positive Negative
Absolute Latency of Success Latency of Probability
failure recovery converted recovery (sign test)
converted reduced to increased
to success absolute
failure
Week 1 2 h h 6 .23
Middle week 1 8 0 l .01
Last week * 0 11 0 2 .01
(* last week in which performance in the earlier tasks allowed for any
improvement on the transformation trials - i.e week before all objects
retrieved instantaneously from platform).
Perception of the act of placing upon obviously does have an effect,
though initially it would not seem to be the effect expected. In
Week 1, perception of the act of placing upon was more likely to
increase the difficulty of the task, 10 out of 16 changes in performance
producing reversals in competence. This is most puzzling. A
possible ad hoc explanation would be that the infant's initial success
on the task when the transformation was. not seen was purely due to
chance; although seeing the object and platform as a single object,
some reaches by chance landed on the object part of the combined object.
This would be less likely to occur in the transformation task since the
baby now had the problem of working out what had happened to the
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original object when it was placed in a spatial relation with
another object; he would not therefore be so ready to accept the
object-and-platforra as the object to reach for. Success rate for
recovery of the object in this first week was in any case only
around 25%; infants typically failed to recover the object at all,
irrespective of whether or not the transformation was seen.
Fortunately for the identity hypothesis, the negative effects
of seeing the transformation were quickly reversed. By the last
week in which differences in performance were possible, the effect
of seeing the transformation was almost universally beneficial.
Thereafter, all of the infants succeeded in all of the presentations.
At this point, they could also succeed with the cone, provided they
saw the placing upon action.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment h, while not producing conclusive
evidence of Michotte's claim that amount of boundary is crucial to
object perception, do suggest that boundaries are indeed relevant to
success or failure on object retrieval tasks. On an identity
analysis, such information would also be highly relevant since
boundedness is, as we have seen, presumed to be central to the infant's
definition of objects and crucial if he is to retain the identity of an
object throughout an event sequence; amount of shared boundary could
well determine whether two objects will be regarded as separable or not.
This type of conceptual analysis' would also gain support from the finding
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that knowing that the two objects could be separated facilitated
retrieval, even when the amount of shared boundary was quite
extensive, a finding which surely detracts from any attempt to
give a straightforward perceptual explanation of difficulties in
such tasks.
Further support for the viewpoint that the difficulty in the
placed upon situation is conceptual rather than perceptual will come
from the results of Experiment 5, to be presented in the next
chapter. Infants in that study were also presented with objects on
platforms. Testing again began in the week in which the infants were
first able to demonstrate that they could reach and consisted of both
Stage III - IV and Stage IV - V tasks. In spite of the massive
acceleration in object concept development later shown by these
infants, difficulties in retrieving the object from a platform were
frequent in the early weeks of testing and virtually all infants
showed clear signs of confusion in the MB situation, some taking
seven (weekly) sessions before being able to succeed in this task.
Although only 7 out of 2h infants went to the wrong - and clearly empty -
platform, introduction of a second platform obviously posed new
problems for these infants, problems evidenced by rapid checking back
and forth between previous and present object positions, occasional
frowning and almost universally increased retrieval times on the B
trial. This evidence that Stage IV - V platform errors occur poses
considerable problems to claims that perceptual or motor difficulties
underlie the difficulties observed in the placed upon task. If the
baby has already passed the Stage III - IV task (as these infants all
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had), he must certainly have overcome any hypothesised perceptual
problems and there can be no doubt that he can both see (and reach
for) the object when on the platform. Why, then, should the AAB
error be produced on the next trial? It seems more reasonable to
assume that the problem is a conceptual problem, with the two
objects being treated as one object, 'the platform-and-object' •, as
far as the infant is concerned, the original object has disappeared
mysteriously, despite the fact that it remains in sight throughout
the entire sequence. It should be noted, however, that errors in
the placed upon situation in this group did drop out earlier than
errors in the equivalent inside and behind tasks, the screen and cup
tests (see Table 5.2).
This analysis of the infant's difficulties would not be
acceptable to many researchers. Bresson and de Schonen (1977)j for
example, would prefer to regard the infant's problems in the 'placed
upon' situation as being rooted in perceptual-motor difficulties.
Problems are caused by 'the presence, in the same visual field, of
two systems of boundaries (object and support) that differentially
regulate the movement of reaching and that conflict one with the
other' (de Schonen, 1977) and are not the result of the two objects
being treated as one, the platform-and-toy. On their interpretation,
however, amount of boundary held in common with the support should be
irrelevant. Bresson et al's own data suggest that this is not the
case (Bresson, Maury, le Bonniec & de Schonen, 1977). Four different
forms of support were used: the palm of the hand, the tips of the
fingers, a 5 cm. cube and a board 21 x 29 x 0.5 cms. The same object,
a 2 cm. cube, was used in all presentations. Reaching for the support
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rather than the object was found to be almost twice as likely in the
condition in which the 2 cm. cube was placed on top of the 5 cm. cube
as when that same cube was placed on the large board . It was also
found that success of reaching for the small cube on the larger cube
remained steady at 60$ from 21 - 32 weeks while success in the board
condition shot up to over 90$ by 32 weeks (see also Cardow, 1978).
These differences fit well with a conceptual analysis of the infant's
difficulties in the placed upon situation but are difficult to
reconcile with Bresson et al's analysis in terms of the development
of perceptual-motor co-ordination.
In support of their argument that the problems found in 'placed
upon' situations are perceptual-motor rather than conceptual, Bresson
and de Schonen point out that between 17 and 21 weeks, prior to any
visual guidance of reaching, infants will make a ballistic reach
toward the platform and object and will at times succeed in removing
the object. This, they feel, is evidence that the infant is
perfectly well aware of the continued separateness of the two objects
involved. Since the success rate in this period is only 20$ however, ^
it would be equally possible to interpret such reaches as reaches for
the platform-and-object which happen to make contact with the toy 'part'
of that object. A tendency to mouth the object as it sat on the
platform was also taken as evidence that the infant is well aware that
the two objects exist quite separately. I would prefer again to
(16) Inspection of Bresson et al's criterion for a successful reach
for the object - 'either the palm or at least a finger covered part of
the object ... and remaining on it (whether moving, fingering, seizing
or picking it up )' - suggest that even this low figure may be an
overestimate of early success.
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maintain that it is equally likely that the infant merely sees
the object, not as a separate, obtainable object, but as some sort
of projection on the platform; his attention to it is hardly
surprising since, in most cases, it is the brighter and more
attractive 'part' to begin with. In my observations of this sort
of behaviour, the infant is most likely to be grasping the platform
as he mouths the object, a fact which surely must detract from
Bresson and de Schonen's interpretation.
Even if there were nothing to choose between these two
conflicting interpretations, it is hard to see how supporters of
perceptual or motor interpretations of the difficulty in the placed
upon situation could reconcile their position with the evidence of
continuing errors in the two platform situation. The infant has
already proved himself capable of dealing with one platform in the
Stage III - IV task and must therefore have overcome the
hypothesised perceptual and/or motor problems. Why, then, should
the introduction of a second platform cause confusion? Consider
also an experiment by Neils on (1977). She found that an 'in front
of' relation between two objects could cause retrieval difficulties
in infants betx^een 22 and 30 weeks - but only if tie distance of
separation between the two objects was sufficiently small. Obviously,
motor difficulties cannot be invoked here; it seems rather as if the
two objects must be seen as sharing a common boundary for the problem
to arise. An experiment by Lucas & Uzgiris (1977) also found
separation to be an important factor in object retrieval. Such
results confirm the suggestion that what determines response or non-
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response in a situation in which two objects bear a spatial
relation to each other is whether they are seen as sharing a
common boundary or not. Problems of motor skill, visibility or
perceptual preference, although they may influence response, are
of secondary importance only. They may influence which of the
spatial relations will be mastered earliest but do not hold the
key to the problem.
It will now be useful to look again at the infant's response
in a variety of situations involving a spatial relation between tw
objects. Chapter 5 will examine further the suggestion that an
infant is unable to maintain the identity of an object throughout
any event sequence which involves close spatial interaction with
another object. Although perceptual information would lead adult
to conclude that one and the same object interacts throughout the
sequence, it is suggested that the young infant will not arrive at
this economical and generally valid conclusion, the result of the
incompleteness of his rules for attributing identity to objects.
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CHAPTER FIVE - A FURTHER INVESTIGATION AND EVALUATION OF THE
IDENTITY HYPOTHESIS
Outline of the identity hypothesis and its proposed identity rules
According to the identity hypothesis, the sequence of behaviours
seen in traditional object permanence testing situations can be
understood and explained in terns of the infant's developing
understanding of object identity. The infant's problem is not one
of differentiating between himself and external reality; his problem
lies in elaborating a comprehensive notion of object identity, one
which will allow an object to participate in an event sequence and yet
retain its unique identity throughout. According to the identity
hypothesis, an object need not have disappeared from sight for its
identity to be threatened. In fact, in the early stages of
development, movement of an object which was previously stationary
will be sufficient to cast doubt on its continued sameness. Later,
although simple movement will no longer cause problems, any
situation in which an object interacts in common space with another
object in such a way that the integrity of its boundaries is either
threatened or obscured will lead to identity confusion in the infant.
The identity hypothesis forwards a series of rules which it
believes can cover the characteristic sequence of search behaviours
found in standard object permanence testing situations. As one
identity rule is replaced by the next, the infant comes closer to a
true appreciation of the unique and independent properties of
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individual objects. The following sequence of rule acquisition
was hypothesised in Chapter 1±:
Rule 1 - Stages I and II
An object is a bounded volume of space in a
particular place or on a particular path of
movement.
Corollaries to such a rule would be:
Two objects cannot be in the same place.
Two objects cannot be on the same path of movement.
Any violation of these corollaries (e.g replacement of a stationary
object by a totally different object) will be interpreted as a
transformation in the original object rather than as its
replacement by another object.
Adoption of the above rule and its corollaries leads to the
following search behaviours:
To find a stationary object, look for it in the
place where it is usually to be seen. (This may
result in a place error if the object is in fact
in a new place).
To find a moving object, look for it along its
usual path of movement. (This may result in a
movement error if the object in fact stops).
Rule 2 - Stages III - V
An object is a bounded volume of space of a certain
size, shape and colour which can move from place to
place along trajectories.
Here, place and movement rules have been co-ordinated and the
features of an object, ignored in applications of Rule 1, are now
included in the definition of an object. The corollaries of Rule 1
still apply but with one important modification:
Two objects cannot be in the same place nor on the
same path of movement simultaneously.
- 180 -
Since featural information is now incorporated in the rule for
identifying an object, any event sequence violating these new
corollaries will be treated by the infant as the replacement of
the original object by another object rather than a transformation
process, as on Rule 1. As a result, search behaviour will be
directed first by the rule:
To find an object that has disappeared mysteriously,
remove the object which has replaced it,
and later by the more specific rule:
To find an object that has disappeared mysteriously,
remove the object which is now in the place where
it was last seen.
Rule 3 - Stage VI
Here, the identity rule essentially remains the same as in Rule
2 but the corollaries are modified to fit with the infant's
experiences of the consequences of interactions between objects. The
corollaries will now be:
Two or more objects cannot be in the same place
nor on the same path of movement simultaneously
unless they bear a spatial relationship to each
other which involves a sharing of common
boundaries.
To an infant working with only Rule 1 or Rule 2, an object which
moves then stops or an object which enters into a spatial
relationship with another object in such a way as to lose or mask its
identifying boundaries will have disappeared mysteriously. Not until
acquisition of Rule 3 can the infant truly understand that a spatial
relationship between two objects does not violate the identity of
either. Prior to this understanding, he may succeed in 'solving'
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problems involving spatial relations between two or more objects.
These successful search strategies are, however, highly specific
to particular problem situations and do not lead to success in
other, conceptually similar tasks.
An investigation of the identity hypothesis
The next experiment was designed to investigate the validity
of the above rules. Infants were tested longitudinally between
12 and 28 weeks (Stages II and HI on Piaget1s analysis). Both
visual and manual competence in object search tasks were assessed.
Both sets of tasks used three spatial relationships which violated
object boundaries - 'on', 'in' and 'behind'; the tracking
presentations also included stops in sight.
The simultaneous and longitudinal investigation of three,
differing spatial relations may shed light on various topics.
Firstly, it may help to determine whether amount of boundary
violation is, as suggested by Experiment k, influential in
attribution of identity to successive appearances of the same
object. If so, 'on' might be expected to be considerably easier
than either 'behind' or 'inside'. It is also possible that 'behind'
could conceivably prove easier than 'inside', since front but not
rear boundaries suffer violation: it is doubtful though whether the
infant would be able to appreciate this rather fine distinction,
particularly since the rear boundaries, although unviolated, are
still out of sight in a 'behind' situation. Secondly, and
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relatedly, this study will allow evaluation of the claim that
'behind' holds a privileged position in the infant's understanding
of spatial relations, a suggestion made by Bower (l97^a) and
Neilson (1977). Bower has suggested that the infant's perceptual
system is able from birth to transduce the information specifying
a behind relationship between two objects, while allowing for the
continued existence of the occluded object. He believes that such
an ability is an essential prerequisite for perception of three-
dimensional space: unless the infant could correctly interpret
occlusion information, he would be unable to disambiguate the
spatial information provided by motion parallax and optical
expansion patterns.
If Bower is right, the apparent decalage between visual and
manual competence in object permanence testing (see p 31 ) would
be easily explained. Young infants are able to demonstrate
existence constancy in visual tracking tasks because these tasks,
almost without exception, use a presentation in which the object goes
behind a screen (e.g Gardner, 1971, Bower, Broughton & Moore, 1971).
The apparent later loss of this knowledge in manual tasks can be
attributed to the fact that the standard manual object permanence
tests typically use 'under' or 'in' relations between occluder and
object, the object being covered with a cup or cloth. According to
the Bower/Neilson analysis, the infant would have no difficulty in
recovering the object manually if a screen were used to cover the
object instead of a cup or cloth. Similarly, a young infant who was
able to show anticipatory behaviour in a visual tracking task
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involving»a screen would presumably 'lose' this competence if a
tunnel or platform were substituted as occluder.
Experiment 3 will allow investigation of the Bower/Weilson
theory. The use of longitudinal testing will also allow the
relation between early and later performance to be more clearly
examined. Tracking studies are generally only performed with
infants who are not old enough to reach. Experiment 1
demonstrated the important interrelationship between the early and
later tasks. It therefore seems essential to monitor tracking and
reaching competence simultaneously in the same infant if we are to
understand this interrelation more fully.
What explanation could the identity hypothesis give of the
decalage usually found between visual and manual competence in object
permanence testing? Like Bower and Neilson, I would like to suggest
that the decalage is an artefact of the testing situations used. I
do not, however, believe this stems simply from the use of differing
spatial relations between object and occluder. It seems much more
likely to me that the competence attributed to young infants in
visual tasks is, in fact, an overestimate. First or criterial
responses only are generally reported (e.g Moore, Borton & Darby, 1978).
More detailed analysis may reveal that this precocious 'knowledge' is
far less stable and complete than is generally assumed. Knowing that
something will continue to exist when occluded as demonstrated, e.g
by the work of Bower (1967) and Mundy-Castle & Anglin (1973), is not the
same as being able to identify the reappearance of that object as the
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reappearance of the same object as was seen previously. This is
not to deny that the young infant may well expect something to
reappear. Repeated presentations of the event sequence will
confirm this expectation. The work of Bower (1971) has shown,
however, that the infant will not at first have a very specific
idea of exactly what will appear, since a total featural
transformation in the reappearing object produces no surprise until
around 20 weeks of age (see also Goldberg, 1976).
Experiment 9 will investigate the identity hypothesis' clam
that entering into a spatial relationship with another object leads
to identity confusion. Such a hypothesis would predict that even
if the infant can anticipate the reappearance of a moving object
from behind, inside or on top of another object, his subsequent
looking behaviour will reveal that he is by no means sure that this
object is the same object that disappeared behind/in/on the
occluder in the first place. Data from the 'on' tracking condition
will be of especial interest since visual competence in a 'placed
upon' situation has not previously been investigated.
A further line of investigation which Experiment 9 may allow
us to pursue is the possible acceleratory effects of visual
tracking experience on subsequent development - both, on eventual
attainment of visual tracking competence and, more interestingly, on
attainment of competence on conceptually related manual tasks.
Experiment 1 would lead us to suspect that a study of this type
(involving weekly exposure to an object which moves and stops), would
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lead to accelerated manual competence. The effect of
introducing another object, the screen, platform or tunnel, is an
unknown. On the basis of the identity rules suggested above, it
might be expected that this too would have an acceleratory effect
on acquisition of higher-order identity rules. Regular exposure
to an object which emerges unscathed from assorted spatial
interactions with another object should help to promote
understanding of the idea that one object can go into a spatial
relation with another object and yet retain its unique identity.
On the identity hypothesis, it might be suspected that the
information yielded by this aspect of the presentation would not be
particularly useful in the early weeks since the infants would not
yet have acquired Rule 2; they would not therefore be registering
the featural identity of the objects seen on either side of the
occluder. These infants would still be struggling to co-ordinate
their rules for maintaining contact with the object while in sight,
their place and movement rules. With acquisition of Rule 2,
however, we might expect much more attention to that part of the




2h subjects, 11 male, 13 female, were divided into two groups,
E la and E lb. All were twelve weeks of age on beginning the
experiment.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Both groups, E la and E lb, visited the laboratory at weekly
intervals from 12-28 weeks. Any sessions which had to be
prematurely terminated were resumed in the same week where possible.
(17)
Two sessions took place in the final (28th) week of testing.
Tracking tasks were begun at 12 weeks and given at weekly intervals
thereafter. Reaching tasks were started on the week in which the
baby first demonstrated the ability to reach and touch a dangling
object within 2 minutes of its presentation. From then on, both
tracking and reaching tasks were given in each session. The
tracking tasks always preceded the reaching tasks.
(17) At the end of this study, half of the subjects went on to
participate in a related study undertaken by Neilson (1977)• The
other half were monitored monthly on Stage IV - VI manual tasks.
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A. Tracking tasks
In the tracking tasks, infants sat on their mother's lap,
facing the display and at a distance of 3 feet from it. Where
necessary, the mother would support the infant's head under the
chin. Mothers were instructed not to direct the baby's attention
in any way but to allow him to look at whichever part of the display
he chose. Sessions were video-recorded for subsequent frame-by-
frame analysis. A T.V. camera mounted behind the display and out
of sight of the infant monitored head and eye movements while
object position was simultaneously monitored by a camera above the
display.
Four tracking presentations were used.
1. Simple tracking: The object travelled from X to Y,
paused for 3 seconds (Trial l), travelled back to X,




2. Platform tracking (on): As in 1, but passing
over a platform positioned midway between X and
Y. The platform was constructed out of the
same material as the tracking apparatus
(chipboard) and was 8" long. It was of such a
height that the base of the object just touched
it as it passed over it. The object therefore
effectively lost its bottom boundary on crossing
the platform .
Platform tracking
3- Screen tracking (behind): As in 1, but passing
behind a screen positioned midway between X and
Y. The screen was constructed of the same
material as the tracking apparatus, measured 8"
x 8" and stood in front of the track.
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li. Tunnel tracking (in): As in 1, but passing
through a tunnel positioned midway between X
and Y. The tunnel was made of lightweight,
opaque, grey plastic, was 8" long and 3" in
diameter.
The same object, a red, fluorescent polystyrene block, 2" x
1-y" x 1", was used in all presentations. The object was carried
on a fine link chain, driven by a Bodine motor. Speed of
movement of the object was 3-2 ins/sec. The length of the track
was 36". Each trial therefore lasted 11.23 seconds, with a 3
second pause at either end of the track. In conditions 2 - k,
/ 1 O \
the length of the occluder was 8"; duration of occlusion
was therefore 2.3 seconds. The process of occlusion itself took
0.6 seconds.
(18) I would like to use the terms 'occluder' and 'occluded' in
reference to Condition 2, as well as Conditions 3 and ii. In
Condition 2, the platform condition, the object is not 'occluded'
in the true sense of the word; it would appear, however, that
something comparable or equivalent is happening as far as the
infant is concerned. There is a degree of conceptual, if not
perceptual, disappearance when an object goes over a platform.
For ease and economy of description, I shall therefore use
'occluded' to refer to all 3 conditions.
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Presentation began when the infant first noticed the moving
object or after h full excursions, whichever was the lesser.
Presentation of any one condition consisted of 8 complete trials
thereafter. On alternate weeks, two stop trials were incorporated,
one after the lj.th trial, one after the 8th trial. In the 1st stop
trial, the object stopped in approximately the middle of the first
section (A) of unoccluded track (i.e before entering the tunnel,
going on to the platform etc); on the 2nd stop trial, it stopped
in approximately the middle of the second section (B) of unoccluded
track (i.e after emerging from the tunnel, coming off the platform
etc). The stop position was not more exactly controlled since it
was felt necessary to introduce a degree of flexibility in order to
cover those instances where the infant did not track section A or B
in its entirety. Stop duration was £ seconds.
Each baby saw two of the four tracking conditions weekly. All
possible pairs of conditions were used, in both orders of
presentation. Conditions were paired and sequenced such that a
total of 12 babies saw each of the conditions at each week-level
ana each individual baby on average saw all U conditions every
fortnight, the maximum separation between two presentations of the
same condition being 3 weeks (see Appendix A). For Group E la,
stop trials took place on even-age weeks; for E lb, on odd-age
weeks. There was therefore stop data for 6 babies on each of the
conditions at each week-level. At 2 8 weeks (the final visit),
each baby saw his appropriate pair of conditions and then returned
later that week to see the remaining two conditions.
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Analysis : tracking tasks
Condition 1, simple tracking, was analysed for two features
only: complete or partial tracking and smooth or confused
tracking. For Conditions 2 - k (platform/screen/tunnel tracking)
tracking trials were divided into five periods for analysis as
follows:
1. object on first section of unoccluded track (a)
2. disappearance of object, i.e from when object
first goes onto platform/behind screen/into
tunnel until it is completely occluded
3. object completely occluded
li. reappearance of object, i.e when object first
reappears from platform/screen/tunnel until
completely reappeared
3. object on second section of unoccluded track (B).
Using frame-by-frame analysis, records were scored for the following
9 responses:
1. looks off
2. tracks forward (terminus of track noted)
3. tracks forward to exit
i;. tracks forward past exit (terminus of track noted)
3. tracks back (terminus of track noted)
6. tracks back to entry
7. tracks back to exit
8. stops at exit
9. stops at entry.
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Although several of these responses are appropriate responses to
demonstrate when the object goes out of sight (e.g 3»or 1 followed
by 7)j none are appropriate when the object is on either unoccluded
section of the track (since all involve looking at some point other
than the current position of the object).
Frame-by-frame analysis was also used to analyse behaviour on
the stop trials. "When the object stopped it was noted whether:
1. the infant's eyes stopped with the object,
either remaining on the object for the entire
duration of the stop or looking off at some
point during the stop, or
2. tracked forward after the stop and, if so,
whether immediately or after a pause on the
stopped object, or
3. tracked backwards after the stop and, if so,
whether immediately or after a pause on the
stopped object, or
h. a combination of 2 and 3-
Behaviour on the rest of the stop trial, while noted, was not added
to the tracking trials analysis as it was felt that the stop could
x-jell confuse subsequent tracking,, making stop trials quite
different in nature from the other trials.
B. Reaching tasks
Reaching tasks were started in the week the baby first
demonstrated the ability to reach and touch a dangling object within
a time-limit of 2 minutes. In the reaching tasks, infants sat on
their mothers' laps at a table which had a semi-circular cut-out on
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the infant's side to facilitate reaching. Mothers were asked to
support the infants in such a way as to neither restrict nor
direct their reaching and to restrain their infants from reaching
while the object was in the process of being hidden.
Three reaching tasks were used:
Platform reaching (on): The object was placed
slowly on one of two platforms made of white,
high-density, plastic foam, k" square and 2" high,
positioned 6" apart and at an equal distance from
the baby. If the baby was successful in removing
the object from the platform within 2 minutes, the
same object was again placed on that platform (A).
If again successful, the object was then placed on
the other platform (B). (i.e a Stage IV - V (AAB)
sequence, with the first trial constituting a
Stage III - IV test in the event of Stage V failure,)
Care was taken that the infant attended to each part
of the sequence.
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2. Screen reaching (behind): AAB sequence as in 1
but object hidden behind one of two screens made
of white, non-reflective card and measuring 5>" x
5" (a size which made it impossible for the infant
to see the object over the top of the screen but was




3. Cup reaching (inside): AAB sequence as in 1 but (-,q\
object hidden inside one of two cups made of blue
cardboard, I4" high and 3" in diameter.
Cup
reaching
(19) "White cardboard cups could not be found and alternative .
white plastic or polystyrene cups proved to be either too difficult
to remove or texturally too interesting in themselves. Home-made
white cups were demolished too easily.
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These three reaching tasks obviously involve the same three
spatial relationships between object and occluder as in the
tracking presentations.
The aim was to give each baby two MB sequences, one
starting on the baby's left, one on his right, of each of the
three reaching tasks. In the early weeks of reaching, however,
reaching or attempting to reach is a laborious and difficult
process for infants and they rapidly become very tired.
Consequently, order of presentation of the tasks was chosen to
maximise the possibility of at least some response (though not
necessarily successful recovery of the object) occurring to more
than one condition. Order was therefore reduced to a function of
two rather than three variables, platform and cup or screen, the
assumption being that, in the case of the platform, as the object
was still in sight, attention would at least be retained to some
extent although reaching might not necessarily follow. It was
hoped that such a procedure would increase the chance of being able
to test more than one condition in these early weeks. Half of the
infants therefore did the task in the order platform, followed by
cup or screen, half doing the reverse order. Within the cup or
screen variable, half would start with cup, half screen. There
were therefore 6 babies in each of the four groups, PS, SP, CP and
PC, chosen equally from the two original tracking groups E la and
E lb (where P platform, S = screen and C ■= cup).
Two MB sequences of the first task would be given, one
starting on the left, one on the right (randomly assigned). Then,
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one AAB sequence of the next task would be given. If the baby
was still interested and responsive, one AAB sequence of the
remaining task (always a cup or screen task) would be given
starting on the side opposite to the previous task. If, after
all this, the baby was still attentive and happy, the remaining
tasks would be given. The following week, the infant would
start with the other of the two possibilities and proceed as above,
(if the first condition was screen or cup, the infant would do
whichever one had been third in the previous week. Week 3 was as
Week 1 and so on.)
As it turned out, infants were soon able to get through all
three conditions in the one session so the above precautions
became superfluous. Adoption of this procedure did, however, mean
that a reasonable spread of data was obtained during the early
weeks of reaching.
Where possible, the same object, a brightly coloured wooden
doll, was used throughout the reaching presentations. When it
became obvious that this no longer interested the baby, another
object would be substituted. All objects were brightly coloured,
flat-based and approximately lb - 2" in height and 1" in width.
If an infant lost interest in the object while within any AAB
sequence, that sequence would be abandoned and a new sequence and
new object introduced.
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Analysis : reaching tasks
All three conditions were analysed in the same way. All
behaviour was noted and divided into three time periods:
behaviour prior to search, during removal of the occluder and
during retrieval of the object (see Appendix B). For each trial,
time taken to remove the occluder was recorded and any delay
between removal of the occluder and retrieval of the object noted.
In the cup and screen tasks, the criterion adopted for Stage
IV success was removal of the correct occluder within the two
minute time limit and recovery of the object within 10 seconds of
its reappearance. (This is a less exact criterion than that
used in Experiment 2 but proved to be quite satisfactory since no
infant with an initial free capture time of greater than 10
seconds in fact succeeded in removing either cup or screen within
the allowed time.) In the case of the platform task, recovery of
the object from the platform within the two minute time limit was
taken as successful Stage IV behaviour. To be credited with being
in Stage V, all tasks required successful recovery of the object on
all three (AAB) trials. Any attempt to remove or inspect the
wrong occluder on the B trial was scored as a failure as was any




All tracks to the exit which occurred while the object was
still on/behind/in the occluder and which incorporated a
discernible pause were counted as anticipations as were responses
in which the infant caught the object within 300 msecs of its
reappearance. Graphs £.1A - 1C show the total number of
anticipations for each condition between 12 and 28 weeks.




In the case of 'behind' and 'in', such anticipations could
be (and usually are) taken as a measure of object understanding,
as an indication that the infant understands that the object
continues to exist while occluded and will reappear in due course
from behind or in the occluder. "Why, then, should there be any
anticipations in the 'on' condition? The infants' behaviour in
this condition is very bizarre; they act very much as if the
object 'disappears' on going onto the platform, checking over to
the far end, as if expecting to see it reappear there. In this
case, the object is in sight throughout; any anticipations here
must surely represent confusion over the identity of the object
(or objects) involved in the sequence. In light of the fact that
there Is no substantial difference in the number of anticipations
in the three conditions in the first 6-8 weeks, we should perhaps,
then, reconsider our interpretation of the meaning of anticipations
in the behind and inside conditions. There is already evidence
that anticipations to the exit will occur even when the object stops
before going behind a screen (Bower, Broughton & Moore, 1971).
Such behaviour does make sense in terms of the identity hypothesis.
If the infant has identified the object only in terms of its
movement, he will continue to look for it on its path of movement
when it stops, a response which, had the object not stopped in
sight, could easily be mistaken for anticipation.
Could it be that the 'anticipation' found above represents an
attempt to catch the appearance of the 'other' object, the object
which usually appears at B after the first object has gone into a
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(mysterious) spatial relationship with the occluder - and not an
attempt to anticipate the reappearance of the same object? From
Graphs 5-1A - 5>.1C, it is obvious that at no time is the number of
anticipations very high, considering the number of infants and
trials involved (12 infants x 8 trials at each week) and the rather
generous criterion for what was counted as an anticipation; if
premature, unsuccessful anticipations had been excluded, the number
of anticipations would have been very small indeed. If, as
suggested, these anticipations represent only a form of event
prediction rather than true object understanding, there are certain
patterns of response which should be seen. Event prediction in
these situations requires no understanding of what is going on in
the centre of the track, nor of the fact that only one object is
involved but could, however, be expected to increase in accuracy
over the weeks. The actual number of successful first anticipations
might not vary greatly over time (since capture within 300 msecs
represents a very stringent measure of event prediction as opposed
to object understanding) but the time taken to catch the appearance
of the 'other' object should decline appreciably with increasing
exposure to the situation. This is precisely what happens;
performance improves between sessions and even, occasionally, within
the course of a single session (Table 5-1 - see also Nelson, 197ir)♦
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TABLE 5•1 Capture times of typical subject in tracking
tasks of Experiment 5
Subject: D.D
Mean time to capture Time to capture
reappearing object "("sees) reappearing object (sees)
Week ON BEHIND IN Week 3 (H; wks) - 'behind1
1 X 2.L6 2.Hi Trial 1 3-Ho
2 -.la X 1.36 2 1.36
3 X • 65 X 3 -.36
li X X .66 li .88
5 -.32 .78 X 5 l.lli
6 X .81 • 51 6 .22
7 -.78 X X 7 -1.Hi
8 ' X -.01; X 8 -.16
9 -.16 X 1.21
10 .ho -.32 ' X
11 X X -.38
12 .25 X X
13 X .70 -.32
1U .02 X -.50
15 X 1.05 X
16 X X -.03
17 0 -.lU X
The suggestion is that all the infant is anticipating is the
appearance of an object on the other side; this anticipation is
heightened with increasing exposure to the situation. Anticipation
of the appearance of an object and anticipation of the reappearance
of the same object as was seen to disappear are not the same thing.
The pattern of anticipations in the 'on' situation are probably the
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most obvious indication of the limitations of the infant's
understanding; these false anticipations must reflect the infant's
belief that he has 'lost' the object from A when it goes onto the
platform; his anticipation represents an attempt to predict the
appearance of the 'other' object which usually turns up at B soon
after; it is difficult to think of any other explanation for this
very odd behaviour.
On the identity theory, what would we predict would happen when
the infant begins to recognise that the object at B is featurally
identical to the object at A? In all conditions, the pattern should
shift from one of tracking the 'first' object to the entry and
increasingly precise prediction of the appearance of the 'new' object
to one showing signs of confusion on the appearance of what is
recognised to be the same object, an object believed to have been 'lost'
on interacting spatially with the occluder. We might also expect this
pattern of behaviour to be followed by increasing attention to the
occluder itself. This is very much what happens. Attempts to
9 5
relocate the object while it is perfectly visible on either unoccluded
section of the track - a clear indication of identity confusion - soar
at 17 weeks and again at 21 weeks (Graph 5-2), the latter peak being
accompanied by a jump in attention to the occluder itself.
(20) Mathematical regression analysis confirmed that the two apparent
peaks in Graph 5.2 were in fact significant aspects of the data.
(Newton-Spurrell coefficients were derived and from these the optimal
regression curve was found by graphical means. This turned out to be
2 h
a quartic curve of the form c + ax - bx , a curve which could account
for 82.6$ of the variance in Graph 5.2. This particular form of
quartic curve has two maxima - in other words, two clear peaks. I am
grateful to Rodney Noble for carrying out this analysis for me).
- 203 -




















Rule 1 behaviour : place and movement errors
Rule 2 behaviour : attention to occluder and other side of track
Why two peaks in confusion? It might be hypothesised that
each peak represents a crisis in confusion prior to acquisition of
a new and better identity rule. The infant starts with Rule 1 :
an object is a bounded volume of space in a particular place or on
a particular path of movement. The platform display could therefore
present him with five (or possibly even seven) 'objects'; the
stopped object at A, the object moving on path A, the object-and-
c $




platform, the object moving on path B and the stopped object at
B (with the possibility that the transition points are interpreted
as yet another two objects). The other two conditions could
contain a minimum of four objects. Some time around 17 weeks,
Rule 2 might be acquired : an object is a bounded volume of space
of a certain size, shape and colour which can move from place to
place along trajectories. Features are incorporated into the
definition of an object and the infant will now understand that an
object can move or stop and yet remain the same object. The
infant will now recognise that the two objects at A and B are
featurally identical but will still find the spatial interaction of
object and occluder totally mysterious. The peak in confusion at
21 weeks could therefore be interpreted as presaging acquisition of
Rule 3, the understanding that an object can in fact go into a
spatial relationship with another object and yet retain its unique
identity.
The supposition that the first peak at 17 weeks may represent
acquisition of Rule 2 seems quite feasible since attention to
featural information in such situations normally occurs around 20
weeks (Bower, 197ba, Goldberg, 1976, Gardner, 1971, Moore, Borton &
Darby, 1978) and we might expect some acceleration to result from
repeated exposure to such conceptually 'pure' stimulus information.
This incorporation of features into the infant's identity rules
should be accompanied by the elimination of place and movement
errors (see p 139)- Unfortunately for the theory, although it can
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be seen that this holds true temporarily (Graph 5-2), these
errors increase in frequency again in synchrony with the
appearance of the second postulated identity crisis. One
possible explanation for this might be that the second crisis
throws the infant back onto his earlier solutions in a desperate
attempt to find a rule which will cover his newly acquired
awareness that the same object is involved on both sides of the
occluder and yet seems to go out of existence between these times.
Some support for this suggestion comes from examination of the
responses to the simple tracking situation (Graph 5-3)















(Confusion was measured on a 3pt. scale : 1 = slight )
2 = moderate )
3 = extreme )
It is obvious that behaviour in this situation mirrors the confusion
so apparent in the tracking situations involving interactions with
another object, peaking slightly later at 19 and 22 weeks. Why
should infants who by llj. weeks were perfectly competent at tracking
in this situation suddenly produce such confused tracking, frequently
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checking back and forth along the track in the absence of either
stops or an occluder? I believe this to be clear evidence of
hypothesis testing in progress. The infant is in the process of
elaborating a higher order identity rule which must be able to cope
with any event sequence, however simple; any former lower level
rules are double-checked for their inadequacy (a process reflected,
for example, in the resurgence of place and movement errors at 17
and 21 weeks in all situations) and a new hypothesis eventually
formulated. When this is adopted, the erroneous behaviours
produced by the lower level rules will fall away and order will be
restored (see Graph 5-2).
What of the second supposition, that the peak at 21 weeks
presages acquisition of Rule 3 and understanding that an object can
interact spatially with another object and yet retain its unique
identity throughout? The infant now knows that the 'two' objects
are the same and that an object can move from place to place but is
still unable to understand what is happening in the centre section of
the track. If this is in fact the case, we might expect a flurry
of attention to the occluder itself to be associated with this peak,
along with checks across to the other side of the track. This is
just what happens (Graph 3-2). It is interesting to note that in
the particular case of the platform condition, both general
confusion and attention to the occluder set in much earlier. This
is hardly surprising - the behaviour in relation to that 'occluder'
is visible throughout (if not understood) and must blatantly
contradict the identity rules the infant is hypothesised to possess
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at this time (two objects cannot be in the same place).
If this second peak is indeed evidence of the imminence of
(21)
Rule 3, we might also expect a rise in genuine anticipations
of the reappearance of the object in the screen and tunnel
conditions and a fall in false anticipations in the platform
conditions. There was in fact a rise in 1st trial anticipations
around 20 weeks in both screen and tunnel conditions (Graph S>.1|).
Graph 5.4 : 'Genuine'&'False' anticipations
20 "~| 'Genuine'anticipations : BEHIND/IN
15 -
Number of
1st trial iq — j
anticipations / \ /'
/ \ / V/N/
H i i i i i—i—i—i—


















(21) How is one to define an anticipation as 'genuine'? It is
considerably easier to write off an anticipation as false than to
prove that it is genuine. In this study, we must settle for a
matter of degree; anticipations on the first trial of any
presentation are more likely to be 'genuine' indications of object
knowledge than any appearing after repeated exposure to the event.
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Unfortunately, no sharp drop in platform anticipations accompanied
this, the pattern being very similar to that shown in the inside
and behind conditions. The following weeks did, however, see a
sharp fall in these false anticipations while the other conditions
in general maintained their anticipation rate. That there was no
further increase (and occasional decreases) in anticipations shown
in the two occluder situations should not surprise us.
Anticipations require very exact spatio-temporal coding of the
event in order to be counted as successful anticipations; it does
not seem unreasonable that the motivation for such precise behaviour,
while present around the time the new identity rule is formed,
should fall away with increasing confirmation of that rule (see also
Table 5-1).
Further evidence that this peak is evidence of the imminence
of Rule 3 comes from the analysis of the behaviour on the reaching
tasks.
RESULTS : REACHING
Table 3-2 shows the age of first presentation of the Stages III -
IV and IV - V tasks and age of first success in these tasks for each
subject. An infant was judged to have achieved a stage on that week
in which he successfully dealt with one set of trials, with the
proviso that:
no error was made if a 2nd set of trials was
presented in that session, or
if no 2nd set of trials was presented in that session,
no error was made on the next session in which that
particular condition was presented.
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JBJECT First First First
tested Passed tested Passed tested Passed
IV V IV V IV V IV V IV V IV V
1 19 20 19 20 19 19 19 19 20 21 21 21
2 17 18 18 18 17 20 20 21 16 18 16 18
3 17 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 17 19 19 21
4 19 24 24 24 19 26 26 27 20 24 24 24
9 17 19 17 19 19 20 20 (28) 18 20 20 21
6 18 21 21 21 18 20 20 22 19 21 21 21
7 19 17 19 17 16 21 20 21 19 20 20 20
8 29 29 29 26 29 28 28 28+ 29 29 29 29
9 19 22 22 26 20 24 26 28+ 19 27 27 28
10 19 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 16 21 21 21
11 18 22 22 22 19 23 23 24 18 21 21 21
12 17 23 23 23 19 22 22 24 18 22 22 23
13 18 21 21 (28) 20 26 26 (28+) 19 27 27 (27)
14 19 19 19 19 20 22 22 22 19 29 29 29
19 19 19 19 19 16 21 21 22 19 19 19 20
16 29 26 29 28+ 29 - 28+ - 26 26 26 28+
17 19 17 17 20 18 28 23 (28) 19 21 21 21
18 20 21 20 21 21 21 21 29 20 20 22 22
19 18 21 18 22 .20 20 20 29 19 21 21 24
20 17 17 17 17 17 19 19 19 17 17 17 17
21 16 21 21 21 16 21 21 28 17 23 23 23
22 21 21 21 22 21 29 29 29 22 22 24 24
23 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 24 24 24
24 18 18 18 18 19 21 22 29 18 18 18 18
Mean * 19.70 20.60 22.OU 23-10 21.83 22.17
S.D 2.83 3-23 2.94 3.24 2.98 2.89
-x- Bracketed ages were omitted from calculation of the mean either because
subject showed clear preference for the occluder rather than the object or
because subject showed no interest whatsoever in that particular hiding
task.
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As can be seen from Table 5.2, mean age of achievement of Stages IV
and V respectively- was 19.70 weeks and 20.60 weeks for platforms,
22.Ql|. and 23-10 weeks for screens and 21.83 and 22.17 weeks for cups.
This fits well with the analysis of the tracking results forwarded in
the preceding section. According to that analysis the transition
from level 2 to level 3 identity rules occurred around 21 weeks in
this group. Theoretically, this advance would allow these infants
to cope with all the later object permanence tests, from IV - VI.
Friedman 2-way analyses of variance on age of achievement of
Stages IV and V for the three conditions showed that for both Stage
IV and Stage V, age of success differed significant3_y in the
different conditions (K-"Xr= li|..25>$ V : 21.Qh - both significant
at .001 level). Table 3-3 shows the results of sign tests carried
out on age of achievement of Stages IV and V in all possible pairs
of conditions.
TABLE 3'.3 Results of sign tests > on data in Table 3.2




PC . 00U . 001*
(P = platform, S = screen, C ■= cup)
As predicted, the platform task is clearly easier than both
screen and cup tasks at both Stages IV and V. No difference was
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found between age of success on screen and cup tasks for Stage IV
but a significant difference in favour of cups was found for Stage
V, a finding which lends little support to the Bower/Neilson
hypothesis that 'behind' holds a privileged position in the infant's
understanding of spatial relations (see also Lucas & Uzgiris, 1977)-
What of the relationship (if any) between age of achievement of
Stages IV and V? Stage V, since it requires 2 successful A trials,
cannot of course be tested until the infant has succeeded in the
Stage IV task. Inspection of the mean age of achievement of both
stages for each condition shows that success on Stage V follows very
quickly on Stage IV success in all 3 conditions (Table 5-2). If, in
addition, we compare age of achieving Stage IV and Stage V in each
baby and make allowance for the fact that the age of these babies
often precluded presentation of both tasks in the same session
(because of fatigue, irritability etc.), it can be seen that, for
platforms and cups, the majority of babies passed Stage V on the very
first occasion of presentation (Table %.k). If we include infants
who passed Stage V on the second occasion of presentation, we see
that, for screens too, Stage V success follows very rapidly on Stage
IV success.
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TABLE <?.h Relationship between age of achievement of
Stage V and week of testing
Platforms Screens Cups
No. infants achieving
Stage V on first ^^23 ^21 16/pi
occasion of presentation
No. infants achieving
Stage V on second ^/ , 6/ *
presentation
Total 21/ 15/21 22/2h
(any infant in whom the gap between presentation and age of success
was very large (e.g infant 13 : platform/7 weeks) but who had
consistently shown clear preference for the occluder over the
object throughout these weeks was omitted from this analysis).
A trend analysis on performance over sessions confirmed the
finding that there was no step-wise progression from Stage IV to
Stage V, with 88$ of the variance being accounted for by a linear
trend and no significant cubic trend being present. This fits well
with the 3-stage identity theory of the development of object
understanding but poorly with the traditional six-stage
interpretation of object concept development.
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DISCUSSION
Clearly the most important result to come out of this study is
the vast acceleration in age of achievement of Stages IV and V
shown by all infants. With hindsight, it is obvious that Stage VE
behaviour should also have been tested. This was not unfortunately
done. Since the normal age of achievement of Stage VI is 13 - 18
months and these infants were still only 28 weeks old at the end of
the study, this is perhaps excusable. First impressions of even
the Stage IV and V behaviour were not in any case very favourable.
Although fulfilling the criterion adopted, it at first seemed
doubtful to me that the behaviour was as object-oriented as a simple
numerical analysis of successful recoveries might lead one to
believe. It must be borne in mind that these infants were well
below the age at which one would normally test for Stage IV - V
behaviour, never mind expect to find it. Stage IV errors are
commonly found around 8-10 months of age; these infants averaged
h months at onset of testing.
It could be possible, of course, that the Stage IV error is a
developmental error, i.e that it only occurs with development.
Gratch & Landers (1971 ) found no evidence of any such growth error
in their longitudinal study of the Stage IV error. 10 out of 13
infants made the AAB error on the first session in which they could
successfully locate an object at A. This study did not, however,
consider infants under 6 months of age. The infants in our study,
regardless of their training, could possibly have been too young
- 211* -
either to show the errors characteristic of Stage IV or to be
capable of truly passing it. As no one to my knowledge has ever
attempted to investigate the behaviour of such young infants in
this situation, the possibility that the Stage IV error is a growth
error is one which cannot merely be dismissed.
The early search behaviours can only be described as messy.
The infants would frequently become very agitated or excited as
they attempted to organise their response. Although there was no
time restraint on onset of search, organisation of a response, if
successful at all, could take the full two minutes in the early
weeks and frustration was very apparent. Attention was almost
exclusively directed at the side where the hiding event was
occurring, little attention being given to the other side. After
the infant had successfully removed the correct occluder, attention
to the uncovered object was seldom focused and many infants did not
appear to have noticed its reappearance until several seconds after
removing the occluder, their attention being absorbed by manipulating
or chewing the occluder itself. This type of behaviour provoked the
suspicion that the behaviour' was not as successful or object-oriented
as might seem on an analysis based on recovery of the object alone.
Successfully choosing the correct side may have been an artefact of
the infant's exclusive orientation to the side where something
interesting happened. At best, the correct side was chosen because
something interesting involving an object happened with that
particular cup in the immediate past; at worst, the interesting
event was over but, since the baby was oriented in that direction, he
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might as well amuse himself with that particular cup. Neither
implies any understanding that the object continues to exist
throughout the sequence. In other words, the remarkable 'success'
of these babies -could be completely false and have little or
nothing to do with any acceleration of development of the object
concept. Any infant tested at this age would be able to produce
'successful' behaviour.
Two considerations, however, make me certain that these
behaviours were, in fact, directed by a developing object concept.
Firstly, close analysis of the behaviours reveals incidents which
clearly indicate expectations of the reappearance of an object on
removal of the occluder and would indeed be hard to explain in any
other way. The baby, for example, might happily pull the screen
towards him and chew the top of it, apparently not noticing the
object which he had revealed. After a few seconds, however, his
hand would reach round the screen, accurately locating the object
and bringing it to his mouth, all this without any apparent
refocusing of attention. Other more straightforward examples of
(22)
reaching round the screen were also observed. The following
(22) According to Bruner (1968, 1970) the behaviour of reaching
round a screen is not found until approximately 9 months, reaching
until then being limited to reaches along the line of sight. Although
this behaviour is not frequent, it occurs sufficiently often to lead
to doubts over the validity of this generalisation. These infants had
not, after all, been given any specific practice in reaching.
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was also occasionally observed: although happily attempting to
demolish the (correct) paper cup and apparently totally ignoring
the uncovered object, an infant would suddenly,, with his free hand
appropriately shaped, reach out in the correct direction of the
object and recover it, even although, by now, he may have turned
away from the original position of that cup. It is difficult to
imagine other than object-related reasons for such behaviours.
Further supporting evidence came from the few errors these infants
made in the very first weeks of testing. Any error on the catch
trial of the Stage IV - V task would be accompanied by clear signs
of surprise and on two occasions by a degree of upset which
necessitated terminating the session.
There is a second and stronger reason for believing the
successes to be genuine. Half of the infants in this study moved
into a further tracking/reaching study at 29 weeks (Neilson, 1977)•
Although the tracking tasks were expanded to include presentations
involving two platforms, two screens and two tunnels, the reaching
tasks were identical to those given here. Babies were tested from
28 - k2 weeks. During this period only 11 Stage IV errors were
found out of a total of 861* test presentations. This makes it
extremely unlikely that the early successes were false passes. Had
this been the case, the normal Stage IV errors would have appeared
in due course.
A third possible proof of the genuineness of the behaviours would
have been a correlation between, say, age of elimination of place and
movement errors in the tracking tasks and age of success in the
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reaching tasks, since we have already established (Experiment 1)
that the two tasks reflect a single developing concept. As we
have seen, however, it would be very difficult to establish this
in this particular study because of the resurgence of these errors
at subsequent points in development. If we were to take
elimination of all those responses we took as evidence of identity
confusion in the tracking tasks, we can see that for the group as a
whole,there seems to be a very close link indeed between this and
age of success in the search tasks - a finding which lends support
to the claim that there is no true decalage between object
understanding as expressed in tracking tasks and object understanding
as demonstrated in reaching tasks (see p 31 )•
Taking all this into consideration, it now seems reasonable to
conclude that weekly exposure to the tracking situations used in
this experiment produces a genuine and substantial effect on age of
attainment of the later stages of the object concept. Why should
this be? The identity hypothesis answer would be that the tracking
situations presented contained all of the information necessary for
formation of the sequence of identity rules it believes to underlie
the six stages of object permanence behaviour - objects moving and
stopping, surviving spatial interactions with other objects and so
on. Unlike the real world, the event sequence seen by these infants
was stripped down to the fundamentals and presented repeatedly and
without variation, thereby allowing ample opportunity for the
framing and testing of hypotheses. Obviously it would be easier to
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extract some ordering principle from such a conceptually pure display
than from the confusion which surrounds normal everyday experience
with objects.
The effects of different kinds and amounts of training : an
extension of Experiment 5>
It could be that in some way the successful object permanence
behaviour shown in this experiment is attributable to the fact that
the infants were exposed to tracking tasks involving a number of
different spatial relations. In order to assess whether this was an
important factor in their success or whether exposure to any single
spatial relations tracking task would produce equal across-the-board
acceleration, two further experimental groups were run.
SUBJECTS AND PROCEDURE
Group E 2 consisted of 12 infants who were exposed fortnightly to
8 trials of one or other of the three spatial tracking tasks seen by
the original experimental group. h saw the platform tracking task,
h saw the screen tracking task and h saw the tunnel tracking task.
Each set of infants was therefore being given the same amount of
tracking experience in any one condition as the original group but
only one quarter of their total tracking experience.
Half of the subjects in each of the 3 groups started training at
12 weeks of age, the other half at 13 weeks. Stop trials were
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inserted in a ratio approximating that for each condition in the
original design, i.e in alternate sessions, with week of initial
and subsequent stop trials being staggered within each group.
Group E 3 consisted of 12 infants who were exposed weekly to
16 trials of one or other of the three tracking tasks; all were 12
weeks old at onset of training. Ij. saw the platform task, Ij. saw
the screen task and it saw the tunnel task. Each set of infants in
this group was therefore being given the same total amount of
tracking experience as the original group but in only one condition.
On this one condition they were receiving four times the amount of
training given to the experimental group. Stop trials were
inserted on odd weeks for half the group, on even weeks for the
remainder.
Both groups were tested on all three manual object permanence
tests as soon as they showed themselves able to reach for a dangling
object within two minutes of its presentation. Manual object
permanence testing was carried out weekly thereafter while tracking
continued on its previous schedule, i.e fortnightly for Group E 2,
weekly for Group E 3. For each infant, testing terminated when
level of manual object permanence competence could be assessed in
all three tasks within the one session. Financial restrictions did
not, unfortunately, permit testing to continue beyond this point.
As a result, all comparisons with E 1 are based on success rates at
that particular point in development, a situation which is not ideal
but still allows some information to be gathered on the relative
efficiency of different kinds and amounts of training.
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RESULTS
Table 3-3 compares the number of Stage IV and Stage V
successes in groups E 1, E 2 and E 3 on the first week in which all
three tasks could be presented together.
TABLE 3-3 Comparison of number of Stage IV and V successes
in the 3 experimental groups
GROUP PLATFORMS SCREENS CUPS % SUCCESS
E 1 (N = 2k)
60Mean age: 19-02 wks IV : 20 11 12
(S.D. 2.2li) V : 13 7 9 1+3
E 2 (N = 12)
Mean age: 18.08 wks IV : 6 1 k 31
(S.D. 2.19) V : 6 1 3 28
E 3 (N - 12)
a h2Mean age: 18.83 wks IV : 9 2
(S.D. 1.12) V : 3 1 2 22
p
X tests on the Stage IV and Stage V success rates revealed that
2
significant differences existed amongst the three groups (IV :X = 9.7k,
O
p <(.01; V :X = 7 .5h, p pairwise comparisons are laid out in
Table 3-6.
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TABLE 3.6 Results of pairwise 9C tests on data from Table 3«3
IV V


















It can be seen that groups E 1 and E 2 differed significantly
in terras of both Stage IV and Stage V successes. The performance
difference between E 1 and E 9>, while large, did not quite reach
statistical significance on Stage IV but was significant in Stage V.
No real difference existed between the performance of E 2 and of E 3
on either level of task. It is important to note that, although
performing more poorly than E 1, both E 2 and E 3 performed better
on the manual tasks than would have been expected for their age (18 -
19 weeks). Single condition training does therefore appear to
produce some acceleration, but not the massive acceleration produced
by mixed training.
It might have seemed reasonable to assume that the single
condition training undergone by E 2 and E 3 subgroups would have
resulted in specific transfer effects, with training on a particular
condition carrying over to the matching reaching task. This would
mean, for example, that infants trained on screens would find the
screens reaching task easiest and so on. Inspection of the data
suggests, however, that this was not the case (Table 3.7).
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TABT.E Relation of training condition to success of E 2 and E 3
on Stage IV and V tasks
E 2 SUCCESSES (IV+V) E 3 SUCCESSES (iV+V)
Testing condition Testing condition
Training










In the original, mixed training experimental group (E l) the order
of difficulty of the reaching tasks was P <(. C <CS. This order of
difficulty remained the same in all subgroups of E 2 and E 3, despite
the fact that these subgroups were being trained exclusively on one
particular spatial relation. (One minor exception occurred in E 2:
the tunnel training subgroup's performance on the cup tasks equalled
(but did not better) their performance on the platform tasks).
In order to test more rigorously for any effects of specific
transfer, expected frequencies were computed from Table 5»7 on the
basis of subgroup and task differences and t-tests were then used to
compare the difference between these expected frequencies and the
observed frequencies, with the sign of the difference being assigned
in accord with the hypothesis that single condition training would lead
to specific transfer. In neither case were significant differences
found to exist (E 2: t ■= 1.1$, N.S.j E 3- t = .76, N.S.) We cannot
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therefore reject the null hypothesis that no specific transfer
results from single condition training; training in a specific
tracking task would not appear to produce specific transfer
effects on Stage IV and Stage V reaching tasks.
There results are In accord with the recent abstract
specific theory of development put forward by Bower (1976 - see
Appendix C). The fact that no specific transfer occurred suggests
that the infant's early conceptualisation and understanding of the
training tasks could not have been formulated in terms which were
specific to the particular spatial relationship that he was
watching. The success rate of these infants, almost all of whom
were under five months at testing, suggests however that a degree of
general transfer did in fact occur in both groups. That this was
significantly less than in the case of the mixed training is not
surprising. If, as Bower suggests, early conceptualisation of the
problem is indeed abstract, it would seem easier to abstract the
general principle necessary for successful transfer - that an
object can go into a spatial relationship without losing its
identity - from a set of interrelated stimulus displays, each of
which embodies that principle in a slightly different way, than from
a single instance, no matter how frequently that may be presented
(see also Neilson, 1977).
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DISCUSSION
The main findings of Experiment 3 are outlined below:
1. 'On' poses problems for young infants in both
tracking and reaching tasks
2. 'Behind' holds no privileged position in the
infant's understanding of spatial relations
between objects
3. Weekly exposure to tracking tasks involving a
variety of spatial relationships produces quite
astonishing acceleration in success on manual
object permanence tasks, an acceleration which
appears to be genuine
I4. Such training seems to produce general rather
than specific transfer effects
3. Stages IV and V of the object concept can be
achieved virtually simultaneously by infants
given such training
6. Both tracking and manual object permanence tasks
mirror the same level of object understanding;
no true d^calage exists between visual and manual
competence. Data on anticipatory looking for an
object which has gone out of sight should thus be
treated with caution and not as all-or-nothing
evidence of understanding of the nature of objects.
All of the above results fit well with the identity hypothesis
of object concept development but two in particular are perhaps
worthy of further discussion. The first, the finding that the
spatial relationship 'on' produces tracking confusion in young
infants, lends support to the findings of Experiment h and to the
identity claim that boundaries at all stages are more important to
notions of object permanence than visibility/invisibility. The
infant's problem is not simply one of understanding that objects
continue to exist while unperceived; his problem lies rather in
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discovering the details of that existence. According to the
identity hypothesis, development of the object concept is
development of a set of conceptual rules which will allow the
infant to attribute a stable identity to an object throughout any
event sequence. These rules go further than merely giving
continuing existence to any object. They concern permanence in a
more particular way, allowing the infant to identify the object as
one and the same object at any point in time.
The second finding of particular importance to the identity
theory of object concept development is the finding that Stages IV
and V of the object concept can be acquired virtually
simultaneously. Normally this segment of development may take
h - 6 months to unfold. According to the identity hypothesis,
however, no true conceptual advance coincides with acquisition of
either of these stages•, the different search behaviour found in
Stages IV and V results rather from the formation of
probabilistically-determined search strategies (see p These
behavioural search rules take note of the occluding object and its
position but do not imply any understanding of the continuing,
unchanged existence of the object being searched for. The
conceptual key to success in all of the later search problems is
knowing that an object can go into a spatial relationship with
another object and yet retain its unique identity throughout. If
this knowledge is promoted early enough in development,(by, for
example, constant exposure to a tracking task stripped of all
irrelevant information in which an object continually goes into a
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variety of boundary-violating spatial relationships with another
object and yet emerges unchanged each time,) there is no reason
why all the later object permanence tests should not be passed
together; there would of course then be no need for the
evolution and continual modification of search rules and the
accompanying characteristic 3 step progress through Stages III -
VI. Experiments 1 and 5, taken together, suggest that just such
a compression of the developmental sequence can in fact occur,
strong evidence in favour of the identity interpretation of the
infant's problems.
The above results not only fit well with the identity
hypothesis but also provide considerable problems for any of the
other explanations of object concept development we have looked at
thus far (see Chapter 3). Motor skill explanations, for example,
suggest that the Stage III - IV task poses behavioural rather than
conceptual problems for young infants; infants in Experiment 3
were, however, in Stage _V within a couple of weeks of the very
earliest signs of the emergence of reaching. Memory and
representation theories would likewise have difficulty in
explaining the problem caused by the spatial relationship of 'on';
the object is in sight throughout yet the infant clearly has
problems in understanding what is happening. The fact that early
visual experience produces massive effects on manual competence in
very young infants also compromises both the intersensory
co-ordination explanation and the action argument of object concept
development (depending, of course, on whether we choose to extend
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the notion of 'activity' to include perceptual activity or not -
see p 98 )•
Moore's Identity Theory
This is perhaps the point at which reference should be made
to Moore's (1975) identity theory. Starting from his early
collaborative work with Bower (Bower, Broughton & Moore, 1971),
Moore has also arrived at a three stage model of the development of
identity rules. The first two stages are fairly similar to those
given here and based on very much the same experimental evidence.
The third, however, diverges completely from the model offered here,
as can be seen in Table 5-8.
TABLE 5-8 Moore's Identity Model
Age
Level (months) Description of levels
Examples of transformations
for which an object's
unique identity is
maintained




2 5-8 Identity maintained for
transformations of
visible objects
Objects in motion stopping
Objects at rest starting
to move







(From: Moore & Meltzoff, 1978)
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According to Moore, acquisition of the third level of identity rules
depends on the criteria of place and movement being extended to
cover invisible displacements. On his model, the infant's
difficulties in the later object permanence tasks are interpreted as
being the result of identifying a hidden object in terms of its
place or trajectory of disappearance and reappearance. These final
rules for identity are hypothesised to be successively reorganised
to cover more and more complex sequences of disappearance, a
process stimulated by the infant's acknowledgement of the featural
identity of the 'objects' involved in the disappearance and
reappearance parts of the sequence (Clark, 19750-
There are several difficulties with this model. Although it
can be used to explain sane awkward experimental findings quite
neatly (e.g Evans & Gratch's (1972) finding that infants will make
the AAB error even when a new, featurally different object is hidden
(23)at B), ~ it has no means of explaining either the problems older
infants have in situations where the object is not invisible
(Experiments 1; + 5) or the early solution of problems in which the
object is. invisible (Experiment 3).
A fundamental difference between the two theories concerns the
role of permanence in the development of the infant's identity rules.
The theory presented here assumes that the infant, from a very early
point in development, already has a primitive notion that objects
(23) A recent study by Schuberth, Werner & Lipsitt (1978) failed,
however, to replicate this finding.
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exist at all times, whether or not they are being perceived
(Bower, 1967> Experiment 3). This is not to deny that infants
have considerable difficulty in understanding the true nature of
objects. This.misunderstanding, however, is believed to be on
a far more subtle level than that of mere existence or non-existence
of objects while unperceived. Moore, however, believes that
development of the early rules of object identity is necessarily
prior to development of any notion of object permanence. Object
permanence is considered to be only a special case of the more
fundamental problem of obj ect identity. For Moore, a belief in
the permanence of unseen objects is not acquired until around 9
months of age, at which time it bee ernes essential for the further
development of the identity rules to cover disappearance sequences.
Like many other theorists, Moore equates permanence only with
the belief in the continued existence of an object when out of
sight and treats identity and permanence as two initially
independent problems. To separate identity and permanence in this
way is surely artificial - what of the permanence of identity, a
question not as facetious as it might at first seem? We have
already seen that an object which remains perfectly visible
throughout an event sequence can produce evidence of identity
confusion in an otherwise competent infant (Experiment 9). When,
for example, an object moves over the top of a platform, the infant
may act as if the 'original' object has disappeared - but surely his
glances back are evidence that he believes in the continued
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existence of that particular object somewhere. His confusion is
over the identity or non-identity of the object at various points
in the event sequence, whether it goes out of sight or not;
although recognising the 'new' object to be featurally identical
to the 'original' object, he is unsure that it is the same and the
only object involved.
A tracking study by Moore, Borton & Darby (1978) may illustrate
the difficulties such a theory will encounter. Moore et al set up
three tracking situations in which they sought to separate
permanence and identity problems. In the permanence violation
condition, an object moved behind one of two screens, failed to
reappear from behind that screen but reappeared at the appropriate
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In the two identity violation conditions, the object moved behind a
single long screen, either to reappear prematurely from the other
side (trajectory violation) or to reappear at the appropriate time
but completely transformed in features (featural violation). All
visual responses were coded and three particular patterns of
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responses selected as indicators of disrupted tracking: looking
away from the task while the object was in sight, looking back
along the track when the object reappeared from behind the screen(s)
and monitoring the final then initial screen edges while the object
was out of sight. Only the two identity violation conditions
produced these patterns of looking behaviour in 3 month olds while
the tracking of nine month olds was disrupted by all three
conditions. From this, Moore et al conclude "that nine month olds
have permanence and five month olds do not.
This conclusion is not the only one that could be drawn from
the data presented. For a start, to expect disruption to be
indexed by the same patterns of behaviour at both ages and in all
situations (situations which even superficially are quite different)
may be theoretically convenient but is somewhat unrealistic. The
permanence violation situation involves two short screens and a
violation which occurs between these two screens; the feature and
trajectory tasks involve one long screen with the violation
occurring at the end of that screen. On information processing
demands alone, an important developmental variable in itself, these
tasks are quite different. Attention and memory capacity could
also differentially affect performance on the different conditions at
different ages. Even if we were to disregard these possible
sources of the differences in behaviour which were found, there are
also considerable problems in using the same measures of tracking
disruption for all three conditions. Looks back on reappearance of
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the object may be appropriate indicator behaviours of identity
violation in the feature and trajectory tasks but surely behaviour
at the point of non-reappearance is the relevant behaviour in the
permanence situation. (Moore et al refer to the object as being
'occluded' at this point. Equating 'out of sight' with 'occlusion'
is to ignore an important distinction, as Experiment 3 has shown).
There are other problems. All of the behaviours chosen to
index awareness of violation appear in non-violation presentations
of the three conditions as well, a fact which surely undermines the
conclusions drawn from the data. By concentrating only on the
difference in frequency of the selected responses between violation
and non-violation conditions, Moore et al ignore what must surely
have been a wealth of potentially valuable information about the level
and nature of the infants' understanding of the non-violation events
they presented. Even if these differences in response frequency were
to be as meaningful as Moore et al believed, it should also be noted
that very enphatic conclusions are being drawn from differences which
only achieved significance levels of .10 at times, significance levels
which in several important cases were not attained in a previous study
which used a larger number of infants but was identical in all other
aspects (Borton & Darby, 1975)-
The most important flaw, however, is perhaps the simplest. The
study explicitly set out to present tracking conditions in which
•i
identity but not permanence was violated and vice versa. This is as
impossible as separating place and response seems to be (see p 93 )•
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Even on Moore's own account of the development of identity rules,
this was not achieved. Nine month old infants are hypothesised to
attribute identity to successive appearances of an object which
disappears from view on the basis of its trajectory or place of
disappearance (Moore, 1975); five month olds are assumed to be
developing this notion (Moore, Borton & Darby, 1978). Surely then
on this analysis the infant's supposed identity rules must also
have been violated in the permanence violation condition since the
object did not continue on its trajectory between the two screens?
Overview: So far then, the identity hypothesis forwarded here
seems to be the only theory which can adequately cover the variety
of appropriate and inappropriate object-related behaviours found in
infancy. Alternative spatial explanations have, however, been
advanced for individual stages in the developmental sequence and,
before deciding finally on the identity hypothesis, it will be
necessary to consider and evaluate these alternative accounts.
This will be done in the next and final chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX - SPATIAL UNDERSTANDING IN INFANCY
Previous chapters have already considered the most commonly
forwarded alternatives to the traditional Piagetian analysis of
object concept development. With the possible exception of the
most weak form of the action argument, all of these explanations were
found to be incapable of accounting for the entire range of object-
related behaviours found during this period of development; few were
able to explain more than even a small segment of that development.
A variety of experimental evidence was both reviewed and presented
which, while undermining the other theories, either positively
supported or was consistent with the identity account of the
development of object understanding. At this point it would perhaps
be useful to recap on the evidence so far presented and summarise the
main points of the identity theory of object concept development.
The identity theory suggests that the conceptual problem which
underlies the six stages of object concept behaviour is one of object
identity rather than object permanence. A basic idea of object
reality (including some idea of permanence) is assumed to be present
from the start. The infant is seen rather as having difficulty in
maintaining the identity of an object throughout an event sequence.
This difficulty is present regardless of whether the event entails
temporary disappearance of the object or not (Experiments 2 and 3)
and is particularly acute if the sequence involves close interaction
with any other object (Experiments U and 5)-
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On this theory, development is seen as a progressive
refinement of the infant's rules for attributing identity to an
object over time. The infant moves from the simple recognition
that an object is the same object at different times and in
different places, through to more elaborate notions which define
identity in a much stricter sense, with the object not only being
recognised as featurally the same but as identical in the sense of
being one and the same object throughout the sequence - i.e the
same and only such object involved (Experiment 3).
The identity hypothesis accepts the six behavioural stages
observed by Piaget as veridical, with the qualification that the
Stage IV - V error is seen as existing on an equiprobable rather
than absolute basis (Experiment l). The identity hypothesis
forwards a sequence of five behavioural search rules which could
account for the behaviour of each of these six stages. Underlying
these 5> search rules, however, is assumed to be a sequence of only
3 conceptual rules, the rules which define identity and in part
determine the search rules. From this, it is clear that each change
in search strategy does not necessarily reflect a true change in
cognitive status. Object concept development is therefore seen as a
three rather than six-stage process. The hypothesised sequence of
search and identity rules is outlined in Table 6.1.
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TABLS 6.1 Hypothetical sequence of development of Search and
Identity rules
Stages I and II
Identity Rule (l) An object is a bounded volume of space in a
particular place or on a particular path of
movement.
Search Rule (l) To find a stationary object, search for it in
the place where it usually is.
To find a moving object, search for it along
its path of movement.
Stage III
Identity Rule (2) An object is a bounded volume of space of a
certain size, shape and colour that can move
from place to place along trajectories.
Search Rule (2) To find an object, search for it in its usual
place or, if it has moved, along its path of
movement.
If, however, another object of a different size,
shape and colour is now in the same place or on
the same path of movement, do nothing (a
mysterious disappearance).
Stage IV
Identity Rule (2) (Same as Stage III)
Search Rule (3) To find an object that has disappeared
mysteriously, remove the object which has
replaced it.
Stage V
Identity Rule (2) (Same as Stage III)
Search Rule (U) To find an object that has disappeared
mysteriously, remove the object which is now in
the place where it was last seen.
Stage VI
Identity Rule (3) Same as Stage HI plus: Two or more objects
can, however, be in the same place or on the
same path of movement simultaneously if they
bear a spatial relationship to each other which
involves a sharing of common boundaries.
Search Rule (3) To .find an object that has disappeared, remove
the object which is now in the place where it
was last seen, taking into account any
subsequent movement of that obj ect.
(after Bower, 197Ua)
- 237 -
The first and second identity rules cover Stages I - V and
are applied with differing degrees of success to events involving
single objects. They determine when two appearances of an object
will be linked to the same object, with Rule 2 growing out of and
representing a considerable advance on the earlier definition.
Boundaries still, however, play a very large - and as yet,
unqualified - part in object identification up to this time. As a
result, any sequence involving close spatial interaction between two
objects will lead an infant restricted to these lower level rules into
difficulties. While recognising the object as being featurally the
same before and after any spatial interaction, the infant working with
Level 2 rules will find the spatial interaction itself totally
mysterious and will fail to understand that one and only one object is
involved throiighout. According to the identity hypothesis then,
Stages HI, IV and V, while they may differ in terms of search
strategies, do not in fact reflect any real change in conceptual
competence. Given this, there is no reason why the later stages of
object concept behaviour should not all be achieved simultaneously,
provided the type of information necessary to produce Rule 3 is
introduced at the appropriate time, i.e subsequent but close to
acquisition of the Level 2 rule (Experiments 1 and 5)•
Each change in level means that the infant can maintain the
identity of an object over increasingly complex event sequences. Each
new identity rule reduces the population of 'objects' with which the
infant must deal and therefore represents a considerable cognitive
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achievement. jn many ways, the evolution of the conceptual
rules which the identity hypothesis forwards could be seen as
paralleling the growth in the baby's own ability to interact
directly with his world. There is evidence, for example, that
young infants, even when able to reach for and manipulate objects,
at first have great difficulty in dealing with two objects
simultaneously (Bruner, 1973)- Experience of spatial interactions
between objects will often therefore depend on the intervention of
some third party. This, coupled with the fact that objects which
do not move or interact in any case far outnumber animate objects in
any baby's environment,means that rules which focus only on the
usual place of an object and ignore spatial interactions will be
eminently well adapted to both the infant's circumstances and to his
capabilities. With development, the infant will obviously become
more able to investigate the rules of spatial interaction for himself
and from such self-initiated activity, it is suggested, the final and
most successful identity rule will eventually onerge.
The identity hypothesis is basically then a hypothesis about
development of the understanding of spatial relations. At some
level or another, spatial relations are assumed to pose problems to
the young infant throughout the first two years of life. In terms of
(2li) The development of the identity rules proposed by the identity
hypothesis fits well with the organisational principles assumed by
computer modellers to be central to any valid model of cognitive
development:
1. the principle of redundancy elimination
2. the principle of local search for regularities (Klahr, 1976).
We are at present ourselves investigating the possibility of modelling
this segment of development, using a production systems approach.
- 239 -
the standard object permanence tasks, the spatial problem seems to
be one of understanding the spatial relations which may exist
between any two objects without doing violence to the unique identity
of either. Achievement of this understanding does not, however, mark
the end of development of spatial understanding. The infant may
still have problems in understanding spatial relations in the wider
sense in which that term is used, in the sense, that is, of the
interrelations between positions in space. This is a problem which
will obviously become particularly acute when the infant begins to
crawl or walk since almost any locomotor activity will change the
spatial relationship between the infant and the objects around him.
Spatial localisation theories of object concept errors
There have recently been a number of attempts to explain object
concept errors themselves in terms of problems of spatial
localisation, a possibility which Piaget himself considered some 30
years ago (see p 88). Such theorists would deny that the infant's
problem in object permanence tasks is one of understanding object
identity or of understanding that two or more objects cai share the
same space. According to their analyses, the infant's problem is one
of co-ordinating or coding the spatial position of objects,
particularly of objects which change position, a viewpoint which has
led to most of the research being concentrated on the Stage IV error.
Experiment 1 would suggest that any adequate theory must be capable of
extension to the entire sequence of development and it is difficult to
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imagine how this type of explanation could possibly account for
earlier or later object permanence errors. Nonetheless, the onus
is still on the identity theory to prove that it has a better and
more valid explanation of all stages of object concept development.
These theories are in any case attracting a great deal of attention
and should therefore be considered at this point. Three main
investigations will be discussed: those of Butterworth, Bremner &
Bryant and Lucas & Uzgiris.
Butterworth (1975, 1976) concentrated his attention on the
Stage IV - V error, talcing it as given that this error must stem
from a misunderstanding of space but suggesting that this need not
imply that permanence or identity problems accompany this
misunderstanding. He performed a series of experiments which led
him to the conclusion that the AAB error results from a lack of
co-ordination between two simultaneously present ways of coding
space, one egocentric, the other allocentric. Both of these codes
were assumed to operate in an equiprobable fashion in the 8-11
month old and could therefore account for the characteristic pattern
of divided search found during this period.
This hypothesis has already been discussed (see pl^O).
Butterworth elaborated his position in a later paper (Butterworth,
1977). There he suggested that the problem of co-ordinating spatial
frameworks could be reduced to one of acquiring skill, skill to both
locate an object and direct action (i.e remove the occluder) within
a single and stable perceived frame of reference. Prior to this it
is assumed that object and occluder are coded separately and
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differently, i.e one egocentrically and one allocentrically. In
an MB situation, the two codes would of course coincide on A
trials and so there will be no difficulty. On the B trials,
however, these two codes will no longer coincide and the egocentric
(2£)
coding of the object will need updating, a process which
Butterworth believes to require accessing a representation of space,
a facility not presumed to be present at this stage. On the basis
of work by Lee Sc Aronson (l9?U), and his own experiments with Hicks
(1977), Butterworth suggested that postural development would lead
the child increasingly to rely on external frames of reference,
giving up his egocentric coding of space for one that would remain
invariant with movement. The AAB error would thus drop out, 'the
first step in the transition to a represented space'.
Interesting though such a theory may be, it nonetheless is
highly speculative. While most of Butterworth's data is not
inconsistent with such a theory, none of his experiments could claim
to provide any real proof for it. In many ways, in fact, the theory
seems an overexplanation of behaviours which could equally well be
explained in far simpler ways, requiring far fewer assumptions.
There is in addition some experimental evidence - some of it
Butterworth's own - which would be very difficult to reconcile with
such an analysis. Take, for example, evidence of the presence of
qualitatively and quantitatively similar errors in AAB situations
(2f?) On Butterworth's theory, it seems essential to assume that the
object rather than the occluder will be coded egocentrically, an
assumption which seems difficult to justify.
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which use transparent cups (Neilson, 1977, Butterworth, 1977)*
Such findings surely undermine any updating theory of the AAB error,
particularly one which denies that there is any identity confusion
in such a situation. If the object is perfectly visible
throughout the sequence and the cups are only 8" apart, it seems
somewhat implausible to maintain that the infant is being led into
error by an out-of-date egocentric coding of object position - some
more basic miscomprehension must be present. Runs of errors on
repeated B trials further undermine any updating theory - as does
Butterworth1s own finding that errors still appeared when no
occluding object was involvedjin a task in which the object was
visible and uncovered on all trials (see also Experiment 5)- In
the latter case no detour behaviour was required since there were no
occluders; surely then there is little reason to assume that two
coding systems would be put into operation. The identity hypothesis
would of course predict that visible uncovered objects could well
present the infant with problems - if they were in a spatial
relationship which resulted in violation of their boundaries, as they
were in Butterworfch1s study. Before considering the identity
analysis further however, we should also look at the work of Bremner
& Bryant who hold a very similar theoretical position to Butterworth
and who also have focused on the AAB error as a means of exploring
spatial understanding in infancy.
One experiment has already been considered (p 93). In that
study an attempt was made to distinguish between place and response
perseveration in the AAB task by using the strategy of moving the
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baby to the opposite side of the table between A and B trials
(Bremner & Bryant, 1977). It has already been suggested that any
attempt to make an absolute distinction between place and response
behaviour requires making the assumption that the infant understands
and codes space in the way adults do, by reference to seme stable
visual framework, one which will remain constant in the face of
movements by objects or observer. This does not seem to be a
legitimate assumption. Acredelo (1978), in a very elegant
experiment, demonstrated that infants under 11 months of age make
absolutely no use whatsoever of visual information as to position.
This finding was confirmed by Bremner & Bryant's own experiment;
although one side of the table was white and the other black, nine
month old infants still tended to respond to the side which was the
same in egocentric terms, ignoring both movement and' the highly
distinctive visual clues to the correct location of the object.
Bremner & Bryant, however, believed their results to be 'a striking
vindication of Piaget's suggestion that ... perseveration is of
responses rather than to places'.
Later papers by Bremner (1978a, 1978b) are more guarded in
their interpretation of the results from that experiment and see
the strategy of moving baby or table only as a means of separating
allocentric and egocentric coding of space. In a study which was
otherwise identical to the original study, Bremner found that the
introduction of heightened visual clues to object position could
eliminate egocentric errors after movement. If, instead of using
different colours for each side of the table, the two hiding
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positions were identified by different coloured cloths, infants
seemed able to overcome their egocentric tendencies and succeeded
in relocating the object, whichever side it was hidden on (Bremner,
1978a).
In Bremner's second study, certain important - and I believe
necessary - alterations were made to the procedure used in the earlier
experiments (Bremner, 1978b). It was, for example, acknowledged that
it would be more informative to hide the object and then move the baby
than to do a series of A trials after which the baby was moved and the
object then hidden in either the same or a new position (allocentrically
defined), a procedure which must surely encourage inattention and
automatic responding. Bremner himself confirmed this suspicion. He
found that infants who were given £ A trials before movement were more
than twice as likely to err on the movement trial than infants who had
no prior experience of finding the object. Bremner also made basic
apparatus improvements in this study, changes which were also, I feel,
essential if it was hoped to interpret the infants' responses in terms
of spatial understanding. In. the first two studies, the baby was
lifted out of a chair, bodily carried around the table and deposited
in another chair. The object was then hidden and, after a delay, the
baby and chair were moved into position for search. 18 seconds
elapsed between trials. The number of things other than spatial
understanding or the lack of it which could have influenced responses
in such a situation is surely large; an AAB situation with movement is
a complex enough experimental paradigm without disruptions between
trials adding to the confusion. With these modifications to procedure.
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Bremner confirmed that use of different covers improved
performance and also found that changes in position due to
movement of the infant were easier than those arising from object
movement.
On the basis of these experiments, Bremner & Bryant put forward
a theory of the development of spatial understanding which is very
similar to that of Butterworth in certain respects. According to
their theory, early coding of spatial locations is typically
egocentric, although, in exceptional circumstances, it is believed
that this may be overriden and replaced by truly allocentric
responding. With development, the infant is seen as relying more
and more on external frames of reference and a true understanding of
space and spatial interrelations emerges.
Such a theory of the development of spatial understanding is
attractively simple and seems to have commonsense merit. None of
the Bremner & Bryant studies, however, produce any actual evidence
to support it. All of their studies used only one age group of
infants, nine month olds. There is therefore absolutely no evidence
for any developmental theory - although the particular theory they
put forward is not in fact one which I would in general dispute.
Nor, it could be added, is there any real evidence for their other
claim - the coexistence of two spatial coding systems in nine month
olds. Only one condition produced allocentric responding, the
condition in which the infant moved and object position was identified
by use of distinctively coloured cloths. No baby performed in more
than one condition in any of the experiments while in the first two
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studies, each baby was given only one set of trials. Again,
their results, like Butterworth's, are not inconsistent with their
claims but there is no actual evidence to support them.
What would the identity hypothesis have to say about the
behaviours found by Bremner & Bryant and Butterworth? The
identity hypothesis can also be reduced to a hypothesis about
spatial understanding and certainly would not deny that the nine
month old has considerable problems in understanding space. It
would not maintain, however, that the AAB error stems from an
inability to co-ordinate spatial information as to position of an
object which has moved, as would Bremner & Bryant and Butterworth.
The spatial problem of the nine month old is seen as being at a
far more basic level. Objects are defined in very basic spatial
terms, terms which give especial emphasis to the integrity of
boundaries. As a result, the infant fails to understand that an
object can still retain its identity while sharing space in common
with another object, an identity confusion which leads to errors in
object permanence tasks. On this analysis, success on the AAB
task, focus of so much experimental interest, is in fact directed
by exactly the same level of conceptual understanding underlying
success on the Stage III - IV task (see Table 6.1). Improvement
in performance between Stages III and V is due only to an
improvement in the rules of search the infant applies; experience
has modified his earlier rules to take into account the last seen
position of the object, thereby producing 'success'. No truly
significant conceptual advance has been made, however, nor will be
until solution of the Stage V - VI task.
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It could be argued that the Stage IV infant's rule of search
does in fact include some reference to position: 'to find an
object which has mysteriously disappeared, remove the object which
has replaced it'. I would like to suggest, however, that this
part of the rule would normally be very secondary in importance.
It will only be needed (and used) when the main rule is ambiguous,
as, for example, when two identical occluding objects are in the
visual field. Then, any definition of identity might fall back on
position, with position being defined in rather imprecise egocentric
terms (e.g 'to find an object which has mysteriously disappeared,
remove the object which has replaced it, the one on my left' - a rule
which would of course lead to error in an MB situation). The point
is that the infant's problem is still at this stage very much one of
object-object relations and not one of interrelating positions in
space. During this period the infant undoubtedly has a very
restricted understanding of such interrelations. It is suggested,
however, that in the standard object permanence situations this is
not what produces the characteristic errors.
Bearing the above in mind, virtually all of Bremner's results
can easily be fitted into the identity framework. As mentioned,
Bremner found evidence which he believed showed that the nine month
old's definition of the position of a hidden object need not be
egocentric. If visual clues were made more salient (by using
different covers rather than different colours for each side of table
top), infants were significantly more successful in recovering the
object even when after movement it was in a new egocentric position.
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Bremner assumes from this that the infant is using the cover cue to
identify a position in space. What would be the alternative
identity explanation? The identity hypothesis would not deny that
use can be made of visual referents. The Stage IV rule of search
specifically mention such referents. These referents are, however,
primarily concerned with the occluding object and only secondarily,
if at all, with its position in space. Obviously then,differences
in the occluding objects would aid solution to the AAB task, just as
Bremner found. Using different covers does not necessarily mean
that allocentric clues are being heightened, as Bremner seems to
assume (an assumption apparently also made by Harris, 1977)j the
infant may code this information simply as, for example, 'under the
grey cover', a coding which says nothing about absolute position in
space and yet will lead to success. Support for this interpretation
comes from Bremner's finding that switching the covers between A and
B trials in an otherwise standard situation (i.e without movement)
improved performance (Bremner, 1978a). Such a result confirms the
importance of the cover itself in determining response and surely
detracts from any spatial localisation hypothesis.
One finding of Bremner's does embarrass the identity hypothesis,
his finding that the use of different covers made no difference to
errors in a standard AAB task. The identity hypothesis would be
forced to predict that such a modification would improve performance.
Butterworth, fortunately, has found exactly the opposite (Butterworth,
1978). Such diametrically opposed results point to the difficulties
of investigating spatial coding in AAB-type situations. The Stage
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IV - V task is best reserved for investigation of object
understanding and even then may provide misleading information as
to underlying competence.
Further supporting evidence that the spatial problem in the
Stage IV - V task is indeed primitive in nature comes from work by
Lucas & Uzgiris (1977)- They discovered that the presence of a
marker screen at the original position of an object which had been
invisibly displaced led to an increase in errors in 8 - 9 month old
infants. (The object stood in front of a marker screen, another
screen moved over, picking up the object and invisibly displacing it
to a new location, leaving the marker screen sitting in its original
position). They found, however, that if the object was placed
slightly to the side of the marker screen (such that 'the boundaries
of the object and the marker screen were clearly distinguishable and
the relation of separation between them was pronounced'), these
difficulties disappeared.
Lucas & Uzgiris interpreted this as evidence of a lack of
precision in spatial localisation: in the first case, they assume
that the infant locates the object in the region of the marker screen
and, not appreciating the invisible displacement, looks for the
object in the last place it was seen. Separation of the object from
the screen removes this topological association and. enhances the
chances of looking behind the correct screen (since the original
position of the object - no longer defined in relation to the marker -
is obviously empty). Such a result could equally well, however,
point to the importance of the integrity of boundaries to success in
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any search task. If the infant does not initially identify the
object as a separate and obtainable object (since it has no clearly
defined boundaries), he is hardly likely to search for it when it
is invisibly displaced (see Experiment Ij.). To move to
explanations in terms of spatial codings of position seems
unnecessarily complicated, the exact same criticism as was levelled
at the theories of Butterworth and Bremner & Bryant. The simpler
identity explanation seems able to cover all of the above findings
and unlike its competitors does not require any elaborate (and
therefore potentially ambiguous) task to produce evidence of the
supposed difficulty - placing an object on a platform will suffice.
Understanding spatial relations between self and object
Denying that the AAB task reveals anything about the infant's
ability or inability to understand the interrelations of positions
in space does not of course add anything to our understanding of
that particular aspect of development. On the basis of the
experiments reported in previous chapters, it would not seem
unreasonable, however, to suggest that any such understanding could
not possibly emerge in search tasks such as those used by Bremner
until some point after acquisition of understanding of the spatial
relations which are possible between any two objects which do not
move. Not until the infant has some reasonable grasp of the
relationship between object and occluder will he be able to begin to
fathom the complexities of the spatial relations arising between
himself and other objects in any search task involving movement.
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The theorists discussed above would obviously disagree with
this suggestion. Butterworth in particular would seem to suggest
that egocentric responding is a defining characteristic of Stage IV;
thereafter the position of all hidden objects is presumably coded
allocentrically. At this point in time there is no empirical
evidence to support or refute such a claim. Although Bremner's
final experiment avoided the pitfalls of examining spatial
understanding within the AAB paradigm, neither his nor the other
studies investigated the problem developmentally. There is
therefore at present no data on the developmental course of spatial




Two main groups of subjects were run, one cross-sectional, one
longitudinal. The cross-sectional group consisted of 85 infants
between 12 and 2k months of age. The longitudinal group consisted of
2k infants seen fortnightly from 12 months of age. Testing of this
group reverted to monthly after two consecutive sessions in which the
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infant was successful on all given trials and terminated at 2h
months. A third group consisting of llj. infants from Experiment 5
(the longitudinal tracking and reaching study) was also run. This
group were brought into the laboratory at monthly intervals from 8 -
12 months and fortnightly thereafter until criterion performance was
achieved. Testing of this group was terminated at 20 months.
APPARATUS
The apparatus consisted of a circular table-top, 28" in
diameter, painted matt white and mounted on a heavy revolving base.
A standard baby chair was attached to this in such a way that it
could be independently rotated around the outside of the table
(Figure 6.1).
Fig. 6.1
Apparatus used in Expt. 6
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Standard blue paper cups were used to hide the object. The cups
were placed 12" apart and 6" in from the edge of the table.
Various objects were used, according to the preference shown by the
particular baby. Where possible, one object was used throughout
the entire testing sequence. All objects were of similar size and
all were brightly coloured.
PROCEDURE
The baby was securely strapped into the chair and familiarised
with the fact that both he and the table could be made to move.
The procedure was explained to the mother who was asked to avoid
giving the infant any clues to the location of the object. The
baby's attention was drawn to the object which was then hidden under
one of the cups. Table, baby or both were then moved. Table
movements were performed as inconspicuously as possible by E, who
remained in the same position throughout. Movements of the baby
were performed by the mother who also restrained the baby from
reaching for any of the cups prior to completion of any movement
sequence. The infant was then allowed to search for the toy. In
the event of an incorrect response, the infant was given time (and
encouragement) to correct his mistake. If he did not, E drew his
attention to the appropriate cup and uncovered the hidden object.
Two series of presentations were given, the first involving
two cups, the second three. Order of presentation in the 2 cup
series was fixed except for these few babies who found movement
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round the table at first disturbing. Two trials of each
presentation were given, one on the left and one on the right.
Order of side of hiding was randomised within each presentation, as
was the direction in which the table or infant turned. In the 3
cup series the 12 trials were presented in random order.
In the case of younger babies, it was sometimes impossible to
get through both series in one session. Cross-sectional babies
were brought back within the same week to complete the
presentations; longitudinal babies were not brought back unless
they had failed to complete all of the first series. On completion
or termination of the movement trials, infants in the third
experimental group (Experiment 3 infants) were also presented with
six trials of the Stage V - VI object concept task at the end of
each session.
2 cup series























Baby and table move
simultaneously in same Same
direction to new position
2 CUP SERIES
- 2^6 -
Presentations 2, 3 and 5 involve changes in the egocentric position
of the object between time of hiding and time of search; if, for
example, the object was initially on the baby's left, it would be
on his right after movement. If the young infant codes space
absolutely (i.e with reference only to himself), relocating the
object should prove to be more difficult on these trials than in
presentations 1 and i|.
3 cup series
The 3 cup series consisted of 12 presentations, given in random
order. In 6 trials the infant was moved round the table; in the
other six, the infant remained in the same position and the table
was turned (Figure 6.3)-
Fig. 6.3
BABY MOVES / OBJECT STATIONARY
Egocentric starting Egocentric finishing












OBJECT MOVES / BABY STATIONARY
Egocentric starting Egocentric finishing








From Figure 6.3 it can be seen that all 12 trials in the 3 cup




Presentation 1 was used to assess whether the infants were still
making Stage IV errors. Not surprisingly, since the tracking group
were already known to be in Stage V (see Experiment 5) and the other
groups were 12 months of age at onset of testing, no infant made any
errobs on this presentation in any session.
Responses to presentations 2, 3 and 5 were scored as being
either geographic or egocentric. In all three presentations, a
geographic response represented successful relocation of the object
after movement; looking for the object in its original egocentric
position after movement would lead the infant into making an error.
In the case of presentation h, both a geographic and an egocentric
coding of object position would lead to a successful response;
incorrect responses in this situation were therefore classified as
1 other'.
Graphs 6.1a - 6.3a (see over) show the proportion of geographic,
egocentric and 'other' responses found at monthly intervals in all
three groups. Incorrect 'other' responses in presentation It suggest
that the baby believes that something changes when he or the object
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Graphs 6.1a — 6.3a Geographic v. Egocentric responding in the
2 cup series (uncorrected)
Cross sectional
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moves. They also suggest, however, that his correct responses
in presentations 2, 3 and 5 need not necessarily imply use of
geographic information as to position; any rule of thumb for
changing response after movanent could lead to the same response,
thereby artificially inflating the number of 'correct1 responses in
these presentations (which do not after all allow for any clear
'other' response). Since a fair number of 'other' responses did
in fact occur, it was felt that these should therefore be applied
as a correction factor to the proportion of successful responses
found in the other three presentations.
Graphs 6.1b - 6.3b (see over) show the proportion of
geographic and egocentric responses for the three groups when corrected
for this factor. In addition, the range and mean age of success (2
weeks all correct) in the 2 cup series in each group is set out in
Table 6.1.
TABLE 6.1 Range and mean age of success in 2 cup series in
the 3 experimental groups
Range
(in months) Mean S.D.
Cross-sectional lS>i - 23 n/a n/a
Longitudinal 12-g- - 21 15-27 2.08
Tracking 11 -16 13-98 1.6l
From the corrected graphs, it can be seen that in the beginning
egocentric responding is higher than geographic responding in all















































egocentric errors by late into the second half of the second year.
All of these infants were, however, in at least Stage V of the
object concept and should not, according to Butterworth, still have
been making such errors.
The fairly steep decline in egocentric errors in the
longitudinal group suggests that experience in this sort of task can
accelerate development considerably, with the mean age of success in
this group equalling the age of the youngest successful baby in the
cross-sectional group. That experience accelerates development is
confirmed by the results of the tracking group. Mean age of success
was even younger in this group, a fact which may or may not be
related to the fact that this group were already vastly accelerated
in object concept development, a phase of development which I would
like to argue must be virtually complete before any headway can be
made in understanding the wider world of spatial relations. At 12
months, the rate of egocentric responding in this group was only half
that of the longitudinal group. This could merely be the result of
experience in this particular task; the error rate of the
longitudinal group also fell dramatically within U presentations of
the onset of testing. It is interesting to note, however, that
when first sessions are compared, the tracking group in fact performed
better than the longitudinal group, despite being It months younger.
3 cup series
The three cup series has a built-in advantage over the 2 cup
series. Each trial allows for geographic, egocentric and 'other'
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responding; there is therefore no need to introduce any
correction factor.
Graphs 6.l;a - 6.he (see over) show the proportion of
geographic, egocentric and 'other' responses in the 3 cup
presentations for all three groups. With the exception of the
tracking group, it can be seen that egocentric and 'other' responses,
taken together,virtually equal geographic responding at 12 months.
Thereafter the picture is one of a general decline in both egocentric
and 'other' responses and a rise in geographic responding.
The tracking group again seemed to have a distinct advantage in
the early months of testing. Their performance at 8 months was
quite noticeably superior to the performance of the longitudinal
group at 12 months. Since this represents the first session of
testing on these tasks, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
acceleration through the sequence of object concept development
facilitates spatial understanding in the wider sense.
Table 6.2 shows the range and mean age of success in the 3 cup
series in all three groups.
TABLE 6.2 Range and mean age of success in 3 cup series in
the 3 experimental groups
Range
(in months) Mean S.D.
Cross-sectional 17 - 2k+ n/a n/a
Longitudinal llj-i - 19 16.U8 l.li5
Tracking 12f - 15-30 1.77
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The three cup series was obviously more difficult than the 2 cup
series. In the cross-sectiona.1 group, some infants were still
making a substantial number of errors at 2h months of age. In
the longitudinal group, only 3 out of 18 infants could pass the 3
cup series before success in the 2 cup series. In the tracking
group, only one infant did so. Success in the 3 cup series does,
however, appear to follow rapidly on success in the 2 cup series;
lb out of 18 infants in the longitudinal group, for example, passed
the 3 cup series within one month of success in the 2 cup series.
Since the principle underlying success in the two tasks is the same,
this is not perhaps surprising.
It is, of course, always possible that the claim that
successful infants must have understood the spatial relations
involved in these search tasks is invalid. It could be argued that
the successful infant merely kept his eye on the correct cup
throughout the period of movement. Observation during testing
suggested that this was not the case. Few infants kept track of
the object throughout its movement and frequently those infants who
actually did follow it to the point at which it came to rest would
still go on to choose the wrong cup. In order to ensure, however,
that this was not the reason for the infants' success, b 20-month old
infants of varying levels of competence in the 3 cup series were
brought back to the laboratory. After the object had been hidden, a
screen was positioned between the 3 cups in such a way that it
prevented the infants from being able to keep their eyes on the
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correct cup. All h infants still produced exactly the same
pattern of responses •, none seemed perturbed by the introduction of
the screen. From this, it seems that success in these tasks is
truly a cognitive rather than a perceptual achievement.
DISCUSSION
It would seem from the results of Experiment 6 that the spatial
relations which arise between infants and objects provide them with
considerable problems of understanding throughout the second year of
life. This should not surprise us. Previous chapters have
laboured the point that infants have enormous difficulty in
understanding the spatial relations between objects. Since the
self is, after all, only one object in a space common to many other
objects and holds no special spatial privileges, it seems obvious
that even very simple self-object relations would present
difficulties to the young infant.
We have already mentioned some evidence that would lead us to
suspect this to be true, the fact that young infants are quite unable
to make use of tactual clues to object location in a Stage III - IV
task (p 103). Amazingly, even if the.infant's own hand is the sole
occluder used in the hiding task, he still seems unable to understand
the spatial relations involved. Take, for example, the situation in
which an object is placed in the infant's hand and his hand then
closed over it. The 5-6 month old infant will act as if the object
no longer exists, looking surprised if it later falls from his hand
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into view again (Brown, 1973)* Spatial relations between self
and object are obviously as mysterious as object-object relations
at this stage. It is hardly surprising then that search tasks
involving changes in the spatial relations between self and object
are even more difficult.
Acceptance of evidence of such difficulties does not, however,
necessitate accepting the Piagetian viewpoint that there is no
knowledge of the self in early infancy (see p 26 )• As we have
already seen, a variety of behaviours suggest that the self-world
dichotomy is present very early on, as early in fact as present-day-
research techniques have allowed us to look for it. ' Reaching,
defensive responses to approaching objects, imitation - all of these
behaviours testify to a very early knowledge of the spatially
distinct existence of self from objects. There seems no need, as
Piagetians would maintain, for any lengthy period of construction of
this knowledge. It could perhaps even be directly given. At a
simple biochemical level, it is certainly true that from the outset
a distinction is made between self and non-self. There also seems
no reason to disbelieve that this distinction, as in adults, is made
at the level of sensation and perception, with exteroception and
interoception being clearly separated in experience, a separation
which after all seems to have structural parallels in the organisation
of the brain (Rosar, 1978). Maintaining the opposite is surely more
difficult. It may indeed well be the case that knowledge of the self
goes even further than mere knowledge of its separate and independent
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spatial existence. A fairly large body of evidence on visual-
motor co-ordinations in early infancy suggests in addition the
presence of a highly co-ordinated body image (see e.g Meltzoff &
Moore, 1977)- Knowledge of the differentiated and co-ordinated
existence of the self by no means implies knowledge or understanding
of the spatial relations which continually arise between self and
objects, however, and it is here that the infant's problem seems to
arise.
Although Piaget believed there to be no knowledge of the self
in early infancy, he did not neglect the problem of spatial
understanding in infancy. He believed that construction of an
understanding of space was intimately related to the development
of understanding of the separate existence of self from objects.
Since all organisation of understanding is in terms of personal
action schemas, egocentrism is inevitable on Piaget's account of
the development of spatial understanding.
"A very young infant has little or no conception
of space or movements. When he does begin to form
a concept of space, it is at first centred on his
own body and on the location of successful actions".
(Piaget, 1997)
According to Piaget's model, however, egocentrism should be over on
completion of the development of the object concept. The results
of Experiment 6 suggest that this is not the case. The tracking
group continued to make egocentric errors in later testing sessions,
despite the fact that they were no longer making any errors in the
Stage V - VI transition test (see Appendix C). This finding
obviously does not embarrass the identity hypothesis. It would
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maintain that little headway in reducing egocentric errors could
in fact be hoped to be made until some point after the infant can
appreciate the nature of object-object relations, a process which
is not complete until Stage VI.
One last point is perhaps worth discussing very briefly, the
finding that the young infant tends to make spatial judgements on
the basis of absolute (egocentric) referents. Evidence of such
absolutism fits well with what we know of his behaviour in other
areas. Between 12 - 2h months, for example, an infant will also
find it difficult to form a seriated tower of cups (Greenfield,
Nelson & Salzman, 1972). To do so, he would have to assess the
size of the cups in relation to each other, not himself. To do
the latter is well within his capabilities; he can after all adjust
his hand accurately to pick up any of the cups. Until, however, he
stops using his own body as the absolute referent for size, he will
be unable to form a tower, succeeding only in forming inappropriate
pairs of cups. This absolutism of the infant's early perception
and understanding of the world around him has also been demonstrated
in studies of drinking behaviour and response to objects of varying
weights (Bruner, 1968, Bower & Wishart, 1976, Mounoud & Bower, 197h).
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IN CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined the development in infancy of the
object concept. A series of six interlinked experiments were
presented. These attempted to demonstrate that the problem for
the infant in standard object concept tasks lies in maintaining
the identity of the object over the spatio-temporal transformations
it undergoes in such tasks and not, as traditionally viewed, in
understanding the permanence of that object when no longer in view.
According to the identity hypothesis, the problem for the infant at
all stages of development of the object concept is one of spatial
understanding; this is a problem for the infant regardless of
whether the object in question goes out of sight or not.
While other theorists have argued that problems of spatial
understanding are linked to performance in object concept tasks,
most have assumed at least some understanding of the spatial
relations involved in the hiding task to be presented; none, for
example, would predict that an 'on' relationship between two objects
would pose problems or that 'inside' should prove difficult if the
object is in fact visible. It would seem from the experiments
presented above, however, that all but. the most basic facts about
objects and space must be learned. In addition, it would seem that
achievement of Stage VI does not mark the culmination of the
development of spatial understanding in infancy, as other theories
would seem obliged to maintain. Even when in Stage VI, the infant
still appears to have considerable problems in understanding the
- 270 -
complex spatial relations which arise in any situation in which
he or the objects around him move. He must realise that he
himself holds no privileged position as a spatial referent before
he can hope to develop some flexible yet stable spatial referencing
system; only then will he be able to succeed in the most complex
of object search tasks.
All of the above represents a fairly radical departure from
the traditional Piagetian analysis of this segment of development.
It is also incompatible with the intersensory co-ordination, memory,
motor and action theories of object concept development which were
considered in previous chapters. It is to be hoped that the evidence
presented in this thesis makes such disagreement seem reasonable.
In conclusion, however, it should be pointed out that this thesis
agrees wholeheartedly with Piaget on two important points: firstly,
that there is indeed throughout infancy a problem in understanding
the nature of objects and secondly, that this understanding is of
great significance to later intellectual development. (Some
evidence in support of this second point is presented in Appendix C).
The latter point makes it especially important that we establish
beyond doubt the causes and nature of the development of the object
concept in the normal infant. Only then might we reasonably hope
to intervene effectively in situations where that development might
not otherwise be expected to take its normal course. This surely
should be one of the major aims of this type of research.
(i)
APPENDIX A : DESIGN OF TRACKING STUDY (Experiment 5)
CONDITION
IrSimple tracking 2:Platform 3:Screen 4:Tunnel
<~ 10-23 weeks -> <" 24-28 week
L starting week (age 12 weeks)
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(iii)
APPENDIX C : THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OBJECT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
AND LATER INTELLIGENCE
Infants from Experiment 5 - the longitudinal tracking and
reaching study - were brought back to the laboratory at age three and
administered the L-M scale of the Stanford-Binet intelligence test.
The Stanford-Binet test was chosen for various reasons: its high
reliability, its good mix of performance and verbal items and the fact
that it is generally easy to interest children of this age in its test
material. It should be noted, however, that previous studies have
generally failed to find any significant correlation between
performance on infant tests and later intelligence (see e.g review by
Goodenough, 195U). This is most probably due to the high motor
content of the infant development scales typically used in such
studies. Evidence is gathering, however, that Piagetian-based infant
tests may have better predictive value than the more traditional tests,
with object permanence tests in particular being shown to correlate
significantly with later levels of development (Birns & Golden, 1970,
Wachs, 1975).
It would have been interesting to have been able to test the
intelligence of these children on a, Piagetian-based intelligence test.
Unfortunately, no easily administered or well-validated Piagetian-
based intelligence test currently exists, a rather surprising fact in
view of the attention Piagetian theory has attracted. Pinard &
Laurendeau have for some time been working on the construction of just
such a test but the present version takes, I believe, a total of
(iv)
around ten hours to administer and, because of the clinical nature
of the testing procedure, requires a very sophisticated tester if
the results are to have any reliability and meaning. Although the
new British Intelligence Scale includes Piagetian items, these are
for supplementary use only and are not used in calculating I.Q.
SUBJECTS
Experimental group: 18 out of the original 2h infants who
participated in Experiment 5 were relocated. Nine of these had also
participated in the follow-on study of Neilson (1977 - see p2!£> ).
None of the subjects had, however, been to the laboratory in the
preceding 18 months. It was therefore unlikely that there would have
been any effect of familiarity with either experimenter or
surroundings in favour of the experimental group. Mean age of the
experimental group on testing was 3 years 0.9 months.
Control group: The control group consisted of 18 children out of our
subject pool, matched with the experimental group for age, sex, birth
order and number in family. Performance of ihe experimental group
could have been evaluated simply by direct reference to test norms.
Performance on the Stanford-Binet has, however, significantly improved
in recent years and norms at younger age levels in particular are now
suspect (Garfinkel & Thorndike, 1976); direct comparison with test
norms might therefore have resulted in an inflated estimate of the
experimental group's performance. Use of a control group served a
(v)
second purpose. As has already been pointed out, our mothers are
all volunteers; they are therefore self-selected and tend towards
the middle class and better educated end of the population. It
would not be surprising to find that the average I.Q. of any group
of subjects drawn from such a pool was above the population norm,
irrespective of experimental treatment. Use of a control group
from within this pool therefore avoids the possibility of mistaking
the effects of the socio-economic bias of the sample for true
experimental effects.
PROCEDURE
All but one of the children were tested with the mother present.
Testing procedure was strictly adhered to although order of
presentation of some items was occasionally altered, a variation
considered by the test designers to be permissible in this age group
and one indeed which proved to be essential if interest and good
motivation were to be maintained in certain subjects. Testing was
sometimes spread over two sessions. This was partly due to the
unexpectedly wide age range of items which had to be presented before
a fail point was reached (from. 2.6 to 9 years in one case) and partly
due to the fact that higher age Stanford-Binet items are predominantly
verbal; many children were considerably less tolerant of such items
and quickly lost interest.
(vi)
RESULTS
Stanford-Binet scores for the experimental and control groups
are laid out in-Table A. A Wilcoxen matched pairs signed ranks
test revealed significant differences to exist between the
performances of the two groups (T = 33, p < .01).
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(viii)
The experimental group, it will be remembered, consisted of
two groups of infants, one of whom (N = 9) had continued in the
experiment of Neilson (1977) while the other was seen only once a
month and given no further training in tracking. Examination of
Table A suggested that there were differences between the two halves
of the experimental group in favour, surprisingly, of those who had
been trained for the shorter period of time (12 - 28 weeks versus
12 - 1|2 weeks). A Mann-Whitney U test on performance scores of
these two groups confirmed this difference (U = 18.5, p <( .05) while
a further test confirmed that this was not due to differences in the
two halves of the control group (U = 3l|.5, NS). Separate
experimental-control comparisons were made for the Wishart-only and
Wishart-Neilson groups •, while differences significant at the .005
Wi tCOXCO
level were found for the former (T = -l)>no significant difference
in performance was found between the Wishart-Neilson group and their
control group (T = ill, NS). That is, if the experimental group
was broken into the two treatment groups, it could be seen that the
superior performance of the experimental group as a whole was due to
the performance of the Wishart-only group. The Wishart-Neilson
group performed no differently from a control group who had received
no training whatsoever.
Before launching into possible explanations of these results it
would be wise to sound a cautionary note. Significant differences
were found between the experimental group as a whole and the control
group. These differences were, however, found to be wholly due to
the superior performance of those subjects who had received medium as
(ix)
opposed to extensive amounts of training. For this experimental
group, I.Q. performance was indeed significantly superior (p <.005).
We should be most wary, however, of drawing any strong conclusions on
the basis of such a reduced sample, no matter how significant the
differences found. In addition, if we want to conclude that a
certain amount of training on object permanence tasks at an early
point in development enhances later intelligence, we might have
expected there to be seme relationship between, say, age of achieving
Stage VI and I.Q. in the Wishart-only group. Although both
Experiment 1 and Experiment 5 show that early training accelerates
appearance of the later stages of object permanence behaviour and the
above results demonstrate to some extent that infants given medium
amounts of early training perform better on I.Q. tests than control
infants, no direct correlation between the age of achieving Stage VI
and I.Q. performance was in fact found ( rs (VI.SB) = .21; NS).
There are possible statistical reasons, however, for this. Stage VI
tasks were only being presented monthly to the Wishart-only group.
In comparison to the exactness of measurement of Stanford-Binet
performance, age of achievement of Stage VI was only very grossly
measured; many tied ages entered the computation, thereby reducing
the possibility of uncovering any correlation between age of achieving
Stage VI and I.Q.
In spite of the lack of correlation between object permanence
performance and I.Q., certain facts still need explaining. Mean age
of achievement of Stage VI in the Wishart-only group was, for example,
very low - 10.9 months as compared to 12.months in the Wishart-
(x)
Neilson group, 13-9 months in the control group of Experiment 1 and
Piaget's estimates of 18 - 2h months. Mean I.Q. of the experimental
group as a whole was 138.72 while that of the control group was only
129.72, a difference of 9 points. In the case of the Wishart-only
group, this difference widened to nearly 13 points. Even in the
Wishart-Neilson group a difference of 5> points was found which,
although insignificant, was still a positive difference.
How then are we to explain this pattern of results? Why should
the group with less training in tasks which seem to bear some
relation to later intelligence perform better than those with more
training? Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to
consider this question in any great depth, it should be pointed out
that these results fit well with the recent theory of development put
forward by Bower (1976). Bower, in contrast to most accounts of
development, has proposed that development goes from abstract to
specific•, that is, that the infant's understanding of the world
around him proceeds from conceptions which are initially abstract to
descriptions which are highly specific - and not vice-versa. Any
such abstract-* specific progression has important consequences when we
consider any situation in which it is hoped that training on one task
will promote transfer to another conceptually-related task. If an
infant is overtrained on the first task, his descriptions of that task
will move away from abstract descriptions to highly specific
descriptions, descriptions which specify precisely both stimulus and
response. The conceptual relationship between transfer and training
task will therefore become obscured and 'spontaneous' transfer will be
(xi)
less easy to achieve. In the case of the Wishart-Neilson group,
this would mean less rapid acceleration of the later stages of
object concept development. If we maintain that object concept
development is intimately related to later intellectual development,
it would then be possible that just such a process could explain
the I.Q. differences found between the Wishart-only and the Wishart-
Neilson groups.
Any attempt to evaluate Bower's theory in the context of this
thesis suffers certain limitations, however. Take, for example,
object concept performance in the two groups. All the infants,
although only 28 weeks of age, were already in Stage V when
transferred to the Neilson study. This leaves only the Stage V -
VI task for comparison. Perhaps on the Bower theory we might
expect the continued training provided by Neilson to have an
inhibitory effect on acquisition of Stage VI. A comparison was
made between age of achievement of Stage VI in the Wishart-only
group and Wishart-Neilson group. Mean age for the Wishart-only
group was 10.9 months while mean age of success in the Wishart-
Neilscn group was 12.U months, a fairly large difference but one
which was significant at only the .10 level (Randomisation test
t = 1.55). Such a comparison is in any case suspect for two reasons.
Firstly, testing was performed by different experimenters. Although
objective criteria for success were identical (6/6 correct on
consecutive sessions), personal criteria for what can or cannot
legitimately be considered a trial can vary greatly between
experimenters. More importantly, the Wishart-Neilson group were not
(xii)
tested on Stage V - VI tasks until they had shown conclusive
evidence of passing the Stage IV - V task (2 consecutive sessions
all correct). This seems to have been an unnecessary precaution
since all infants had already proved themselves to be in Stage V on
entering the Neilson study. Attentional problems (hardly surprising
in a group who had been presented with the same problems for many
weeks) made criterion performance on the Stage IV - V task difficult
to obtain, with the result that age of achievement of Stage VI was
likely to have been inflated in this group, a fact confirmed by
Neilson's finding that many infants passed Stage VI within the first
few weeks of its presentation.
Neilson also trained a group of naive infants from 28 - h2 weeks.
Comparison of object permanence behaviour found little or no
difference between the groups by the end of the experiment, the naive
group, if anything, being slightly superior on object concept tasks.
I brought back nine of these infants for Stanford-Binet testing (see
Table A). There was no significant difference in intelligence between
this group and the Wishart-Neilson group (U = h6, NS) who, it will be
remembered, had shown no advantage over a completely untrained control
group. This constellation of results suggests very much that training,
to be effectual both in the short and long term, must be of a certain
amount and will only be efficient if given at the appropriate time.
Both amount and timing of training require to be more extensively
studied if we are to understand this interaction.
One further note of caution should be sounded. The long term
effects of object permanence training on later intelligence could have
nothing to do with any relationship between object understanding and
(xiii)
the development of intelligence. It could equally well be
possible that weekly attendance at the laboratory heightens a
mother's perception of her baby's abilities and increases her
motivation to promote his development, a process with long term
returns. Allowing that our group of mothers is in all
probability highly motivated (and skilled) in the first place,
It is still a possibility which cannot be ignored.
In order to examine this possibility, a group of infants who
had taken part in another longitudinal study (infants from
Experiment 6) were brought in for Stanford-Binet testing. These
infants (N = 9) averaged Ij. years ij. months on testing. Difference
in mean age between this and the original Wishart-only group was
not considered to be important since I.Q. scores by their very
nature take this into account. These infants had been involved in
approximately the same number of visits to the laboratory, spread
over the same amount of time as the group from Experiment 5; none
had been to the laboratory in the preceding 18 months. A Mann
Whitney U test on both sets of scores (see Table B) proved to be
Insignificant (U = Ul.5). Such a finding may indeed weaken the
implications of the earlier results although it should be pointed
out that this thesis argues that the skills promoted in Experiment
6 are in themselves intimately related to object concept
development. Additionally, it should be mentioned that any
argument that the differences found stem from the effects of
visiting the laboratory on the mother rather than the baby cannot
(xiv)
explain the differences found between the Wishart-only and
Wishart-Neilson group; on that hypothesis, the performance of
the latter group should at least have equalled that of the
Wishart group and might even have been expected to exceed it.
This was not the case.
TABLE B : Stanford-Binet performance of Wishart-only group and
2nd Wishart control group
SUBJECT WISHART-ONLY 2nd WISHART
GROUP ' CONTROL GROUP
1 11*5 136





7 171 ( + ) 11*1*
8 130 118
9 138 171 (+)
Mean ll*l*.00 (S.D. 11.1*3) 11*2.66 (S.D. 16.33)
Obviously, further studies are required to separate out these
alternative explanations more satisfactorily.
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Stagesinhdevelopmentfobjecc nc pt THOMASG.RBOWER J.G.PATERSON UniversityofEdinburgh
Abstract Therearproblemsindiscussingtopics clthdevelo m ntfjncept, sincethemeasur sus doass st tufobj ctco ceptchangedr tically duringtheallegedperioofdeve opment,ndco c pti s lfo snotev lop
inanycontinuousfashion.Aaccelerationexperime tperf r dtdi overwh th r ornotinterventionatep intfthhyp the calrocesseff cdevelopm tla r points.Theresultsarositive,sugge tingt aterei ,ind dobjecc nc pt developsoveran18-m thperiod.Aun xp ctedr sultfthstu ywafind ngt developmentisiscontinuousa dtage-like,r th rthac ntinu s. Thedevelopmentftmatureobj cc nc pisgen rallyreckonedb mostsignificanttepsintellectu ldevelopme tfa cy.(P agdI h ld r,1969) Themainoutlinesft ssegm ntdevelopwereinitiallyscr bedbyPia tv r thirtyyearsago(Piaget,1954).Subs quentwo kh sme lymplifiedndexten hisdescriptionw thoutmateriallyhangingi(Bower,Broug tandM ore1971; Bower,1971;EscalionandC rman969).Inllfthatimv li itye problemhasneverbe nqu stio ed.Nonev rskf rvide cethatri objectconcepthatdevelops.T iisnandquestion,br th rspe ificinst ce ofaproblemthatbedevilslfdevelopmentalpsychology.Td l pm nt objectconceptspansthperiodfr mbirtha ou18mont s.Tresp nsesu toindexhelev lfconcepthangedrasticallysperiod;eymovements, heartrate,ope ntrespons s,vergraspingloc motormov mentellbeu d togaugehesta fconceptat ainment.Ts imulusprese tationsu deli i theseindicatorbe aviorsl och ngemark dly,fromsimplovementfbject fairlyelaborateversionsof'findthel dy'.Whatjustificationdwhavs yi g thatthesevariousS-Rsitu tionrllma kersforunitaryco cep ?Tak Cognition1(I),pp.47-55
specificexample,howc nweyth tst gedevelop entatndsaroundfiv monthswitheabilityr ckvisibleobj ctfoll wingiwhenmoves,h rev r
itmoves,regardlessofwherthasm dnhpa t,st ppingh nto(Bow r eta/.,(1971);BowerndPaterson,inpress),sthanc toroft tagedev lop¬ mentthaendsn arlyaylatwitheinfa tbleofio j cthidd n location,regardlessofwhereih spreviouslybe nidd n?Tprobl msp t c larly acuteheresincthold rinfantappar ntlyre ats,fo m llev lft mistakesadandovercomebytheyoungerinf ts. Thetec niquesus dbyembryologistsaofint resiconnec ion,although theyareobviouslynotdirec lyappli able.Wcannotstainbe v rswt in acell,usingthpre enceofstam keanifestdes enda tsrig nal cell.Noranwedestroybehaviorasmightltidentifd s e dan s bytheirabsenceindevelopedorganism.How v r,cs ekaccel ratth appearanceofbehavior.Ift eacc l rationsu c edsine ingppea ncen behavior,andls-withoutfurtherinte ve tionappearanceofla i r, wemightitsomeju t ccon ludethabe aviorni usallynnectedite¬ haviortw ,subjectofcoursemanybvi usq alif catio .Thfirstexperimentb reportedherwasdir cteonlyast blishingthpresenceb flong- rm causalonnectionbetweenthr esubstagesidevelopme tfj conc pt, withlongtermaccelerationeff ctsscrit r af causatio . Twoofthereephas sbe aviorundinvestigati nrri lyallu d above.Thefirstphasconc rnstdevel pme tfccura evi u lt a kingo j c s, andtermi atesbetweenfourivonthfg .Thsecondphasconcern developmentfaccurate,vis llyguid dsearchfohiddeobjec s,ndterminates betweenninea dtwelvmo thsofg .Thc aracteristicsdevelopme t visualtrackinginear ynf nchaveb endescrib dlsewhere(Bo r,1971).B i fly theinfantsof12-20we ksgedisplayocharacteri tice rotr ckingask . Whentrackingmoviobjectatsuddenlyt ps,hesinf ntswillcontinue trackalonghepathonwhicbj ctasmovi ,ign rvisiblest t o ary object.Thiserrormaybdescribedatresultfnin ilitd nt fov ng objectwithitselfh nstationary.Thcompl mentaryerrorresulti gfran¬ abilitytoidentifstationaryobjectwithitselfhnmot on,h slsbe nd ¬ onstrated,althoughwithsomew atmo ec pl xexperim nt.Ifinf n sf12-14 weeksarepresentedithobj ctthamovfr mlac12ndbac againcyclically,stoppinginbothplaces,thenle rtr kbj tnd forthbetweentht oplac s.Terr rd sc ib daboveoccursinitiallyutr p t, sothateinfantsimplytr ckobj ctfrpl cea e.I ,howev r, movestanewplaceg ingfroml13,hinf ntswilllo krbject inplace2,thelwh r yhaveusuallyse nobj ct,ignori gfullvi ibl
objectatplace3.Thinf n swillt nlookf robjectfamiliarpla e,igno ing
asitmovestnewplace.Bothfth seerrorsdeclinzerofrequ ncyfoccur e ce bytheageof23we ksincross-sectionalsamples. Thesecondphaseofdevelopmentstudi dh rwastransitionfrst ge4 stage5ofthebj ctconcept.Wh nchildi stage4hretr veobj ctt t hasbeeniddenunderclothori contai er.H w ver,fallow dtr r evehb¬ jectfromneplace,A,moreth nochildwillsearchfthobj ttaft r seeingithidd natB,d ff r tplace.Inst ge5thchildo socommitt rror, andcanfinobjectth th sse nidden,regar lessfindtp stistory hidingsandfin i .Itsnoteworthythateerrocha cteristicfst ge4per¬ sistenceofsear hfabje ttpl cwh rthobjecth sbe nfou dfo e, ignoringthenewplacewh rtobj cthasjustbes eidd .Anlev lf descriptionatl st,thierr rseemsidenticaloeesc bedabovecharact r¬ isticoftherackingbe avioryouinf nts;ylof robj ctwhereth e seenitbefore,ign ri gthplacwh robj cthasjustes emov.T formalsimilaritybetweentheseaviorsouldmarguega n tcausalon¬ nectionbetweeth m,sincei smprobabletamrr rshou dhav overcometwi eatdifferentim sinhevelopm ntfsa econc pt,whilt r isadequateprecedentforthsameproblemsh vi gbov rco etwindev l¬ opmentfdifferenbehaviors(Bernstein,1967). Thet irdphaseofbehaviorinvestigatedw sransit nfr mt g5 6ofthebj ctconcept.Istage5infanm keserrornbxplain ds inabilitytotrackvisibledisplacementsfno jec .Thwass si wasdevisedindependentlybyAronsonaMcGonigle.*Thchilpr nt dith twocupsorlothundernfhichayisp ac dhattuig .Tstage- 5childhasnoproblemifind ngthobjectund rsuchcircumstances,mattwhat thesequ nceofhidingsi .If,owev r,ocuprlotharransposedat cuporlothontainingthebj ctisplacetw scc piedbyth r andviceersa,thstage-5chilw llpi kuprongup.Transpositioidon infullviewofthchildwhonon thelessa saktra spositionntccount inchoosingwhichuptpickup. 1.Subjects Sixty-sixinfantsservedubjects.Th ywered vid dtonexperim ntal controlgroup,matchedfobiro d rsex,a dparentaccupati n. *Pers.comm.
2.Procedure Thetrackingtas(BowerndPa er on,op. it.)w sfoll w .Thobjecttbrack d wasa10cm.diameterbulls ye,paintedinday-glopi k,wh tndor n .Itmou ¬ tedattheenofarm30cm.inle gth,drivbysw pgeneratora .24cy l sp sec,throughanrcof180°.T einf nts tonmet rfromthd spl y.Objectpo itio wasmonitoredbyaT.V.c eramountedbehindt einfantH danymovements weremonito edbyaT.V.c ramount dbehindt edispl y.Toutpufthw cameraswascombinedandfedintVTR,providingsimultaneousr c rfosub¬ sequentanalysisofbjectp itiona dheanyposition. Theobj ctwassetinm tionbef rethinfantwasbroug ti .Thepresentation 'began'whenthinfantfirstlookedtthd spl y.Fr mthipoint,tw ymov me cycleswerpres nted.Thlascycleandrandomthreoth rincorpo atedstop whichtheobje tstopp dmovingfortensec ds.S psw realwaysmadeinthcen¬ tral90°ofthearc.Recordswers edforequ ncyftracki gnllt i ls.Beh vior onthestoptrialswscoredfothefollowingfeatu es. 1.Didtheinfantstopanf x tthestoppeobjec ? 2.Ifyes,forh wlong? 3.Ifno,didtheinfantcontinuetrackhetraje toryoft b ct? 4.Ifnotoboth1and3,didtheinf t( )returntst rti gpoofmovem t,r (b)lookaway? 5.Ifyesto1,didthinfanttheaft rttimgivi2,( )con inuetrackhe trajectoryofthbject,r(b)lo kbacts artingpoint(c)lo kaway? Recordsweres orebytwobserve s. Theexperim ntalgroupwasgiv nw klyexposu ethtrackingsfrom12 weeksuntil16we ks.Thcontrolgroupwasivaequi lenumb roflab rat y visitsthatdidnoinvolvetrackingthentesteotrack gt16weeks. Afterthisestnofurth rtrackingexperimentsw rcarriedout.Ho ev r,allth infantswerebroughtiteim sparticipatei experimentsonr chi gbefo eth object-permancncetes i gwasbegunandrepeatedw kly.Iaori i llyintend d toc ntinuetheobje t-permane cetes i gunt lalofthinfantsh dre ch dst g6. Howeverfinancialconsiderationsfor edutstopbeforhip twreached. Theobject-permanencetes i gwasalwaysbegunwitsimpls g4test.An objectwasc veredbyacl thinviewofthinfant.Ifi fsucceededio t i ing theobj ct,tstag4-5transitionte t gwasbegun.Tclo hswereplacedoth table,ndheobj cthiddenundero fthem,A.ft rretri valanreco ryfrom theinfant,twasag ihiddeunderths mcloth,A.fterre ri valare o ery fromtheinfant,washiddeunderthot rcl th,B.Aftert is,newcl thae toywereintroduc d,andthpr cedurerepeat d.Af reachABs quentoysa d
clothswerehanged.Tsidc senathAvariedran omlyfromtri lbl k trialblock.S xAABsequenceswereuthr ugh.Whchildreachedc iter o ofsixerrorlessBtria ,hst ge5-6te tings quencw sbegu .Onachw ek thereaftereinfantw sgivenonAABri l,asdescrib dbov ,b f rt sti g properbegan.Thet sti gprocedurew sasfollows.cl thwerpla donth table.Ano jectwasplacedund roc oth,iththb yw tching.T ep sitio s ofthewoclothserentransposed.Sixt ialsw rgiv .Testi gdiscont nued aftertwosessionsithouterrors. 3.Results TheresultsarsummarizedinTabl1.Ac nbseeth r ,acc l ratedg o p maintaineda deveincr sedtle dov rthwholeexperiment.I lbs eth thateresultsasp sentedrhyb idofmea res,withnumbefer ora particularageusedinonpl e,a dgfttainm ntfze oerrorsusedelsewhe . Table1.DevelopmentfSt gesothObjectConcepiExperim ntalandContr l GroupsfInfants AcceleratedControl Probabilityferrorsintracking0
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Wehadoriginallyintendedtreatoursultsitermsfroratpa tic l rg only.However,thdevelopm ntalchangesinrrorwersuchth tam asurofth t sortw uldbenecessarilymi leading.Thuofsu has ma ydepe dsoth assumptionthatperfor anceimprovescontinuouslyfromze oco rectres di gt zeroerrors.Inthcoursefexperimentibecameobviouth tsuchaassump¬ tionwouldbeentirelyrroneousinthiscontext.Fig.1showstperf rmancofe infantthewe ksupoandincludingthlasterrorithst ge5-6tra sitione t. Thisprofilewan tunchar cter ticoalltheinf tsa dcert nlydo snosugge t anycontinuousde l eierrors.Thed stribut onofr orsfoa lftheinf ntst lastdayonwhichthemadeerrorintst ge4-5transiti ne tish wnTable2, whichalsogivesthexpecteddistributiononthassump ionfrandomrespon ing.
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Table2.Expect dandObt i edDistributionsofr orslasterrort ialSt g transitione t Nerrorsf expectedf obtained 601 556 41314 31814 21312 157 chi-square=2.09,.90>p.75
Ascanbes enth rediffere cebetw nthodistributionsn tsig ificant. Table3showsexpectedandobserveddi tributionsfr rhl trortrial Table3.Expect danObtainedDis ributionsofE rorl sterrorialStageV-I transitiontest Nerrorsfexpectedobtained 613 531 476 3912 276 I32 chi-square—6.9,.25>p10
thestage5-6transitionest,fort oseinf ntshatreach dst ge6.Thdifferencei againnotsi nificant. 4.Discussion Theresultsdescribedabovesupportthhypoth ist arianobj ctc ncept developingfrombirthonwardsanth tfaci it toryint rventi no epo tllspe d developmentatlaterpoints.However,resul slikthi luno hingle scan deviseaplau ibletheoryolinkvariousstag .Thatbey ndtc pacitiesf thepresentwrit rs.How ver,illoutlinesomfthq stionssuchat ry wouldhavetanswer,ans mefthan rst eo ymightcomepwit . Thet eorywouldhavebabledescribetinfant'sco c ptfnbj ct eachstageofdev lopment.Thisinosucheasyt sknemig tsuppose,ce therearappar ntcircularitiesndeve salithoursefdev l pm nt.F rex¬ ample,thereisevidencthat12-week-oldinfa tx c sthast tionaryobjectwill remaininplaceafterh sb ecover dyscr n(B wer,1971).Th ri vid ce that12-week-oldinf ntxpectsaobjectthamovesb hindscre nre m rge frombehindt escr en.Byaround20we kst seob t finfo ationarcoo ¬ dinated.Whyth no se24-we k-oldfa t,pr sentedwithobjectcoverb aclothorup,ctsiftheobj ctwasnolo g ro tainable?Thehypoth sist ti resultsfromlackfmotorskill(Bower,1967)hab endi proved(Y nas,ers.c mm). Bower(1967)sugg stedcoveringobj ctsithtranspar ntcov rs;ifmo orkillhi ¬ deredsuccesswithopaquecovers,ishouldeq allyw lhind rsucce sitht anspa ent
j-tatiui.iujyj.jowerunaj.<xaierson covers.Yonafoundth tiswasns ;infa thoersuccessfulithtransparent coverswerenotsucc ssfulithopaqucov rs.Perh pthanswerliitobject concept,orperhapsitliesnthec nce tfav .Cer ainlytcoversus dt24 weekstoelicitmanualsear hardiff r ntsstimulfrothscr nsu edt12w ks
toelicitvisualanticipation. Asimilarproblemaris sw ththelatterstageoflo kingbeh vioandm nual search.Byaround20w eksthav rageinf ntilllookfobj ctwh reh s seenitmove,ignori gthplacewherhasbeenaccustomedtsi .W yhdo theinfantsomem nthslatersearchfoaobj tw rh sbeaccusto dtf d it,gnoringtheplacewh rheasjusts entobj tdd n.Ithierrresult ofconceptualdevel pmentroesitr presentla ktransf rinformationfr m theeye-mov mentcontrols stethhand-movem ntcontrolsyst ?Therisom evidencefavoringthl tterinterpretatioanunpubl shedstudybyHcinow k (pers.comm.)whofoundthatinfa tw estag5sfath irh ndmove¬ mentsw reconce n derstillintage4whrequiredtcr wlahidd nobje t. Thatistoy,eyw uldcrawltpl cew erthhadbeenac ustomedofind theobj ct,ratherthanpl ceyhadseiidden.Ifwhatarobs rvinghe islackoftransferinformationbetweemo rc tr lsystems,thenin t problemforatheoryfdevelopmentt bj ctconcept.Thisex lanation,how¬ ever,runsintodiffic lti swi htheexperimentdesc ib dher ,sincia dto howmotorskillcouldtransferbetweenm torsyst msdiverat sohy andthehand. Theset enarsomfdescriptivproblemst atmu tbolv df rtheory ofthedevelopm nttobjectc nc panvb gic ns d rthpr cess st producethedevelopment.
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Abstract Piagetfound(hainfantstf rsyearoflifwillotr movecl thoup thateyhavese ncov rt y.P rtfhdifficultyimotorskillpr blem.H w¬ ever,deficitsinmo oskillarenotsufficienttacc ufothfailurei s tuation. Wecannotassumethao tfightimindf rchinf sth ywill reachouttoobtainanjectthh sb em detgoutfsightywitchingo f theroomlights,leavingt eb byntaldarkn s. Piaget(1954)foundthatfo epresentssix-eightmo holdinfw attractivetoyh tist encover dwithclorupbef ehinfantang asp it,theinfantwillmakenottemptoremovehobstacleget y.This observationhasbe nint rpretedhowingth tsuchinfa tst i katobj ct thatisnolo gervisiblelo gerexists;oufghti ,ll gedly,fmin thisstageofdevelopment.O h rinvestiga ors,bycont a t,vef u dtinfa ts oftwentyweeksorlesdos emtbeli vehatobjec stautfsighttill existinaloc lizablepl ce.Thus,13ow r,BroughlonandM ore(1971)f nthat infantsoftwentyw eksereabltoanticipatehr appe rancefnobje tt t hadmovedoutfsightbehinscr en.Mundy-Castlea dAnglin(1970)f ndth t evenyoungerinfa tsw rebltdohia di dditiontllowthinvis blepath ofthebjectwhileitasoufsight,ev nwht atp hwascomplex(Fig.1) Theseexperimentswouldthusse mhowthatfightinoufindf r infantsoftwentyw eksormore. ThestandardinterpretationofPi get'scl ssicobservationscontr di tion withthemorerecentobs rvationsdes ibedabove.Bow r(1967)argu dt at contradictionw smoreappa e ttheal.Bow rl(1971)dMundy-Castle andAnglin(1970)usedeyemovementsasindicatorbehavi rstomakemanifest
Figure1.Mundy-CostleandA glinsethapparats ownhere.Th yfou d that,afterobjectdisappearsinonwi dow,priorti sreappearance intheother,infantsf16weekillinterpolateaeye-movemen trajectorycorrespondingthinvisiblep thofthebject. /\-baby theinfants'k owledgeboutobjects.Pi g t,byc ntra ,usedha dmovem nts, manualse rchbehavior,asnindicator.Manu ls archbehaviorifarmo e complextaskforninf tthasvisualse rchbehavior.Contr lftha d developsmuchlat rthancontrolfteyes.Bow(1967)thuargu dt t apparentcontradictionbetweenPiagndthotherau o sci edw ss m ly matterofexperimentalmethod:ThinfantsthPiagetianm nualse rcsitu ti n knewthateoywasund rthcupb ttdidnknowhotremovhec p togetatthobject. Bowerpresenteddatainsupportfthihypothe isgat redianinformalex¬ perimentinwhich5-6montholdinfantswerepresenteditt yhw scover , beforetheycouldreachi ,withatransparentcup.Sinnobj ctu dertrans¬ parentcupisfullyvisibleatheim ,failurw thicouldnotbepdo nt outfsighmeaningoutfind.Failurewithtr nspar ntc pouldonlyre lt fromlackfmanualskil ,ndtheamelacofmanualskillcouldexplaifai ure withanopaquecup,withouttherebysuggestingt tinfan sdidn tknotha anobiectthevhadseenhiddund rcupw sund rtc p.
Theresultsgatheredfromw atasnex r melyunsystematicexp ri nt favoredthhypoth sist at5-6monthldinfantilstandardPiaget ntes becausetheylackmotorskillpicup;tinfantfailedw thbottr ns¬ parentandopaquecups.Thd tawg th redveryunsyst ma ically,inde wasnotrep rtedasnexperimen .Yo(p rs.comm.)ndGr tcheco .) haveperformedm rsystematicreplications,findingtho positer sult,ain¬ fantswhoiledithopaquecupoulremovetrans rentcups.Si chres t
isimportantf rtheoriesfhdevelopm nteobj ctc nc pt,ts emedworth¬ whileperformingtheexperimentithmorcont olfconditi nsthanhabe employedbeforinanyofthesstudies.Tfirstexperim ntwast sys matic replicationofthebserv tionsor edbyBow r(1967). Althoughatfirstsighttherewouldembewmeth dolo icalprobl msin¬ volvedintestingwhe herrotaninfaknowsthersobj cundercup,is firstimpre sionwouldbverymisleading.Obj cermanenceexp rim tsadon undersomewhatrelaxedconditionswi hahe vyemphasisor p ortbet en subjectandexperimenter.Givthneeforr po t,itess tialhav ry precisedefinitionsofwhatconst tutesapassingresponserfa l gresponse.Th merefactthachildfinis esupwithtobj ctash ddeniand notascorablepieceofinformation.Thfoll wi gconsiderati nsmustbee inminddevizingcriteriafoapasslrespo senbjectper n nce situation.Firstofallim sbecert nthesubjecanp ckpnobjectfr m aforcplanesurfac .Itheb byannotpickpobje ttl,theili tlpoi t incheckingw therorotthsubjectanpickpano cludergeta oth object.Ifthsubjectcanpickpanj t,heitfoll wst thcapicku occludingbject,providethccluderisn tt olarge.Howe rpi kingupan occludingbjectisnotthameingaspi kingupoc ludinbjecti rd r togetatnobjecthah dbeeidd nunder eathccluder,aitst latteractionthatweishoc nsidercrit rialintsituat n.Piaghcer ai ly neverdeniedthatinfantswhoothavobj cpermanencecaneverth less pickupobjects.Thsp ialc aracteristicfickingano cluderinthbje permanencesituationith teoccludernopi kedupf rwsabi removedtoallowheinfantg tttobjechh sbeocc uded.Itisi abilitytoc njoiifctionsra herhamerabil tpickupo lud rt t Bower(1967)thoughtwaslackinginnfanthof iledesta dardbj ct permanencetest.Thprobl misusdecidwhetherainf nthopickup occluderispi kingtupf rtswnakinrdergetatthbjectnsi theoccluder.Tcriterionwasasfollow .Priortbeginni gfobj ctpe ¬ manencetestinghinf tsw rpres tedi hoypl cedtabicpbe r whichtheysat.Timefrompresentationupsucc ssfulcapturefobj
wasrecorded;thisimein erv lwillbreferredtoasfrcaptut m .Iwa determinedthatifainfar movednocclud ranthpi keuptobj ct thathadbeenundertoccluder,withthimfromremov lft eoccl d rt pickinguptheobj ctlessthantinfant'freeca turtim ,hi two ldb recordedash vingpickedupthocclud rtg tobject,asuccessfulrespon . Pickingupanoc luderwithoutgettingthobjectthadbeenoccl d drn y gettingitafternintervallon rthafrcap urtimw sscoredasfa lure. Subjects 16twenty-oneeekoldinfa tss rv dassubjects,8mal ,fem l . Procedure Subjectssaapl inbrowwoodeta l ,facingthexperimenter.Astyliz d manikin4.0cmhigh,paintedday-gloi ,by1.5cindiameterw sus dsto . Previousworkhadfoundth sbdesirableenought y.Thetran p r toccl der wasaplasticcup6mhighby3cindiameter,wittrans issiontof.7, sothatanobjectwithinicouldbecl rlyseew ilthcupitselfw scl ar y visible.Theopaquoccluderw saitpla ticcup6mhighby3indiameter, thatw sperfectlyopaque. Theinfantswerepresent diththoy,pl c dwithire c ,andth irfre capturetimerecord d.After15secon sthoyw stakwayfrothbaby. Initsoriginallocationwasplacednftheoccluders,t paq e8babies,th transparentotheremaind r.Fcaptutimwasrecorded.Theoc lu rw thentakeawayndoyreplacedinsoriginallocat o .Beforthbabcould takehoygaint eopaqucclud rw splac doverthy.Tbabyw sthen giventhreeminut soremovt occlud rbefortrialw sterminated.Ah endoftherialtoccluderwasremover vealingthobjectw i htinfantas allowedtpickupndretainfor15seconds.Atheenft isimyw removedandplac dintso iginalloc ti n,th simebe gov r dytrans¬ parentoccluder.Trialduratiow sag inth eminutes,s vtifainf th d ahandontheccluderte fthreminut shw sgivfurt rt ominut s tocompletehisresponse.Attheendfip ri d,iftnfa thadtoy,was takenway,replacedndrecov rbythopaquec lud r,withtri ldu ation equaltohatgivenwithtransparentocclud r.Iftheinfantdidnhavt y attheendoftransparentoccludert i l,heoc lud rwasremov ,at infantallowedtakendretainheoyf r15secon sbef rthseco dop qu occludertrialw sbegun.
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Discussion
Itthusseemst ato fsighinoecessarilyoutfmind,n teventhap rf themindthatcontrolsha dmovem nts,pr idedthransitiooufsighi accomplishedbyplungingthero mintdarkness.Ocouldinf rfromthist outfsightinotmindthestandarestsituati nither,tdifficult sof themotortasksimplyu mingwithdifficultiescreat dbythfaatobjec is nolongervisible.Onthoth rhand,s oulbewarfequatinglthecha es instimulationthatresultd sappear nceofbject.Thpsychophysicsfdi ¬ appearanceh sbeenstudied(Michott ,1962;Bow r,7;Gib onta!.,1969) anditsclearthatomedisappear ncsequ cesresultinperceptionofthcon¬ tinuedexist nceofthbjectathadisappe r dwhilothe sh vjusthoppos t result,thevanishedobjectse mingtnolong rexi ta ywher .Iipossiblth t disappearanceundercupolothid sappearancetransform tionfthlatt r sort,foinfantsf5-9mo th .M recarefulpsychophysicalw killberequir d todecideheissu . REFERENCES Bower,T.GR(1967)hedevelopmentf objectperman n e:Sostudi sf existencecon a y.Per ept.sy- chophys.,2(9),411-418. Bower,T.GR.,roughton,JMand Moore,.K(1971)Developmentf theobj ctc nc pasmanife t din changesintherackingbehaviorof infantsbetween7a d20we ksofg , J.exper.ChildPsychol ,1182- 93. Gibson,3.J ,Kapla ,A.,Reynolds,H andWheeler,K.(1969)Tc ange fromvisibletinvisible:Astudyfopticaltransitions.Percept.Psycho- phys.,5,113-116. Michotle,A.(1962)Causaliteperm nencet rcalitephenomcnales,I-ouvai ,Publica¬ tionsUniversitairesBelgium. Mundy-Castle,A.C ,andnglin,J.(1970) Thedevelopmentflookinginnfancy. PaperreadtSoci tyf rResearchin ChildDevelopment,SantaMo ica, California,April1970. Piaget,J.(1954)Theconstructionfre l ty inthechild,NewYork,BasicBooks.
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